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Abstract 
This study examined the commonalities and the differences between creativity and the 
schizophrenia spectrum. The variables measured as potential commonalities and differences were 
creativity, schizotypy, cognitive inhibition, spatial ability, balancing skills, positive and negative 
presence, absorption, mystical experiences, childhood abuse, and neuroticism. Three community groups 
were recruited, consisting of 31 artists, 10 people with schizophrenia, and 31 comparisons matched for 
gender and age with the artists. A larger student group consisting of 102 students was also recruited in 
order to examine the correlations among the same variables within a larger, more normative, group. 
The largest commonality between the artist and the schizophrenic groups, who represented the 
extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum, was the propensity to mystical experiences. The greatest 
differences between the artist and the schizophrenic groups were that the artists were higher in creativity, 
performed better on spatial abilities, had better balance, had more positive states of presence, and were 
lower in neuroticism than the schizophrenic group. In the student group, creativity was correlated with 
spatial ability, positive presence, absorption, and mystical experiences. In addition, creativity was 
significantly related to two facets of schizotypy, unusual experiences and impulsive nonconformity. In 
other words, students high in certain facets of schizotypy, who may share certain characteristics with 
those who have schizophrenia, are higher in creativity, but people who are on the extreme end of the 
schizophrenia spectrum, who have been diagnosed with schizophrenia, are not. 
The differences between the artist and schizophrenic groups on spatial ability, balance, sense of 
presence, and neuroticism may help to determine whether mystical experiences help to integrate creative 
work or destabilize and disorganize the sense of self. It may be that mystical experiences can be used 
more positively by the creative individuals than people with schizophrenia, in that artists and people high 
in creativity were higher in positive traits such as positive presence and lower on negative variables such 
as neuroticism, and introvertive anhedonia. 
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Introduction 
The debate over the relationship between creativity and psychopathology has taken many 
forms. One may fmd it winding its way through arguments of semantics, or at the local art 
gallery, in the history of scientific discovery, and between the lines of lyrics that touch the hearts 
of all who listen. It began to appear in literature as far back as the writings of the Greeks, where 
it was the inner daimon that was thought to communicate creative ideas to the individual, and 
subsequently induce a state of "inspired madness" (Becker, 2001). Many contemporary studies, 
both qualitative and quantitative, have shown positive correlations between creativity and various 
mental disorders, or the risk of mental disorders, yet others show no such relation.· Additional 
research has begun to tap into the personality factors and cognitive mechanisms that underlie both 
areas. The present study will examine these underlying factors more closely to determine which 
ones unite and which might separate creativity and psychopathology, more specifically in this 
study, the schizophrenia spectrum. 
The research regarding the creativity and psychopathology debate has come from many 
different theoretical and research perspectives. The variables of interest in these different 
literatures, however, often seem to have overlapping content. One literature examines the 
problem of creativity from the perspective of psychiatry. This literature looks for direct relations 
between creativity and various mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorders. It 
also looks at creativity in the relatives affected with these disorders. Another literature, based on 
personality research, focuses on the trait ofschizotypy. Researchers of this literature believe that 
schizotypy is a dimensional trait, in other words, the lower one's score, the more "normal" one is, 
while the higher one's score, the more characteristics one would have in common with those with 
schizophrenia. Those who examine the creativity versus mental illness debate from this 
perspective believe that creative people are higher in schizotypy than the average population, but 
short of actual schizophrenia. A more transpersona1Jpositive psychology literature looks at 
creativity in terms of transpersonal or mystical experience. For instance, Rank (1932) spoke of 
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artists as having the potential to use their creativity for the purposes of finding spiritual meaning 
in the face of death. Likewise, Csikszentmihalyi (2000) described flow, which is often 
experienced by artists while creating, as an intense feeling of clarity and concentration, as an 
experience in which time is often distorted, and as an intense intrinsically rewarding experience 
to the artist. These characteristics are often also described in mystical experiences (Hood, 1975). 
A final literature focuses on underlying traits that could account for both creativity and mental 
illness. Some examples of traits that could fit that role on the level of personality and cognitive 
style differences are absorption! fantasy proneness/ imaginative involvement, while a literature on 
neurocognitive processes has researched the possibly overlapping concept of attentional 
"overinclusion". The following study will attempt to unite these distinct literatures by 
encompassing integral features of each one, in order to arrive at a more holistic and fully 
contemporary perspective of the relation between creativity and mental disorders or 
characteristics of mental disorders. 
The following review of the literature will first discuss creativity in terms of its 
definition, the processes involved, its personality and cognitive correlations, and finally, its 
measurement. This will be followed by the relations found between creativity and 
psychopathology. Some personality traits that could account for both creativity and 
psychopathology will then be discussed. Since this study focuses on the relations between 
creativity and the schizophrenia spectrum, schizophrenia and schizotypy will be described. More 
specific similarities will then be discussed, namely, cognitive similarities. The literature review 
will then be concluded with some differences between creative individuals and those afflicted 
with more serious levels of the schizophrenia spectrum, such as spatial ability and sense of self 
presence. 
Overlapping Research Perspectives 
1. Creativity 
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Creativity has been defined as the ability to bring something new into existence (Barron, 
1969). The idea of bringing something new into existence could explain why creativity has often 
been seen as something magical or mystical. 
Mednick (1962) pointed out that in addition to an idea being original, it also needs to either 
meet a specific requirement, or be useful in some way. How then does one define usefulness? 
Some would say that if an idea benefits society, such that it satisfies technical, professional, 
aesthetic, or scholarly criteria, then it is useful (Cropley, 1999). However, what it is that constitutes 
a benefit to society could still be questionable. In response, Amabile (1983) proposed that 
creativity is the production of responses or works that are reliably assessed as creative by 
appropriate judges such as art critics or a specific scientific field, which, of course, could still be 
relative. 
Defmitions of creativity such as these focus on abilities of creative people or on the creative 
product itself. Other definitions, alternatively, focus on the creative process; for example, Finke 
(1990) defined creativity not as the product of a creative act, but the way one engages in creative 
exploration. He emphasized that creativity lies in the use of the things we create rather than the 
creation of the things that we use (Finke, 1990). 
Generally, those who use definitions which focus on the creative person, such as those who 
take the individual differences approach to the study of creativity, study exceptional creativity (e.g. 
Barron, 1969; Eysenck, 1995). These researchers make the assumptions that some people are 
inherently more creative than others and that there are qualitative differences between their thinking 
styles and with those who are less creative (Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999). Alternately, those who 
emphasize creative processes, such as those who take a cognitive approach to creativity research, 
often study normative creativity (e.g. Ward, Smith, & Vaid, 1997). These researchers make the 
assumption that everyone has the ability to be creative and that there are no qualitative differences 
between the processes that account for high creative achievement and those that account for 
everyday problem solving. 
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This study is examining both exceptional creativity, such as can be seen in working artists, 
and normative creativity as distributed within a student population. Exceptional creativity will be 
studied as a category defmed by one's placement in a group of visual artists, and normative 
creativity will be studied as a distribution that is present in any given normative university student 
population. Personality traits will be examined as well as cognitive processes potentially involved 
in creativity. Ultimately, creativity may be a combination of a creative person, a creative process, 
and a creative product, for it requires a creative person who is able and likely to employ a creative 
process to generate novel and useful outcomes. 
There are many different theories attempting to account for the creative process, one being 
that of breadth of association. Association, often referred to as conceptual combination, is the 
merging of concepts that were previously separate, resulting in a novel entity that is more than the 
sum of its parts (Ward et at, 1997). Mednick (1962) stressed the importance of remote, or less 
common, associations for creativity. There has been some research indicating that defocused 
attention makes remote associations more accessible (Martindale, 1977-78). In a later study by 
Martindale (1995), he explained that defocused attention results in a greater activation of nodes in a 
network, therefore widening the range of relevant concepts and increasing the chances of creativity. 
In contrast, Wertheimer (1959) advocated that creativity is a result of productive 
thinking, a type of thinking that involves productive processes such as grouping, centering, and 
reorganizing. Productive thinking involves restructuring, essentially grasping the crucial features 
of a problem and their relationship to the final solution. Restructuring works by changing the 
representation of the problem; in other words, new information is taken into consideration and a 
new perspective is taken in order to understand the problem (Runco, 2007). Wertheimer (1959) 
contrasted this type of thinking to problem solving using traditional logic and to associationism. 
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It is likely that both forming wider associations and taking a new perspective or grasping essential 
features of a problem are essential for creativity. 
Most researchers in creativity would agree that much of the creative process, including 
forming associations and restructuring, happens unconsciously. Anecdotal evidence confirms this, 
given that spontaneous insights often present themselves to the individual in the form of a dream or 
a sudden flash, the origin of which cannot be pinpointed by the artist (Blackmore, 2004). Artists 
and scientists often describe the process of working deliberately on a problem, setting it aside to do 
something else, and then having the solution to the problem come to them seemingly out of 
nowhere (Blackmore, 2004). This experience has been tied into a widely used model of creativity 
that proposes four stages: the preparation stage, in which the problem is identified and the skills 
needed to solve the problem are acquired and applied; the incubation phase, where consciousness is 
diverted away from the problem; the illumination or insight phase, in which a creative insight 
flashes into view; and, finally, the verification phase, in which the insight is subjected to evaluation 
and criticism (Wallas, 1926). 
Goswami (1996) compared these stages of the creative process to quantum theory, and 
more specifically, to chaos theory. According to Goswami (1996), chaos theory would predict that 
new creative ideas can happen only when old and more rigid patterns of associations in one's mind 
are first destroyed, thus, allowing unconscious processes to self organize as more novel 
associations. 
Psychoanalysts also believe that creative ideas come from unconscious processes (Cropley, 
1999), understanding the type of thinking that leads to creative ideas as primary-process thinking. 
Freud (1915/58) described primary-process thinking as a disinhibited and primitive system of 
thought containing unconscious conflicts and wishes, not subject to logic or oriented in reality. 
Primary-process thinking is the type of thinking exhibited in dreams, imagination, and fantasy. 
Kris (1952) extended Freud's theory by stating that artists are more able to regress to primary-
process thinking in a controlled fashion, which he called adaptive regression and contrasted with 
uncontrolled regression in psychosis. In creativity, these thoughts are then elaborated on during 
secondary, or reality oriented, thinking. 
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Some evidence for the involvement of unconscious processes in creativity has been found 
by Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006), who presented three groups of participants with a creative task. 
One group was instructed to respond immediately, one was told to give the problem conscious 
thought, and the third was distracted for a few minutes so that unconscious processes could take 
place. The results revealed that the responses of the group in the unconscious thought condition 
were more original and divergent than those of the other two groups. Of course, in order for the 
unconscious mind to come up with creative solutions, one must fIrst do the work of pondering the 
problem, as well as actually possessing the facts needed to solve the problem. 
There are some social and environmental factors that can create unconscious conflicts 
and potentially lead to creativity. For example, Simonton (1975) found that periods of revolt 
against oppressive rule tended to increase the amount of creativity in the following generations. 
Similarly, Rank (1932) believed that the contemplation of the inevitability of death is a major 
motivator of creativity. Goodman (1981) found support for this belief by interviewing artists and 
fInding that many of them have an upsurge of creativity after the death of a loved one. In 
addition, the knowledge that one could die at any time hastens the process of creativity out of fear 
that the artwork may not be completed (Goodman, 1981). Another explanation for revolt and 
death motivating creativity is perhaps that creativity happens as a result of the process of 
resolving trauma, whether it is personal or cultural. 
Otto Rank (1932) proposed an intricate theory to further describe some of the inner 
conflicts experienced more directly by creative individuals. He argued that creative individuals 
face existential concerns more directly, partly because they are not as good at denying them and 
accepting the constructed realities spoon-fed to the general population. He also described a 
constant struggle artists have with their art and how this struggle is closely coupled with their fear 
of life and death. He suggested that artists paint because they fear the ever-changing 
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unpredictability of life and the inevitability of death. He said they wanted to crystallize life in order 
to gain control over its unpredictability, and also to leave something that will outlive them in order 
to transcend death and achieve immortality. The artist, however, cannot contro11ife because a 
painting always changes from its original conception and thus, creates the unpredictability of life 
once again. Society then takes the painting, changes its meaning in order to incorporate it into its 
own ideology of immortality, and as a result, strips the artists from his or her more personal 
triumph. 
Rank also points out that by trying to achieve a personal immortality beyond that of the 
collective one, the artist becomes isolated, and often experiences guilt for placing personality above 
the collective. Furthermore, the artist needs to draw from experience in order to create, which often 
leads to sacrificing the fullness of one's living in order to create. The artist thus faces a continuous 
struggle between the will to create and the will to live a norma11ife. Finally, artists crave fame, but 
this depersonalizes them from their art, threatens their immortality by making it collective, and robs 
them of the hope ofliving a norma11ife by exerting a constant pressure to continue creating at the 
level that made them famous in the flIst place. Abra (1995) agreed with Rank by saying that artists 
are especially sensitive to the questions that trouble all of humanity such as the meaning of life and 
death. Thus creativity becomes for many a tool for fmding such meaning, reaching for the only 
type of immortality they can fmd: the immortality of their work. The contemplation of the 
inevitability of death, therefore, becomes both a drive to create and to finish one's work (Abra, 
1995). 
There has been some empirical evidence for conflict leading to greater creativity. 
Akino1a and Mendes (2008) found that placing individuals in a social rejection condition resulted 
in more creativity than placing them in a social approval or nonsocial situation. They believed 
that this followed because the negative emotions induced by the social rejection condition 
produced more introspection and self-reflection and so led to more creative ideas. They also 
found that individuals who were predisposed to negative affectivity (i.e. had lower levels of 
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dehydroepiandrosterone sulfate, also found in people suffering from depression) were even more 
affected by the social rejecting condition, producing even greater levels of creativity. This 
demonstrates a person-situation interaction between a predisposition to negative emotions and a 
negative situation producing more creativity. Not all studies, however, found such a relation. For 
example, Ayers, Beaton, and Hunt (1999) failed to find any group differences between artists and 
controls matched for absorption in either a predisposition to negative affectivity or in having 
experienced more trauma that could have led to their creativity. The present study includes a 
measure of childhood maltreatment to determine one level of trauma, namely that of early 
childhood experiences. 
Several other environmental factors that have been found to influence creativity are birth 
order, early parental loss, creative role models, and supportive environments (Eysenck, 1995). 
Motivation, sometimes considered an environmental variable (e.g. Amabile, 1983), is also 
essential for creativity. According to Amabile (1983), intrinsic motivation, which is engaging in 
a creative task for the purposes of enjoyment rather than for external rewards such as praise and 
financial gain, is an integral part of being successfully creative. Another variable that may affect 
creativity is age of the individual. Mednick (1962) reported that many great discoveries were 
made by individuals early in their careers. Mednick (1962) accounts for this by suggesting that 
people who possess the associations needed to solve problems will, over a long period of time, 
begin to develop inhibitory response habits that could actually hinder new creative ideas. 
One aspect of creativity that has been widely studied is the personality of creative people. 
Barron (1969) conducted a series of studies in which he compared creative architects with non-
creative architects and found that the creative architects were more unconventional, non-
conforming, impulsive, independent, rebellious, open, sensitive, and emotional. He noticed that 
artists, especially visual artists, showed a noticeable preference for drawings that are complex and 
asymmetrical, as opposed to ones that are simple and symmetrical. More recently, using the five 
factor model for comparison, Feist (1998) found in his meta-analysis of creativity that artists 
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differed from non artists on two of the five dimensions: conscientiousness and openness to 
experience. He found that artists were less cautious, conscientious, controlled, orderly, and reliable; 
and they were more aesthetic, curious, imaginative, open to experience, sensitive, and original. 
Dispositions of creative people seem to be stable across the lifespan (Camp, 1994), and are also 
perhaps passed down through generations. Studies have confirmed that creativity does, in fact, 
have a genetic component (Eysenck, 1995). 
Barron (1969) also reported that creative people lived more complex lives, and were more 
observant of their surroundings than their less creative colleagues. Their drive for finding purpose 
and understanding in their lives seems to be higher, as does their drive for expressing the 
transpersonal states that are thought to be repressed during socialization (Go swami, 1996). 
Similarly, Cowling (l985) imagined that the capacity to see things as unified, as happens in 
mystical experiences, would enhance the imaginative, novel, and emergent ways of thinking 
required for creativity. He found creativity to be correlated with mystical experiences in a 
normative sample (Cowling, 1985). Ayers et al. (1999) extended this research by finding that 
highly creative individuals had significantly more mystical experience, as well as archetypal-
mythological dreams, than imaginative controls. They concluded that these intense states of 
consciousness may be part of their creativeness. However, the Tellegan Absorption Scale (Tellegen 
& Atkinson, 1974) has often been found to correlate with creativity (e.g. Roche & McConkey, 
1990), and it has also been found to be correlated with the propensity to mystical experiences 
(Hood, 1975; Hunt, Dougan, Grant, & House, 2002). Therefore, this study will attempt to tease out 
whether creativity relates directly to the tendency to have mystical experiences, or whether this 
relation is mediated by absorption. 
Another individual difference variable that has been widely studied in the creativity 
literature is cognitive style, the most popular being divergent versus convergent thinking. 
Guilford (1950) was the first to make a distinction between these two thinking styles, maintaining 
that artists are higher in divergent thinking (Guilford, 1950). Eysenck, (1995) has added that 
people differ along a continuum between these two types of thinking. 
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Divergent thinking is made up of fluency (the number of ideas generated), originality (the 
uniqueness of ideas generated), and flexibility (the number of different categories implied by 
ideas generated), and has often been used as a way to measure creativity empirically (Runco, 
2007). Many, however, such as Eysenck (1995), do not believe that divergent thinking is an 
accurate measure of creativity because it does not predict creative achievement; in fact, Eysenck 
reported that divergent thinking has a normal distribution, while creative achievement has a J 
curve, meaning that only a few ever reach a great creative achievement. This signifies that 
divergent thinking may be picking up on normative rather than exceptional creativity. According 
to Mumford, Vessey, and Barrett (2008), creativity is more than simply generating a large amount 
of ideas, in that gathering information, selecting from generated ideas, and evaluating one's work 
are all essential factors of creativity that go beyond divergent thinking. Evidently, creativity 
depends on a plethora of variables that include personality and the environment. Furthermore, 
Runco (2008) speculated that divergent thinking may be an estimate of potential creativity, but 
cannot guarantee creative behaviour. Similarly, Silvia, Winterstein, and Willse (2008) 
hypothesized that divergent thinking may predict creativity in novices, but not in experts, since 
knowledge and strategies used by experts cannot be accounted for by divergent thinking. 
Besides knowledge of a field and learned strategies, Barron and Harrington (1981) found 
that intelligence itself is essential for creativity. They concluded that there is a threshold level of 
intelligence that is required for creativity to take place. According to Sternberg (2006), people 
need intelligence to see things in new ways, to recognize good ideas, and to persuade others of 
their ideas. Many of the above characteristics shared by creative people suggest that intelligence 
is necessary, but not sufficient for creativity (Dellas & Gaier, 1970). 
In this study, creativity will be measured using the Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Barron & 
Welsh, 1952). This measure was devised by determining which items out of 400 free-hand figures 
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drawn in black ink were consistently preferred, or not preferred, by artists and non-artists. It was 
found that artists consistently preferred more complex, asymmetrical, free-hand, restless and 
moving figures to simple, bilaterally symmetrical, and predictable figures (Barron & Welsh, 1952). 
Artists would often describe the figures they preferred as more "organic" as opposed to the static, 
dull, and uninteresting ones preferred by non-artists (Barron, 1953a). Welsh (1975) concluded that 
people who scored high on this test were shown to be creative in real life, and had similar 
personality characteristics to people with high creative achievements. 
There are several reasons why the Barron-Welsh Art Scale was chosen over fluency and 
divergent thinking tests, despite the fact that the latter are more commonly used (e.g. Silvia et aI., 
2008). First, it was chosen because of its emphasis on visual material. Many other tests of 
creativity use words and language, something which may not be a strong point in visual artists, such 
as those examined in this study. Many verbal tests of creativity, including divergent thinking tasks, 
tend to correlate too highly with IQ, which poses the threat that the tests may be testing intelligence 
instead of creativity (Eysenck, 1995). Divergent thinking is also thought to be highly confounded 
with fluency: the generation of many, not necessarily creative, ideas (Silvia et aI., 2008). This 
problem would particularly pertain to this study because a creative response may be 
indistinguishable to a response made by someone experiencing psychosis. A schizophrenic may 
respond to a word generation task with a word salad that could be very novel but not necessarily 
creative. Furthermore, many of the divergent thinking tasks require an expert to judge the 
responses as being creative, and although there exists training on how to score them, the 
subjectivity in raters will always be an issue (Baer, 2008). Finally, divergent tasks have been found 
to have poor predictive and construct validity (Simonton, 2003). For example, one longitudinal 
study found that divergent thinking did not predict future productivity (Kogan & Pankove, 1974). 
Silvia and his colleagues (2008) made an attempt to improve the validity of divergent 
thinking tests by constructing a new scoring method that involved the participants picking their two 
best answers after they have generated their ideas. They believed that this would eliminate the 
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confound problem between divergent thinking and fluency and also more closely replicate real life 
creativity where people must present their best work. They then attempted to find preliminary 
evidence for the construct validity of their new scoring method by finding correlations with their 
measurement of divergent thinking and various personality constructs related to the big-five traits 
that are known to correlate with creativity. They found correlations between creativity and 
openness to experience and conscientiousness with their new scoring of divergent thinking. 
However, conscientiousness is not a personality variable often found to be associated with 
creativity. Furthermore, personality itself is not equal to creativity, and therefore does not provide 
enough evidence for the construct validity of their new scoring method (Baer, 2008; Mumford, 
Vessey, & Barrett, 2008). As can be seen thus far in our discussion, personality is but one predictor 
of creativity and is not sufficient to predict creative behaviour. There is no substantive evidence, 
therefore, that the new scoring method devised by Silvia et al. (2008) is a more valid measure of 
creativity. 
The Barron-Welsh Art Scale does not necessarily address all of the problems encountered 
in the measurement of creativity, but it does potentially fix a few. The measure has been found to 
be uncorrelated with intelligence (Welsh, 1975); however, it does correlate somewhat with fluency 
(Eysenck, 1995). It does not ask of the participant to generate anything, so there is no danger that 
non-useful answers will be scored as creative. Some validity has been found for this measure; more 
specifically, more creative individuals obtain higher scores than less creative individuals (Hall & 
MacKinnon, 1969). It has also been shown to correlate with personality variables that have been 
found to be characteristic of creative people, such as independence, openness, wide interests, 
intuitiveness, flexibility, and rejection of external constraints (Welsh, 1975). Likewise, it has been 
found to have good reliability (Welsh, 1975). The ultimate reason, however, that the Barron-Welsh 
Art Scale has been chosen is because the present study follows up much of the approach of Eysenck 
(1995), and he found this measure to be the most valid in his own research. 
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The measurement of creativity has suffered from the fact that these different measures of 
creativity do not often correlate highly with each other, and there does not seem to be a measure of 
creativity that perfectly predicts real life achievement (Eysenck, 1995). One reason for this is that 
creativity depends on more than responses to a given ta'sk, but depends on other variables such as 
personality and the environment. To increase the chances of measuring creativity in this study, 
there are also some direct questions about one's creativity such as rating oneself on the concept 
itself, and on various creative skills such as drawing, writing, and creating melodies. Participants 
are also asked to list their creative hobbies, how creative they consider themselves to be in these 
hobbies as opposed to the average person, and how much time they spend doing their hobbies. 
Hocevar (1981) has argued that simply asking the individual is one ofthe most valid ways of 
measuring creativity. Furthermore, several studies found that a self-rated measure of creativity was 
not overly confounded with a measure of intelligence, although some correlation given the needed 
threshold of intelligence is inevitable (Batey & Furnham, 2008; Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008). 
This present study will include a group of self-identified creative individuals, namely 
working visual artists. They will be recruited from organizations of artists and galleries, and will be 
involved in creating visual art. They are asked to participate only if they have shows and/or if they 
make at least part of their income from selling their art, so that society has confirmed their creative 
potential and at least to some extent proved the relevance of their art. Furthermore, Hocevar (1981) 
argues that past creative behaviour is generally a good predictor of future creative behaviour, so that 
their involvement in creating visual art suggests that they will continue to create it. 
Including a group of working visual artists will also help to validate the two measures of 
creativity. If the artists score higher than the matched-age comparison group on the measures of 
creativity, then it provides some extra evidence for the validity of the measures. It they do not, the 
measure has failed to properly measure creativity in working visual artists. 
The reason working visual artists have been chosen over other areas of creativity is the 
author already has access to their community. Furthermore, mixing various types of artists may not 
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be useful because there is no certainty that creativity is a general ability that can be applied across 
domains (Baer, 2008). However, since the self-rated questionnaire already contains items that cross 
several creative domains, then perhaps having homogeneity in the group of high creatives would 
help lessen the ambiguity of the results. There is also no reason to believe that the personalities and 
cognitive styles of artists in different domains are comparable. In addition, it might be found that 
different groups of artists show different patterns of background psychopathology (Post, 1994). 
2. Creativity and Psychopathology 
Another approach to the debate between psychopathology and creativity has focused on the 
direct correlations between the two concepts. There is growing evidence that creativity is linked in 
some fashion to psychopathology (Eysenck, 1995; Ludwig, 1995). This affiliation can be seen first 
and foremost if one takes familial factors into account. In his study of female writers, Ludwig 
(1994) observed that the more creative ones were more likely to have mental illness in their 
immediate families, especially in their mothers. Although Ludwig suggests that these results may 
demonstrate a familial basis for the mental disorders of female writers, this should not obscure the 
potential impact that certain traumatic childhood experiences may have had on their lives. Several 
studies found that mental illness is a common phenomenon in the families of eminent people, or 
those who became famous due to their creative accomplishments (Ludwig, 1995; Post, 1994). This 
was especially found to be true when it came to artistic creativity. Kinney, Richards, Lowing, 
LeBlanc, and Zimba1ist (2001), who conducted a controlled family study, found that children of 
people who had schizophrenia were only more creative than controls if they inherited some of 
parent's schizophrenic traits. These traits were determined by very high scores in schizotypy, 
showing a predisposition to schizophrenia, and schizoid personality disorders. Kinney et al. found 
that, generally, the more schizotypa1 traits people possessed, the more their vocational and 
avocationa1 activities were rated as being creative. 
Other studies have found a higher prevalence of various forms of psychological 
disturbances, including traits that may predispose people to mental illness, in creative individuals. 
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For example, in his series of studies on creative architects and writers, Barron (1969) found that the 
more creative groups were higher than normal on several dimensions associated with 
psychopathology. He found that creative writers were in the upper 15th percentile on many of the 
psychopathology measures (Barron, 1969). Similarly, MacKinnon (1962) found that in a sample of 
architects, creativity correlated with both the psychopathic deviate and schizophrenia scales of the 
MMPI. Based on applying DSM-I1I-R standards to biographical information, Post (1994) found 
that artists, composers and writers had more episodic psychiatric conditions, psychopathology, and 
personality disorders, in the sense of disrupting work, needing time off, and sometimes needing 
treatment than people in other professions such as scientists. Likewise, Ambers and Burke (2000) 
found that students doing their masters in fme arts showed similar cognitive processes as 
psychologically disturbed individuals on Rorschach tests when compared with students doing their 
masters in other subjects. The answers of the students doing their masters in fine arts revealed more 
fluid self-other boundaries, more preoccupation with early separation issues, more self-cohesion 
anxiety, and more manufacturing of idealized objects. Not all studies have found such relations, for 
example, Chavez-Eakle, del Carmen Lara, and Cruz-Fuentes (2006) did not find that high creative 
achievers scored significantly higher on a checklist of psychopathological symptoms. 
Direct correlations have been found between creativity and both the schizophrenia spectrum 
and the bipolar disorder spectrum (Jamison, 1993; Prentky, 1989). For instance, Jamison (1993) 
found a high prevalence of depression and a history of lithium treatment in British writers and 
artists. Ludwig (1998) conducted a series of interesting studies in which he compared people in 
more creative professions with people in less creative ones. He started by comparing artists with 
scientists, and then reduced the scale of his comparison until he was comparing formal with 
symbolic visual artists. In all cases, he found that people in professions that required more 
intuitive, subjective, and emotional forms of expression had a higher prevalence of all types of 
mental illness than those in professions that required more logical, objective, and formal forms of 
expression. In one particular study, Ludwig (1995) reported that his creative participants had a 
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higher prevalence of alcohol use, drug use, depression, mania, anxiety, schizophrenia, and suicidal 
ideation in their lives. 
Interestingly, it has also been found that there are different patterns of psychosis in different 
types of artists. For example, in her study of writers, Andreasen (1987) found that poets were more 
likely than other types of writers to have schizophrenia, and musicians were more likely than other 
types of artists to abuse drugs. Post (1994) found differences in types of pathology amongst 
different professions as well. More specifically, he found that creative writers were higher in 
antisocial, narcissistic, and histrionic tendencies, and suffered more from depressive conditions, 
while artists and philosophers were higher in paranoia, schizoid personality traits, and schizotypy. 
Differences were also found in the way creativity was expressed in people's lives in terms 
of psychiatric diagnosis. Richards (2001) noted that there are more bipolar tendencies found in 
people who show more work-related creativity, and more schizophrenia found in people who 
engage in creative endeavors as leisure activities. The latter's creativity, therefore, is more out of 
the public eye. This could be accounted for by the notion that bipolar tendencies make creativity 
more relevant to the general population, while the more withdrawn personality of those with 
schizophrenic tendencies may prevent them from sharing their art or being business minded enough 
to properly promote it. Another study found no differences between creativity scores in people who 
are bipolar or schizophrenic (Ghadirian, Gregoire, & Kosmidis, 2001), but they also found that 
higher creativity is found in people who have tendencies towards schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, 
but do not have full blown diagnoses of either one. If someone is more seriously ill with either 
psychiatric disorder, he or she is less likely to be creative in such a way that society would fmd 
relevant. 
These findings raise the question of how creativity and tendencies towards mental illness 
are related. Many believe that it could have something to do with underlying traits that these two 
groups have in common. Some of the personality characteristics mentioned above that Barron 
(1969) found in creative people are characteristics that would also apply to people high in 
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psychopathology. Non-conformity may be one of these, as well as unconventionality and 
impulsiveness. Eysenck (1995) also mentions uniqueness and forming unusual responses. Other 
shared characteristics mentioned by Neihart (1998) were intense feelings and racing thoughts. In 
her overview of creativity and psychopathology, Neihart focused on three areas of commonalities: 
mood, thinking styles, and tolerance for irrationality. As mentioned above, creative people are 
more prone to mood disturbances such as depression and mania. 
People high in both creativity and psychopathology seem to have a higher concern for more 
abstract rather than social issues, and seem to see the world more magically. These observations, 
according to Otto Rank (1932), are partially due to the egocentricity often seen in creative people 
and those high in psychopathology. Such a characteristic would undoubtedly make social situations 
more challenging, which could perhaps bring about either a creative or a pathological response, or 
both. Neuroticism, which comprises emotional reactivity, a tendency to worry, a susceptibility to 
negative mood, and a proneness to psychopathology (Claridge & Davis, 2001) may also be 
implicated in creativity. Eysenck, (1993) proposed that creativity should be correlated with 
neuroticism due to the emotional involvement necessary for the creative process. Others have 
agreed that creative people are more prone to mood disturbances and are generally more sensitive 
and emotional (e.g. Barron, 1969). Several studies indeed confirmed this theory. Some found a 
correlation between neuroticism and creativity in the form of divergent thinking (Komarik, 1972; 
Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008), while another study found higher neuroticism scores in visual arts 
students than students in other departments (Burch, Pavelis, Hemsley, & Corr, 2006). Others, 
however, have failed to find that connection (King, McKee, & Broyles, 1996). Neuroticism will be 
measured in this study to see if it relates to either creativity in the general population or to the 
classification of being a working visual artist. 
3. Absorption and the Propensity to Mystical Experiences 
One of the most likely candidates for a factor common to both creativity and 
psychopathology appears to be imaginative absorption and a closely related cluster of overlapping 
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measures. The term absorption was first coined by Tellegen and Atkinson (1974), who described 
it as "a disposition for having episodes of total attention that fully engage one's representational 
resources (i.e., perceptual, enactive, imaginative, and ideational)" (p. 262). Roche and 
McConkey (1990) describe it as an "openness to experience emotional and cognitive alterations 
across a variety of situations" (p. 91). People high in absorption tend to have periods of 
becoming fully absorbed in attentional stimuli. They are more likely than others to experience a 
heightened sense of reality for a given stimulus, are unaware of distracting events, and often 
experience an altered sense of reality (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Absorption has often been 
associated with creativity. This relation is not surprising since most art requires for its production 
a very absorbing type of attention. 
Absorption is sometimes thought to be a facet of openness to experience, as one of 
McCrae and Costa's (1999) five basic traits of personality. Measures of the two concepts are, in 
fact, correlated (.40 to .55) (Hunt et aI., 2002; Roche & McConkey, 1990; Wild, Kuiken, & 
Schopflocher, 1995). Openness is described by McCrae and Costa (1997) as manifested in "the 
breadth, depth, and permeability of consciousness, and in the recurrent need to enlarge and 
examine experience" (p. 2). McCrae (1993-94) also observed that people who are high in 
openness have more vivid fantasies, are more creative, are more sensitive to their feelings, are 
more behaviorally flexible, are more intellectually curious, and possess less conventional 
attitudes. They also tend to be more in tune with their intuition, and have thin mental boundaries. 
Openness is thought to be genetic, and is relatively stable in adulthood (McCrae, 1993-94). 
Other traits that have been associated with absorption, and sometimes even used 
interchangeably with it, are imaginative involvement and fantasy proneness. Imaginative 
involvement entails the suspension of reality and the expansion of consciousness (Roche & 
McConkey, 1990). It was a term used by Hilgard (1974) to describe highly hypnotizable people. 
She described it as "the savoring of sensory experiences, drama, reading, childhood fantasy ... and 
creativity" (p.138). Hunt et al. (2002) found significant correlations between imaginative 
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involvement and absorption. Wilson & Barber (1981) similarly describe fantasy prone people as 
those who spend a lot of their time in a world of imagination and fantasy. They are also often 
creative, have vivid mental imagery, and see themselves as unique individuals who do not 
conform to the mainstream (Lynn & Rue, 1988). There seem to be two routes to fantasy 
proneness: parental encouragement for creative activities and isolating childhood trauma that can 
make fantasy a refuge (Lynn & Rhue, 1988). Many have found a relation between childhood 
abuse and absorption (e.g. Eisen & Carlson, 1998). Post (1994) found that 56 percent ofa group 
of eminent creative writers had unhappy childhoods. Ayers at al. (1999) failed to fmd a 
connection between childhood trauma and creativity in a study; however, they compared working 
creatives to controls matched for levels of absorption, suggesting conflict would be more related 
to a background absorption than to creativity per se. This study will also examine these variables 
in an attempt to replicate or extend these fmdings. 
Dissociation, another correlate of absorption, has been defmed by Bernstein and Putnam 
(1986) as "the lack of the normal integration of thoughts, feelings, and experiences into the 
stream of consciousness and memory" (p. 727). In earlier literature, absorption and dissociation 
were often used interchangeably; however, Irwin (1999) argued that absorption is the 
nonpathological side of dissociation. Although it has a significant positive correlation of .35 to 
absorption and .30 to imaginative involvement, Hunt et al. (2002) agreed that dissociation 
represents the negative side of these traits, since of all these measures it alone was correlated with 
neuroticism. Spiegel (1986) reported that dissociation is a defense mechanism that is used to deal 
with the pain caused by trauma. Dissociation separates consciousness from the immediate effects 
of fear and pain. Although it may be helpful at the time of abuse, dissociation may become an 
integral part of one's functioning and might cause psychological dysfunctions later in life. 
Absorption has also been found to correlate with several processes. Wild et al. (1995) 
related it to experiential involvement (also an engagement with an attentional stimulus), aesthetic 
experience, flow (specifically, intense involvement with an optimally stimulating task so that one 
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loses track of time), and peak experience (an experience of profound meaning). Wild et al. also 
found that absorption is related to the motivation to listen to music, to paint, and to view art. In 
addition, it is related to the perceived importance of these things, and the impact of these 
activities on mood. Absorption involves the ability to become open to a variety of domains such 
as fantasies, actions, ideas, feelings, and values (McCrae, 1993-94). It also has been found to 
relate to the frequency of mystical experiences (Hood, 1975; Hunt et aI., 2002). 
Carl Jung coined a term very similar if not identical to the ones described in the 
preceding paragraphs. He labeled his concept innate sensitiveness and described it as a 
predisposition to more reflection and intuitiveness. Aron (2004) revisited Jung's concept and 
found in her research that people high in sensitiveness are easily over stimulated, and as with the 
concepts mentioned above, are particularly affected by childhood trauma. According to Jung, 
people who were high in sensitiveness and also experienced childhood trauma were more likely 
to develop depression, anxiety, and shyness later in life (Aron, 2004). 
Many believe that absorption and its correlates have two sides, one more positive, such as 
their association to creativity (e.g., Manmiller, Kumar, & Pekala, 2005) and some more negative 
(e.g., Roche & McConkey, 1990). For instance, most of the above measures have also been 
associated with some degree of psychopathology. Openness has been known to correlate with 
measures of schizo typicality and narcissism (Costa & McCrae, 1995; Widiger & Trull, 1992), and 
Watson (2001) found that dissociation was highly correlated with schizotypy. There is also 
evidence that higher scorers on absorption and fantasy proneness are more at risk to be distressed, 
symptomatic, and have an elevated score on schizotypy measures. Absorption has been found to 
correlate with nightmares (Belicki & Belicki, 1986), hypochondriacal concerns (McClure & 
Lilienfe1d, 2002), panic attacks (Lilienfeld, 1997), and somatization and global distress (Gick, 
McLeod & Hulihan, 1997). Lynn and Rhue (1988) found that fantasizers scored higher on the 
MMPI schizophrenia scale; however, it was only a small number of the fantasizers that had those 
heightened scores. Absorption has also been associated with a tendency to place personal 
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meaning on events that may not be widely relevant consensually, something that is also present in 
patients with schizophrenia (Roche & McConkey, 1990). Tellegan and Atkinson (1974) agreed 
that high absorbers may have difficulty discerning fantasy from reality: 
Even if the attentional object is constructed from memory, it is experienced as present and real. It 
is assumed that an already fully engaged representational system cannot, in addition to 
representations of the focal object, maintain salient qualifying ''meta-cognitions,'' that is, thoughts 
about the primary representation, such as ''this is only my imagination" or "this is not really 
happening" . 
As mentioned earlier, absorption and its related concepts have also been known to 
correlate with childhood trauma. One study in particular found that college students with high 
scores in dissociation had more psychopathology and a greater history of all types of abuse in 
their childhoods (Sandberg & Lynn, 1992). One possibility is that if one is high in absorption and 
then experiences childhood trauma, then the negative face of absorption, in other words 
dissociation, might be expressed. This theory was partially confmned in a study by Irwin (1999) 
who found that pathological dissociation was predicted by childhood trauma, but non-
pathological dissociation, or what he referred to as psychological absorption, was not. Jung also 
mentioned that people high on his trait of sensitiveness tend to resort to fantasy while stressed, 
and are more prone to anxiety, depression, and dissociation when faced with adversities (Aron, 
2004). 
The positive side of absorption has been referred to as a more transpersona1, or growth-
enhancing state of consciousness (Hunt et aI., 2002). As well as being related to dissociation, Hunt 
et al. (2002) found that absorption is related to the Hood (1975) mysticism scale. Mystical 
experiences are sometimes thought of as the core experiential aspects of religious experiences 
(Hood, 1975). Despite their slight variations in ideological interpretations, these experiences are 
often thought of as being universal. This study will employ the Hood Scale of Mystical 
Experiences, which includes experiences such as a loss of sense of self, unity, inner subjectivity, 
spatial and temporal transcendence, the acquisition of special intuitive knowledge, ineffability, 
intense positive affect, and religiousness. Hood (1975) found that the propensity to mystical 
experiences was also related to several other religious experience scales and openness to 
expenence. 
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The two sides of absorption have been distinguished further by the finding that dissociation 
was not related to the mysticism scale, and that the negative qualities of neuroticism and ego 
grasping, described as over-controlling one's experience instead of simply accepting it, were related 
to dissociation but not to mysticism (Hunt et aI., 2002). This demonstrates that although both 
positive and negative traits are related to absorption, these'traits are not related to each other, 
meaning absorption likely has two sides. 
Despite the differences between the more positive and negative faces of the traits discussed 
above, overlap is seen in many cases. In addition, Hunt et aL (2002) found evidence for the 
inseparability between the more positive states of consciousness such as mystical experiences, and 
some degree of conflict and emotional pain. Hunt et al. (2002) suggest that these traits may even 
come from a common predisposition to sensitivity and openness to spontaneous altered states of 
consciousness. Concepts such as these might help explain some of the similarities between 
creativity and psychopathology by providing characteristics from which both may stem. Both 
absorption and mystical experiences will, therefore, be tested to see if they are related to both 
creativity and the schizophrenia spectrum more so than to a comparison group. To test the two 
sides of these traits, correlations within the artist and the schizophrenic groups will be examined to 
see if the propensity for mystical experiences correlates more with positive states in the artist group 
and negative states in the schizophrenic group. If it does, then it will provide additional evidence 
for the positive and negative sides of altered states. Finally, absorption will be tested to see if it 
mediates the relations between creativity and mystical states and creativity and more negative 
states. If they do then it will provide evidence for absorption being a core altered state from which 
others, both positive and negative, may stem. 
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4. The Schizophrenia Spectrom 
One thing that could be helpful in deciphering the correlation between creativity and 
psychopathology would be to examine mental illnesses more directly. Schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorders are the most widely studied mental illnesses in relation to creativity due to their sharing of 
perceptual and cognitive anomalies with both absorption and creativity. Furthermore, Claridge 
(1997) suggested that it is the schizophrenic element rather than the affective element of the schizo-
affective continuum that is more closely related to creativity. Since visual artists will be examined 
in this study, and were found by Post (1994) to be higher in paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal 
disorders than other groups of creative individuals such as writers, then the schizophrenic spectrum 
is the mental illness dimension that will be emphasized. This will include schizophrenia at the 
extreme end of the spectrum and schizo typicality to represent the features of the illness present in 
non-patients. 
Schizophrenia 
A description and short history of the schizophrenia spectrum follows, beginning with the 
illness itself, which represents the extreme end of the spectrum. Schizophrenia, which affects 
approximately one percent of the population, can be characterized by a difficulty in distinguishing 
between what is inside and what is outside of the self (Barron, 1969). Bleuler (1924) saw people 
with schizophrenia as highly autistic, in other words, they seem to turn away from reality towards 
a more inner world of fantasy. The symptoms of schizophrenia can be classified into three 
categories: positive symptoms, negative symptoms, and cognitive disorganization (Javitt & 
Coyle, 2004). Most people with schizophrenia have a combination of symptoms that may include 
one or more of the three categories. The positive symptoms are the ones that are the most 
noticeable to the public eye. Some of these symptoms include agitation, paranoid delusions, and 
hallucinations. Some of the more common paranoid delusions are feeling conspired against, 
believing one is somehow special or chosen for some great task such as saving the world, 
believing one's thoughts are being broadcast, and believing that one's feelings, thoughts, and 
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actions are dictated by forces outside oneself (Bernheim & Lewine, 1979). In a study in which 
they looked at first-person accounts of delusions, Santon and David (2000) found that people with 
schizophrenia think that everything around them possesses personal meaning, in other words, 
every thing that happens fits into their delusions. An example would be if someone read 
something seemingly unrelated to them in a newspaper, but still related it to themselves by 
claiming that it was written in code. This would indeed seem to demonstrate a lack of boundary 
between the self and the outside world. Some examples of hallucinations people may have are 
hearing their thoughts spoken aloud, and hearing voices commenting on their actions and/or 
giving them instructions. These perceived instructions can be especially dangerous because they 
can bring on violent actions. According to Hughlings Jackson (l932), positive symptoms are 
created by the individual in order to fill the void left by the negative symptoms, which include a 
loss of interest in others, emotional withdrawal, and blunted affect. 
Negative symptoms can be particularly distressing to the individual who is experiencing 
them since they can be experienced as signs that something is wrong with one's mind. One 
example of trying to cover up blunted affect with a delusion would be to accuse the government 
of releasing chemicals into the environment that prohibit people from realizing their full 
emotional potential. One of the most common cognitive symptoms, and one which according to 
Bleuler (1924) is one of the fundamental features of schizophrenia, is loosened associations, 
which can result in mixing words together and creating so called ''word salads" (Javitt & Coyle, 
2004). In some cases, a thought may be articulated coherently in one's mind, but when the 
attempt is made at communicating the thought, it is not produced in a meaningful way. 
Like most physical and mental disorders, schizophrenia has both a biological and an 
environmental basis. According to Bernheim and Lewine (1979), schizophrenia occurs as a result 
of physiological and psychological predispositions, and environmental stress. People with 
schizophrenia have an excess of the neurotransmitter dopamine and a lack of the neurotransmitter 
glutamate in their brains (Javitt and Coyle, 2004). This does not mean, however, that everyone 
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with this type of brain chemistry necessarily has schizophrenia. According to Javitt and Coyle 
(2004), studies conducted with monozygotic twins showed that when one twin has schizophrenia, 
the other twin only has about 50 percent chance of also being afflicted. It seems as if people may 
be born with a predisposition for schizophrenia, but the environment determines whether or not it 
will develop. Environmental causes are more difficult to identify because of the large number of 
variables that are involved. 
One likely antecedent to schizophrenia is stress. According to Fairbairn (1994), maternal 
deprivation and hostility is one of the major causes of adult psychopathology. Fairnbairn's theory 
suggests that as a result of experiencing abuse or parental neglect, children develop split ego 
structures. This either happens because they internalize the "badness" that they see in their 
parents, or create a split within themselves in order to remain attached to an object that they also 
hate. This same split is seen in many adults with schizophrenia: they have difficulty integrating 
good and evil, and have difficulty accepting the aspects of themselves they fmd less favorable. 
Sullivan also suggested very strong environmental factors as being the main causes of the 
disorder (Sullivan, 1956). He argued that schizophrenia is not completely intrapersona1, but 
rather it stems from people's relationships with others, more specifically relationships with family 
members. He took a dynamic approach by claiming that childhood is extremely important in the 
development of schizophrenia, since it is childhood stress that is reactivated later in life which 
triggers the onset of the disorder (Sullivan, 1956). Like B1eu1er, Sullivan saw the self as being an 
important aspect of the disorder, but he went further by stating that the se1fwas damaged by 
negative appraisals from the parents that were detrimental to self-esteem. Arieti (1974) then took 
Sullivan's theory further by stating that the children then grow up feeling guilty for being angry at 
their parents, and generally detach themselves emotionally to prevent further blows to their se1f-
esteem. Despite their aloofness, however, they are often very emotionally sensitive and can show 
much emotion if need be. Sullivan believed further that once their aloof defenses are threatened, 
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and can no longer protect them, they become very anxious and blame others for their difficulties. 
The full blown psychosis is sccn as the last attempt to heal oneself (Arieti, 1974). 
Other researchers disagree with blaming the parcnts and instead believe that 
schizophrenia could be caused by internal or environmental toxins. For example, Bleuler (1924) 
theorized that schizophrenia had an organic cause, and that some sort of toxin could playa part. 
Earlier, Kraepelin (1904) posited that schizophrenia was due to a metabolic disorder. Some 
research has found differences in metabolic functions in schizophrenia; for example, Takahashi 
(1953) found that people with schizophrenia have more problems in metabolizing sugar in their 
brain tissues, and Henry (1927) found that a high percentage of people with schizophrenia have 
problems with their gastro-intestinal functions. A more recent study suggested that prenatal 
exposure to lead and/or delta-aminolevulinic acid could playa part in the later development of 
schizophrenia (Opler et al. 2004). Of course an inborn hypersensitivity would also be associated 
with more negative parental experiences, thus fitting with the later adult recall as documented by 
Fairbairn and Sullivan. 
Placing the nature/nurture debate aside, Sass and Parnas (2003) have focused on the 
homogeneity of schizophrenic symptoms, searching for an underlying psychological cause. 
Together, they rejected the earlier notions of schizophrenia as irrationality. Instead, Sass (1992) 
argued that the diminishing of mental functions in schizophrenia was in fact the result of a 
heightening of conscious awareness. This heightening of awareness is often experienced as a 
preoccupation with inner life rather than with the outside world (Ogilvie, 2000). 
Sass and Parnas (2003) proposed that schizophrenia is a disorder of the self, and that all 
of the symptoms could be accounted for by two distortions in awareness: a diminished self-
presence and hyperreflexivity. The former refers to a diminished sense of existing as an 
autonnmous source of awareness and action. This is reflected in many cases in which people feel 
their thoughts or actions are controlled by external forces. They often feel separate from their 
bodies, as if they are no longer their own. These symptoms can be paradoxical, as in the sense of 
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controlling the universe, but being unable to control one's own body. Hyperreflexivity refers to 
an exaggerated fonn of self-consciousness in which inner processes become focal objects of 
awareness (Sass, 1992). It is as if a heightened introspection is imposed on the individual. The 
fact that inner processes are continuously and involuntarily scrutinized makes these processes 
seem distant, or separate from the individual. Another symptom that is most likely due to 
hyperreflexivity is the dissolution of ego boundaries (Sass, 1992). It becomes difficult for the 
individual to distinguish what is inside and what is outside the self. Hallucinations and altered 
states would most likely arise, subsequently, as expressions of these alterations. The potential 
connection between hyperreflexive introspection and absorption seems obvious. Previous 
research has also found that people with schizophrenia had equal Hood questionnaire of mystical 
experience scores as long tenn meditators (Stifler, Greer, Sneck, & Dovenmuehle, 1993). This, 
again, could be another outcome of both hyperreflecivity and a diminished sense of self. Since 
artists have also been found to be high in mystical experiences (Ayers et aI., 1999), mystical 
experiences may be a variable that could potentially be shared by the two groups. This will be 
the first study to compare mysticism scores in artists and people with schizophrenia. 
One of the difficulties in diagnosing schizophrenia is that it is rarely seen in its purest form. 
Schizophrenia is often seen in combination with affective disorders such as manic depression. In 
fact, ever since Emil Kraepelin (1904) distinguished between manic-depressive (now bipolar) 
disorder, and what we now call schizophrenia, the validity of this classification has been in question 
(Greene, 2007). Those who have tried to find a clear distinction between the two were unable to do 
so (Brockington, Kendell, Wainwright, Hillier, & Walker, 1979). This view would lead to a more 
general factor of psychopathology and/or schizo-affective psychosis as advocated by Eysenck 
(1995). 
Most would agree, however, that patients with full blown schizophrenia are not necessarily 
creative. For instance, Rubinstein (2008) found that people with schizophrenia were very low in 
conceptual fluency. He concluded that because the patients are often chronic, they no longer have 
any creatively productive psychotic episodes. Rather, their post psychotic impairment leads to 
verbal deficiency and general deterioration of personality that is responsible for their lack of 
fluency. 
Schizotypy 
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Several researchers (e.g., Cox & Leon, 1999; Eysenck, 1995; O'Reilly, Dunbar, & Bentall, 
200 I) pointed out that since outwardly recognized creativity is not often seen in full blown 
schizophrenia, it may be more profitable to look at creativity correlates with the background 
characteristics that predispose one to schizophrenia or subclinical psychopathologies. Schizotypy is 
a good candidate for this type of inquiry. Schizotypy is a trait possessed by certain people who 
others often find unusual. It was a clinical label created by the psycboanalyst Rado (1953) and 
further developed by Meehl (1962) to identifY the potentially inherited deficit that could interact 
with environmental influences and lead to the development of schizophrenia. Schizotypy has much 
overlap with schizoid personality disorder, defined in the DSM-IV (American Psychological 
Association, 1994) as including signs of indifference to social relationships, constricted affect (cold, 
aloof), and a preference for solitary activities. The schizoid personality is also similar to 
schizophrenia in that people high in the trait tend to lack affect towards others and are often very 
independent and autistic (Eysenck, 1995). People who score high on questionnaires of schizotypy 
(Claridge, 1997) are more likely than the average person to experience unusual perceptions, have 
odd ideas, behave inappropriately, and are often described as being "eccentric" (Fisher, Mohanty, 
Herrington, Koven, Miller, & Heller, 2004). 
Loren and Jean Chapman and their collaborators developed a series of self-report, true-false 
questionnaires th~t measured symptoms and traits that characterized schizotypy and schizophrenia 
(Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1976). They found that with these scales they could identifY a 
large proportion of the normal population as having experienced psychotic-like experiences 
(Chapman et aI., 1976; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), some of which, however, overlap with 
experiences included in absorption measures. Some ofthe scales they developed were the 
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Perceptual Aberration Scale (Chapman et aI., 1976), which measures perceptual distortions of 
objects and the body; the Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), which measures 
beliefs such as implausible causality and special powers; the Revised Social Anhedonia Scale 
(Eckblad, Chapman, Chapman, & Mishlove, 1982), which measures asociality and an indifference 
to others; the Physical Anhedonia Scale (Chapman et aI., 1976), which measures deficits in sensory 
and aesthetic pleasure; the Impulsive Nonconformity Scale (Chapman et aI., 1984), which measures 
impulsivity and the failure or refusal to conform to society; and fmally, the Hypomanic Personality 
Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), which measures chronic affective conditions. Chapman, 
Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad, and Zinser (1994) found in a lO-year longitudinal study that those high 
in what they considered the positive symptoms of schizotypy (perceptual aberrations and magical 
ideation) had a significantly greater prevalence of psychotic disorders later in life. 
Brod (1997) reviewed several factor analysis studies, including those by the Chapmans and 
their collaborators, and found evidence for at least four distinct syndromes in schizotypy. The first 
factor is Aberrant Perceptions and Beliefs, sometimes referred to as unusual experiences, and is 
often associated with the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, and so is referred to as positive 
schizotypy (Venables, 1995). This factor includes magical thinking, perceptual aberration, 
paranoia, suspiciousness, a tendency to experience hallucinations, and a tendency to experience 
manic states. This factor combined both the perceptual aberration and the magical ideation scales 
by Chapman, Chapman, and their collaborators, and shows the greatest overlap with absorption. 
The second factor is Introvertive Anhedonia, which includes social and physical anhedonia, and flat 
affect (Brod, 1997). It encompasses the negative and withdrawal symptoms often found in 
schizophrenia and schizoid personality disorder. The third factor is Cognitive Disorganization, and 
closely resembles the cognitive disorganization often found in schizophrenia. It includes social 
impairment or anxiety, attentional difficulties, distractibility, and sometimes introversion and 
neuroticism (Brod, 1997). The fourth factor, Asocial Behaviour, is sometimes referred to as 
impulsive noncomformity and is the factor that most closely resembles Eysenck's (1983) original 
psychoticism trait. According to Claridge et al. (1996), it consists of asocial behaviour, 
impulsiveness, and mood-related disinhibition. 
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When the label of schizotypy was created, most researchers believed that it was a distinct 
type of mental disorder, and that this disorder was basically a milder version of schizophrenia, and 
thus, categorical (Meehl, 1962). The quasi-dimensional model of schizophrenia introduced the idea 
of continuity between schizophrenia and its milder forms such as schizotypy or schizoid personality 
disorder (Claridge, 1997). This continuity is often referred to as the schizophrenia spectrum. 
Bleuler (1924) was the first to suggest a fully dimensional model, in which milder forms of 
schizophrcnia can exist within healthy individuals. This model was further taken up by Claridge 
(1997) who proposed that schizotypal traits can range from healthy or adaptive variations to a 
predisposition to psychosis. For instance, Holmes and Steel (2004) conducted a study in which 
they found that people with positive schizotypy experience more PTSD-like intrusive experiences 
than controls, and intrusive experiences may be one of the mechanisms behind the positive 
symptoms of psychosis (Holmes & Steel, 2004). Further support for the dimensional model was 
found by Rawlings, Williams, Haslam, and Claridge (2008) who used a taxometric analysis to 
demonstrate that Meehl's fmding that schizotypy is categorical may have just been due to the 
skewed distribution of the data rather than the presence of a taxon. The obvious temptation, 
supported by research (below) is to equate this healthy variant of schizotypy with absorption and 
openness to experience. 
Eysenck and Eysenck (1976) was one of the first to propose a related model of 
schizophrenia as the extreme end of a personality continuum. Eysenck (1995) argued that the more 
extreme psychological disorders came from a personality trait, called psychoticism, on which all 
people vary. Eysenck dcfmed psychoticism as a dispositional trait in which people show similar 
cognitive features to psychotic patients, and developed a questionnaire for its measurement 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976). Also, if combined with environmental stress, this trait can predispose 
people to functional psychotic disorders of all types. However, in the absence of psychosis, people 
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who score higher on this trait could be as psychologically healthy as people who score lower. He 
stated that the positive face ofpsychoticism could be creativity. Several researchers have found a 
positive correlation between psychoticism and creativity (Barron, 1969; Stavridou & Furnham, 
1996; Woody & Claridge, 1977). Psychoticism, however, is not the dimension that defines 
schizotypy, for it loads only on one of the schizotypy factors, namely, impulsive nonconformity 
(Claridge et aI., 1996; Claridge, 1997). In other words, Claridge (1997) concluded from his 
research that psychoticism is only one of the factors that comprises schizotypy. Hypomanic 
personality and borderline personality disorder loaded on the unusual experience and the cognitive 
disorganization factors respectively, not the psychoticism factor (Claridge et al., 1996), which 
suggests that not all psychotic disorders may stem from psychoticism as Eysenck (1995) had 
suggested. 
Several recent studies have supported a dimensional model of schizotypy, otherwise known 
as the schizophrenia spectrum (Goulding, 2004). McCreery & Claridge (2002) believe that some of 
the facets of schizotypy that are present in the subclinical population could be seen as being positive 
or adaptive. They conducted a study with people who have experienced an out-of-the-body 
experience and controls and found that those who have had an out-of-the-body experience scored 
higher than the comparison group on the positive schizotypy facet of Aberrant Perceptions and 
Beliefs, but not higher on the other negative facets of schizotypy or on neuroticism. Although some 
may pathologise out-of-the-body experiences, many deeply value them, and even give them a 
religious significance (McCreery & Claridge, 2002). 
A similar study conducted by Day and Peters (1999) found that members of new religious 
movements scored significantly higher than non-religious groups and mainstream Christians on an 
unusual experiences scale. This signifies that one can score high on schizotypy and still be a 
functioning member of society. Both the new religious groups and the mainstream Christians 
scored higher than the non-religious group on Introvertive Anhedonia, although the authors believe 
that could be at least partially accounted for by the qualities promoted by most religious groups of 
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quiet prayer and meditation. Finally, Jackson (1997) conducted a study in which he found a 
substantial correlation between positive schizotypy (unusual experiences) and mystical experience. 
He found that the correlation to schizotypy was higher than the correlation of any other personality 
variable to mystical experience. The studies above all support the notion that positive schizotypy 
overlaps with mystical states, which suggests that there is a facet of schizotypy that could indeed be 
considered adaptive. 
Another adaptive attribute that has been found to correlate with schizotypy is that of, 
creativity. Indeed, the choosing of art as a career is likely correlated with aspects of schizotypy. 
Support was found for this in a study by O'Reilly et al. (2001) who compared humanities and 
creative arts students and found that the creative arts students scored higher on the unusual 
experiences dimension of schizotypy. Several studies have found that positive schizotypy was 
related to creativity (Green & Williams, 1999), including one that used a measure of self-rated 
creativity (Batey & Furnham, 2008). This fInding is expected to be replicated in the present study. 
Fisher et al. (2004) found that the combination of magical ideation, perceptual aberration, odd 
beliefs, and unusual perceptions were signifIcantly correlated with scores of fIgural fluency, a 
measure of creativity. Several researchers have made the connection that both creativity and 
schizotypy result from an increase in brain activity in the right hemisphere (Fisher et al., 2004; 
Weinstein & Graves, 2002). It has been asserted that the linking of uncommon ideas is a right-
brained process which is often associated with creativity, but in extreme cases, can lead to the 
creation of delusions (Fisher et a1., 2004). 
Several researchers found that only positive schizotypy, which includes unusual 
perceptions and magical beliefs, can be linked to creativity, while negative schizotypy, which 
includes anhedonia and flat affect cannot (Fisher et a1., 2004; Tsakanikos & Claridge, 2005). 
Several creativity measures, namely the Barron-Welsh Art Scale, an alternate uses test (which 
measures divergent thinking), and several assessments of creative activities, were found to be 
positively correlated with positive schizotypy, impulsivity, and hypomania; and negatively 
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correlated with negative schizotypy and depression in a study by Schuldberg (2001). Similarly, 
Batey & Furnham (2008) found that self-rated creativity is positively correlated with positive 
schizotypy (unusual experiences) and impulsive nonconformity, but negatively correlated with 
cognitive disorganization. These findings give support to Eysenck's (1995) theory of a relation 
between creativity and psychoticism, since his measure of psychoticism is similar to impulsive 
nonconformity (Batey & Furnham, 2008). Conversely, Cox and Leon (1999) did find a positive 
correlation between an alternate uses test and Introvertive Anhedonia. One possibility is that 
different domains and styles within the creativity dimension might account for these variations; for 
example, perhaps the differences lie in the relevance of the creative ideas. 
There are other explanations that could account for the correlations between positive 
schizotypy and creativity. For example, there is evidence that both positive schizotypy and 
creativity are associated with similar brain waves. Stough, Donaldson, Scarlata, and Ciorciari 
(2001) found that those high in questionnaire openness had greater theta production, and suggested 
that these waves would most likely be a requirement for magical or unusual thoughts or 
experiences. Glickson and Naftuliev (2005) found similar brain wave differences in those high on 
Eysenck's questionnaire measure of psychotic ism. Another theory is that positive schizophrenic-
like unusual experiences could be the product of a higher automatic spreading activation; for 
instance, one word could automatically activate another similarly sounding word, which could in 
turn activate another semantically related word (Tsakanikos & Claridge, 2005). This type of 
process is also thought to facilitate creative ideas. 
It is expected that the positive results between creativity and both positive schizotypy and 
impulsive nonconformity will be replicated in this study. Besides finding these correlations, it is 
expected that working artists will score higher on these facets of schizotypy than non-artists. 
People with schizophrenia, conversely, are not expected to be significantly higher in creativity than 
a matched-age comparison group, but are expected to be higher than this group on the introvertive 
anhedonia subscale of the schizotypy measure. If these expected results are found, then it would 
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provide evidence that creativity is related to being moderately high on the schizophrenia spectrum 
(being high on certain aspects of schizotypy), but not at the highest end (having schizophrenia). 
Cognitive Similarities: Overinclusiveness and Semantic Inhibition 
Much of the recent research on the correlations between creativity and psychopathology has 
focused on the commonalities of cognitive processes in the two groups. According to Heinrichs 
(2005), cognitive measures are better at distinguishing people with and without schizophrenia than 
neurological tests such as structural magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission 
tomography. For these reasons, a cognitive measure will be used to demonstrate some 
commonalities between creativity and the schizophrenic spectrum in this study. 
There have been many theoretical arguments made for the cognitive commonalities of 
creativity and psychopathology. Heinrichs (2005) believed that cognitive differences are the 
primary symptoms of the schizophrenic brain. It has already been mentioned that people with 
schizophrenia have looser boundaries of the self. This same phenomenon may also be true- for 
those high in creativity. Rose (1964) argued that artists possess the capacity to loosen their 
boundaries of the self so that they can then reshape their surroundings into art. A related cognitive 
similarity found in the two groups is that they both have the tendency to make loose associations. 
Bleuler (1924) argued that impaired associative thinking was the fundamental defect in 
schizophrenia, and that it is what leads to observable behaviours such as delusions and 
hallucinations. Similarly, making associations between remote ideas is considered a necessary step 
to developing creative ideas (Mednick, 1962). 
A related cognitive trait that has been associated both with creativity and 
psychopathology is that of overinclusiveness. Cameron (1939) originally used this term to 
describe the thinking styles of people with schizophrenia. He described it as the inability to 
maintain normal boundaries, and the use of abnormally large and vague categories. 
This theory of overinclusiveness was later reformulated so as to include an increased 
awareness of, or a failure to inhibit, internal and external stimuli that are irrelevant to the task at 
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hand (Eysenck, 1995; Payne, Matussek, & George, 1959). Payne and Hewlett (1960) found 
evidence for the significance of overinc1usiveness in schizophrenia in that they found that 
schizophrenics had higher overinc1usiveness scores than controls, depressives, and neurotics on 
several classification tasks. They rejected earlier theories of "concreteness" in schizophrenic 
thought that portrayed people with schizophrenia as having an inability to think in an abstract 
way. They found instead that schizophrenics responded to a card sorting task in an overinclusive 
way, and that responses in previous studies that were highly unusual had been arbitrarily 
classified as "concrete" (Payne & Hewlett, 1960). Payne and Hewlett (1960) found that those 
with paranoid delusions were the most overinclusive, while those who were not significantly 
overinclusive had other symptoms. 
Frith (1979) further developed Payne and Hewlett's theory by proposing that the positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia are due to a breakdown of the inhibitory processes that help screen 
distracting information from the environment, in other words, they are due to overinclusiveness. 
The inability to screen sensory input could conceivably be related to the flooding of thoughts. 
Loose associations could then be made between these thoughts, creating delusions. In a dichotic 
listening study, Dykes and McGhie (1976) found that both creative and schizophrenic individuals 
sampled a wider range of environmental input than those in the control group. 
Two common experimental paradigms used to study cognitive inhibitory processes are 
negative priming and latent inhibition. Eysenck (1995) describes negative priming as a situation in 
which a distractor object which had been previously ignored is represented later as the target object 
to be dealt with. Because the distractor was to be ignored before, it takes longer for the participant 
to identify it as the target. An example would be if a participant had to identify a word as belonging 
to a certain category, and this word was preceded by a distractor word. If the distractor word 
became the target stimulus on the following trial, it would take longer for the participant to identify 
this word as a target than if the word was novel. Another example would be if one was doing the 
STROOP task, and had to identify the colour of a word. If the next colour they had to identify is 
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the same as the previous word, then it should take longer to identify this colour. A similar concept, 
latent inhibition, can be described as a paradigm in which the conditioned responding to a 
previously exposed stimulus is lower than to a stimulus that has not been exposed (Lubow, 1989). 
In other words, a stimulus is presented without having a consequence. It becomes a distraction and 
is thus ignored. It is then presented again with a reward; however, because it was ignored before, it 
takes longer for the participant to make the association between the stimulus and the reward. 
The reduction in the tendency to screen from consciousness stimuli that have previously 
been experienced as irrelevant has been associated with psychosis (Baruch, Hemsley, & Gray, 
1988). Several researchers have found a reduction of cognitive inhibition in patients with 
schizophrenia (Laplant, Everett, & Thomas, 1992; Williams, 1996). Williams (1996) found that 
only certain subgroups of schizophrenics showed this weakening of inhibitory process, and these 
were the reality distortion and the disorganization subgroups that characterized the positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia. These groups of participants showed a reduction in, and in some cases 
a reversal in, negative priming. Individuals who demonstrated only negative symptoms that 
contribute to psychomotor poverty did not show reduced inhibition. 
A reduction in cognitive inhibition has also been found in non-clinical samples of 
participants high in schizotypy (Beech, McManus, Baylis, Tipper, & Agar, 1991; Ferraro & 
Okerlund, 1996; Tsakanikos, 2004). This demonstrates that it is not only people with schizophrenia 
who demonstrate a reduction in cognitive inhibition but also people who are in the middle of the 
schizophrenia spectrum. Beech, Baylis, Smithson, and Claridge (1989) found a reversal of the 
negative priming in some of their high schizotypes. Other researchers tested cognitive inhibition in 
participants scoring high on different subtypes of schizotypy. The pattern found was that positive 
schizotypy was related to a reduction of negative priming, but negative schizotypy was not (Moritz 
& Mass, 1997; Peters, Pickering, & Hemsley, 1994; Steel, Hemsley, & Jones, 1996). These results 
were found by Williams (1995) as well, but she also found a reduction in negative priming in some 
participants high in negative schizotypy, but only when positive features were also present. This is 
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the same pattern that was found in patients with schizophrenia, or those on the extreme end of the 
schizophrenia spectrum. 
Carson, Higgins, and Peterson (2003) conducted a study in which they used a latent 
inhibition paradigm to test cognitive inhibition in lifetnne creative achievers in the fields of art and 
science. The results indicated that the participants who scored higher in overall creative 
achievement had significantly lower scores on latent inhibition than the control group. This 
indicates that, similar to patients with schizophrenia and participants who score high in positive 
schizotypy, creative individuals show a reduction in cognitive inhibition. These results offer further 
support for the notion that there are qualitative differences, as shown by the reduction of cognitive 
inhibition, between highly creative and less creative individuals. They also further sustain the 
notion that creative people and those with schizophrenia or schizotypy share certain neurobiological 
properties (Carson et aI., 2003). 
This study will attempt to replicate these fmdings in the sense that both artists and people 
higher on the schizophrenia spectrum (i.e. those with schizophrenia and those higher in schizotypy) 
will show a reduction in cognitive inhibition. If this result is found then it provides evidence that 
that there is a cognitive similarity between creativity and the schizophrenia spectrum. 
Several researchers looked more closely at the mechanisms behind the reduction of 
negative priming to ensure that it is in fact the result of a reduction of inhibition. Tsakanikos 
(2004) tested the hypothesis that it may not be a lack of inhibition that makes high-schizotypy 
scorers show a disruption in latent inhibition, but a tendency to see every stimulus as salient. His 
results failed to support this hypothesis. Beech et al. (l991) wanted to find out if the people high in 
schizotypy were not fully processing the distractors instead of not inhibiting them, so they gave the 
groups a semantic facilitation test as well as the negative priming one. The people who scored high 
in schizotypy had shorter reaction times to previously ignored stimuli in the semantic facilitation 
test. This demonstrates that the high-schizotypy scorers were fully processing the distractors, and 
supports the reduced inhibition hypothesis (Beech et aI., 1991). Ferraro and Okerlund (1996) found 
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evidence that the differences in negative priming between low and high schizo types are not a result 
of simple motor reaction time differences. Moritz and Mass (1997) compared high-schizotypy 
scorers with controls on a Stroop type colour word reading task and a priming condition, in which 
the target of a stimulus is identical with the distractor in the subsequent stimulus, and successfully 
ruled out the possibility that the reduction in negative priming seen in high schizotypes is simply 
due to dyslexia or deficits in early processing. To ensure that reduced inhibition is specific to 
schizophrenia and not solely to a non-specific psychiatric state, Laplante et al. (1992) tested 
depressive subjects in negative priming, and found that they showed the same amount of negative 
priming as controls. Tipper and Baylis (1987), however, did fmd a similar effect of a reduction of 
negative priming in participants who scored high on a measure of everyday absent-mindedness and 
failures of attention. The measure they used was called The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, so 
logically, people high on schizophrenic symptomatology would most likely also score high on this 
questionnaire. 
There have been a handful of studies that did not find a reduction of negative priming in 
high schizotypal participants. For instance, Green and Williams (1999) failed to fmd a significant 
association between schizotypy and negative priming. Moritz and Andresen (2004) found a slight 
correlation between a lack of negative priming and positive schizotypy; however, the effect was not 
significant. Both of these studies used the Stroop (1935) colour-word ink-naming task, and 
although many of the studies that did find a significant effect between a reduction in negative 
priming and positive schizotypy also used this task, it seems to be very sensitive to small nuances in 
timing. In one study, Beech et al. (1989) found that as presentation time of the stimulus increases, 
the relation between schizotypy and priming decreases. They suggest that to find an effect, the 
presentation time of the displays should be equal to or less than 100 ms. Green and Williams 
(1999) also suggested that their negative finding could have been due to the fact that they did not 
find a strong negative priming effect across all of their participants, making it more difficult to find 
a reduced priming effect in high schizotypes. 
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Another nuance of the negative priming paradigm is that the participant needs to know that 
the test situation will be difficult and that there will be distractors. When participants know there 
will be distractors, they get into a "selection state", and block all that is irrelevant (May, Kane, & 
Hasher, 1995). If they do not think that it will be difficult, then they take in everything, distractors 
and all, and instead of negative priming happening, their responses to the distractors may become 
facilitated when they become target stimuli. May et al (1995) suggested that this could be one of 
the reasons a reversal in negative priming was found in some schizophrenic and high schizotypal 
participants, in terms of attentional and experiential openness. This is one of the reasons 
instructions are so important in the negative priming task. Of course, another problem in trying to 
discern the mechanism responsible for any cognitive task when measuring participants with 
schizophrenia is that they may not be as motivated to perform well on a given task. If that is the 
case, then even if the task is difficult, they may not be motivated enough to access the "selection 
state" needed to bring about the effects of negative priming. Careful observations and directions 
would be needed to ensure that inhibition, not motivation, is being tested. One example of such a 
direction would be to let the participants know that they are being timed so they know they must 
work quickly. 
The assumption that inhibition operates during selection to reduce the future interference of 
current distractors was challenged in a review by May et aL (1995). Instead of inhibition acting in a 
future direction to assure that a distractor remains a distractor, they found data that supported the 
hypothesis that inhibition acts in a backward fashion and instead is a function of memory. The 
assumption behind this hypothesis is that every stimulus activates all recent memories of it, and if 
something is remembered to be a distractor, then it takes longer for the participant to now see it as a 
target stimulus (May et aL, 1995). An example of a study supporting this hypothesis was one by 
Lowe (1985) who found that inhibition requires some time to develop, suggesting that it does not 
happen during current selection. Instead of inhibition, in which a distractor activates its internal 
memory representation and an inhibitory mechanism decouples it from the response output, this 
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new mechanism, called episodic retrieval, works so that the presentation of a stimulus automatically 
evokes the most recent memory of that stimulus, so it is remembered as a distractor and ignored. In 
their paper, May et aI. (1995) offer ways to avoid the activation of the episodic retrieval mechanism 
and to ensure that it is, in fact, inhibition that is being tested. They suggest longer stimulus 
displays, using response requirements such as naming, and to omit repeated target trials. They also 
concluded that negative priming is still the best mechanism for testing inhibition (May et aI., 1995). 
The results found with negative priming and latent inhibition offer further support for the 
dimensional model of schizophrenia since the same pattern of cognitive inhibition is found in 
people high in positive schizotypy as well as in those showing positive symptoms of schizophrenia. 
Additional support was obtained by Carson et aI. (2003) who found that more or less the same 
pattern of cognitive inhibition was present in high lifetime creative achievers. One possible 
conclusion from this data on cognitive similarities is that the more one is creative, the more 
schizotypal or predisposed to schizophrenia one is as well. The other possibility, one that will be 
mentioned below, is that the creative people have additional characteristics that act as buffers from 
psychosis, such as intelligence, allowing them to use their cognitions in more productive ways. 
An examination from an evolutionary standpoint as to why the cognitive abnormalities 
associated with schizophrenia would remain in the gene pool suggests that although these cognitive 
mechanisms could cause problems for those affected with schizophrenia, they could work in 
different and more adaptive ways for creative individuals, and in turn, could benefit society with 
culturally valued creativity. Several researchers (e.g., Kinney & Matthysse, 1978) have proposed a 
compensatory model in which genes that predispose people to mental illness remain in the 
population for their benefits of creativity. Creativity is a highly valued characteristic for the 
purposes of defining and advancing culture and also from the perspective of most individuals. 
Artists and musicians, especially those of high caliber, will certainly be deemed as desirable by 
many. Therefore, if there are creativity genes that may predispose some to mental illness, then 
there is an utmost probability that they will be passed down. 
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Frith (1979) believed that excessive or overly inclusive information processing helps 
stimulate delusions in the schizophrenic patient. Creative individuals, who also experience an 
excess of information from the environment, may be able to use this information to help create new 
associations for creative ideas. Of course, creative indiViduals likely experience this excess of 
information to a lesser degree than schizophrenic patients or possess some compensatory 
characteristic, making it less overwhelming. For example, perhaps artists are more able to switch 
between high and low arousal states, so that not only do they generate new ideas, but they are also 
able to examine them to make sure they are relevant. A related theory is the biological model 
proposed by Claridge (1972) in terms of arousal states of people with schizophrenia. He found that 
the usual inverted U shape that dictates optimal functioning at a moderate level of arousal in non-
psychotic participants is actually a right-side-up U shape for schizophrenic participants and normal 
participants on LSD-25. In other words, instead of functioning optimally at a moderate level of 
arousal on various tests, these groups function better at extremely high or low levels of arousal. In 
a later study, Claridge and Chappa (1973) found a similar pattern of optimal functioning in high 
participants demonstrating high levels of psychopathology. Claridge (1972) concluded that these 
results offered further evidence for the dimensional model of psychosis. In a later paper, Claridge 
(1987) suggested that this atypical pattern of nervous system functioning might be an important 
biological characteristic in predisposing people to schizophrenia. It could also be one of the main 
reasons for the cognitive deficits and personality characteristics seen in these patients in everyday 
social circumstances. Yet this overinclusiveness may be beneficial for finding creative solutions in 
situations of high stress. In stressful times when most people would be overwhelmed and 
functioning at a less than optimum level, those predisposed to overinc1usiveness would perhaps be 
able to function at a more creative level. Perhaps more stress could induce a more manic state that 
helps generate many ideas. 
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Creativity and Psychopathology (With a Focus on the Schizophrenia Spectrum): Differences 
Apart from the numerous similarities between creativity and psychopathology there are 
many fundamental differences showing that the phenomena are not identical. First of all, many 
researchers would agree that the psychotic's responses on a test of creativity may fit into the 
definition of creativity by being original, but does not necessarily fit into the second part of the 
defmition of being relevant (Eysenck, 1995). Relevance would likely include other factors that help 
individuals reject responses that are merely idiosyncratic (Eysenck, 1995). As mentioned above, 
Rubinstein (2008) found low creativity scores in a group of people with schizophrenia. Many 
people with schizophrenia engage in creative endeavors, but there seem to be some fundamental 
differences in their art as compared to art created by non-schizophrenics. Arieti (1974) analyzed 
the art of many patients with schizophrenia and found the motivating factor behind many of their 
works to be an adjustment to their new vision of reality. Often their realities are quickly changing, 
which can be quite distressing for the patient. An attempt to crystallize their realities, therefore, 
often comes out in their art. Some typical themes that can be found in schizophrenic art include 
concrete representations of ideas, forms that are bizarre, geometricized, distorted, fragmented, lack 
wholeness, have disconnected pieces, and at times disintegrate into scrawls (Arieti, 1974). They 
also typically fuse two or more subjects or make collages without unifying principles, similar to 
their word salads. Arieti (1974) found similar patterns in the poetry of schizophrenics, in that they 
focused on individual rhymes rather than whole meanings. He also found that artists who are later 
diagnosed with schizophrenia begin to show the features typical of schizophrenic art prior to their 
diagnosis. 
Despite the cognitive similarities in creative and schizophrenic individuals, some 
researchers believe that the similar cognitive mechanisms may produce differing effects in the two 
groups. For example, although Dykes and McGhie (1976) found that both creative individuals and 
those with schizophrenia appeared to take in a wider range of environmental input than the control 
group, a card sorting task revealed that this widening of environmental input may have detrimental 
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effects on the performance of those with schizophrenia, but not for those high in creativity. Their 
creative participants seemed to cope with their influx of environmental stimuli, and were able to 
process it without being overloaded with information. They concluded that what was different 
between the two groups was the amount of voluntary control they had over the amount of 
information entering their awareness (Dykes & McGhie, 1976). Perhaps highly creative people can 
step back from the flow of ideas and become more analytical in order to make sure what they are 
creating is also relevant. 
In his study of creative writers and architects, Barron (1969) found that his groups of high 
creatives were also high on a measure of ego strength. Ego strength was originally devised to 
predict which psychotic patients would benefit the most from psychotherapy. It measures such 
qualities as adaptability, resourcefulness, personal functioning, amount of secluding oneself, 
morality, sense of reality, and coping mechanisms. In the general population, ego strength is highly 
and negatively correlated with various types of psychoses. However, it was found to be quite high 
in creative individuals despite their high scores on all facets of the MMPI that would indicate 
psychopathology, which Eysenck would consider as predisposing one to schizo-affective disorders 
(Barron, 1969). Eysenck (1995) endorsed Barron's original suggestion and reported that ego 
strength, characterized by high motivation, the ability to work hard, and the capability of intense 
concentration or controlled attention, is often negatively correlated with psychopathology, but 
positively correlated with creativity. Both Barron and Eysenck concluded that in the case of highly 
creative individuals, ego strength compensates for their psychopathological features, and allows the 
creative person to function in society (Barron, 1969; Eysenck, 1995). 
Rank (1932) had earlier observed differences between creative individuals and those he 
labeled as "neurotics". In context, what he meant by "neurotic" would now mean narcissistic, 
bipolar, and schizotypal disorders. He suggested that creative people are dominated by will 
whereas "neurotics" are weak-willed, and therefore, dominated by their instincts or their constant 
struggle to suppress them. Another clinically observed distinction between creative people and 
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"neurotics" is their dissimilar way of dealing with death. In Goodman's (1981) interview study, she 
found that artists tend to deal with death more directly and consciously than others. Many artists in 
her study found the contemplation of death to be stimulating and, as mentioned earlier, used it as 
motivation to create. "Neurotics", however, often struggle with their existential fears of death 
(Rank, 1932), even to the point of delusions of immortality. 
In a recent study, Nettle (2006) argued against the notion that creatives share all of the same 
characteristics of those high in schizotypy. Schizotypallack of voluntary control over selective 
attention, lower scores in ego strength, and less constructive ways of dealing with death support this 
notion. Nettle (2006) found in his study that poets and visual artists scored as high as mentally ill 
patients on measures ofunusual experiences and cognitive disorganization, but lower than even 
controls on introvertive anhedonia. Like other theorists mentioned above (e.g., Schuldberg, 2001), 
he found that creatives share positive schizotypal symptoms (i.e. unusual experiences) with 
patients, but not negative ones (i.e. introvertive anhedonia). He connected this to Barron's theories 
of ego strength, concluding that while creatives have more schizotypy, but not as much as 
schizophrenics, there are two factors of psychopathology (positive and negative) and creatives share 
only the positive. 
Interestingly, Nettle (2006) also found that visual artists and poets who described 
themselves as seriously involved but not working as professionals in their craft had higher levels on 
all facets of schizotypy, both positive and negative, than professionals who made all or part of their 
income from their craft. This indicates that those who are able to benefit socially from their craft, 
and tie it in with the way they make their living, are less schizotypal, or have less of the qualities 
that predispose others to schizophrenia. Perhaps those more seriously and personally involved 
create art that comes mostly from within, and so reflects more conflicted and less socially relevant 
states. Professionals, who are perhaps more business minded, may alternatively be more inclined to 
see a marketing opportunity for a specific craft, and reproduce ideas in mass quantities that may not 
be as personally significant, and in which they are not as emotionally involved. 
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Building from this notion, there is another possibility that conflicted states in creativity 
could vary depending on the stage of completion of a given project In other words, the differences 
between high creatives and those with schizo-affective disorders may be smaller or greater 
depending on whether they are in the midst of a project or at the end of it. Support for this idea can 
be found from Goswami's (1996) comparison of creativity to chaos theory. As mentioned above, 
he proposed various stages in the creative process. One of these stages consisted of the destruction 
of rigid patterns of associations in one's mind, which gives an opportunity for new and creative 
ideas to be formed. Following this reasoning, it is possible that there is greater conflict experienced 
prior to the completion of a project than when it is complete. Rank (1932) would in all probability 
agree with this notion as well, since he believed that the artist faced a constant struggle between life 
and art. He recognized that artists need to draw from experience in order to create, which often 
makes them sacrifice living their lives for their art. He also documented that artists face life's 
existential problems more directly, which increases their level of conflict. This conflict, however, 
is necessary to create. In other words, artists create due to deprivation, but then rise above their 
conflicts with a solution, their finished product (Rank, 1932). Rank (1941) also believed that some 
experiences can be directly transforming, a notion that was shared by many transpersonalists and 
existential philosophers such as Sartre (1964), who relieved his "nausea" in part by the writing of 
his novel. 
Other theorists have looked at intelligence as a candidate for accounting for the differences 
between creative people and those with mental disorders. Payne and Hewlett (1960) found that 
schizophrenics, like those with depression, perform slower on reasoning and cognitive tasks, and 
that this cannot be accounted for by their overinclusiveness. Others have suggested that certain 
people, although predisposed to schizophrenia, do not become clinically psychotic because they are 
inununized by their superior intellect (Carson et al., 2003; Claridge, 1972). This seems like a 
plausible theory given that people with schizophrenia are generally known to have a lower IQ level 
than average (Hu, Liu, Huo, & Li, 2000). It is also potentially related to Barron's original 
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definition of ego strength. Zannit et aL (2004) conducted a longitudinal study in which they found 
that people who developed schizophrenia had lower premorbid IQ scores than those who did not. 
This suggests that schizophrenia might not cause lower intelligence, but that low intelligence might 
be a risk factor for developing it in the first place. Conversely, Sheringham (1999) found that there 
is a subgroup of schizophrenics patients who have excellent premorbid grades in school. In fact, he 
found that eleven percent of people who later developed schizophrenia had excellent premorbid 
grades, while equivalent grades were found in only three percent of controls. To solve this 
dilemma, there is a possibility that it might be spatial intelligence that is lacking in people with 
schizophrenia, rather than verbal intelligence. Evidence for an intellectual asymmetry in 
schizophrenia with superiority of verbal skills to spatial skills has been found in several studies 
(Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998; Park, Puschel, Sacter, Rentsch, & Hell, 2002). Heinrichs & Zakzanis 
(1998) found evidence for a similar pattern in those who go on to develop schizophrenia, and 
Kravariti, Dixon, Frith, Murray, and McGuire (2005) found the pattern in first-degree relatives of 
people with schizophrenia. Furthermore, Longevialle-Henin et aL (2005) found that the severity of 
disorganization influences the visuospatial context of processing and visuospatial working memory 
in people with schizophrenia. Spatial intelligence will thus be measured in this study using the 
Embedded-Figures Test (Thursone, 1944). 
Interestingly, in terms of a general factor of spatial orientation, studies have found that 
people with schizophrenia have poorer physical balance than their non-schizophrenic counterparts 
(Sullivan, Rosenbloom, & Pfefferbaum, 2002). Balance may not be directly correlated with spatial 
intelligence, but Hunt (1995) suggested that balance and spatial skills are aspects of the core sense 
of self, the same self that Sass (1992) argued to be diminished in patients with schizophrenia. In 
other words, the deletion of the self talked about by Sass and schizophrenic symptoms that can lead 
to positive symptoms such as hallucinations in schizophrenia are directly related to body image 
distortions, spatial disorganization, and dizziness (Schilder, 1950). Furthermore, Ayers et aL (1999) 
found a correlation between good balance beam performance and mystical experiences, mystical 
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experiences being the major variable separating creatives from imaginative controls in their study. 
Similarly, Swartz and Seginer (1981) found that a task related to both balance and spatial 
orientation (namely, pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey) was related to the proclivity to mystical 
experience. Ayers et al. (1999) also found that nightmares correlated with poor balance. These 
findings demonstrate that good balance is, indeed, correlated with positive and more integrative 
states while poor balance is associated with more disintegrative states. Perhaps a similar pattern 
could be seen in creative individuals, who tend to score higher on measures of mystical experience, 
and the opposite may be found in those with schizophrenia, whose balance and spatial intelligence 
tends to be diminished. This is precisely what is expected to be found in this study. Some evidence 
has been found for creativity relating to spatial ability. For instance, Moreno and Morales (2008) 
found that spatial ability predicted student's ability to recreate a work of visual art. Similarly, 
Spotts and Mackler (1967) found field-independence, which they measured using a similar task 
used in this study to measure spatial ability, to be related to a battery of creativity tasks. If spatial 
ability including balance is indeed something that separates creativity and the schizophrenic 
spectrum, then the artists in this study should score significantly higher than the people with 
schizophrenia in both of these variables, and they should be negatively correlated with negative 
schizotypy. 
As mentioned earlier, Sass and Parnas (2003) believed that the sense of presence is 
diminished in schizophrenia. This is often felt as a detachment from the self or the body . Some 
may even begin to experience that they not are direeting themselves, but instead, are being 
directed by an external force. Sense of self-presence could be another variable that separates 
those who are creative, and those who develop schizophrenia. In fact, sense of presence is noted 
to be affected in both mystical states and in schizophrenic states, although in mystical states, it is 
enhanced, whereas in schizophrenic states it is deleted (Hunt, 2004). According to Hunt (2007), 
sense of presence is the underlying variable of which spatial abilities and balance are more 
outward measures. 
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In addition to measuring spatial abilities and balance, presence will also be directly 
assessed using a sense of presence measure devised for this study. This measure consists of 
words used as metaphors to describe states of being felt by the participants. Positive presence 
will be measured by rating the amount participants experienced states that can be described by 
positive words, such as "centered" or "expanding". These words would be considered to enhance 
presence and would be positively related to integrated body image and spatial abilities. These 
types of states could also lead to mystical experience (Hunt, 2007). Negative presence will be 
measured with words that describe deletions in presence, such as "hollow" and "fragmented". 
These words are often used by people suffering from schizophrenic and related disorders to 
describe their feelings about themselves (Binswanger, 1963). Similar words, both positive and 
negative, are a major part of Barron's (1953b) original ego strength questionnaire. Again, if 
artists score higher on positive presence than people with schizophrenia than sense of presence 
can be considered yet another variable that differentiates creativity and the schizophrenia 
spectrum. 
Hypotheses 
The present study will measure the concepts of creativity, negative priming, spatial 
abilities, presence, absorption, mystical experience, and schizotypy in three groups of 
participants: people high in creativity (the artist group), people on the extreme end of the 
schizophrenia spectrum (the schizophrenic group), and a comparison group matched for gender 
and age with the artist group. The correlations between the same variables will also be examined 
within a larger group of university students. 
1. The Creativity Measures, Creativity, and Schizotypy 
a. To help demonstrate the validity of the creativity measures, it is hypothesized 
that the artist group will score higher than the matched-age comparison group on 
measures of creativity. 
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b. To demonstrate that people on the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum are 
less creative, it is expected that the artist group will score higher than the 
schizophrenic group on the creativity measures. 
c. It is expected that the artist group will score higher than the matched-age 
comparison group on unusual experiences (positive schizotypy) and impulsive 
nonconformity. It is also expected that the schizophrenic group will score higher 
than the other two groups on social anhedonia (negative schizotypy). 
d. Furthermore, it is expected that unusual experiences and impulsive 
nonconformity will correlate positively with the creativity measures in the 
student group. 
2. Negative Priming and Distractibility 
It is hypothesized that the artist group and the schizophrenic group will have 
reduced ncgative priming as opposed to the matchcd-age comparison group. Similarly, it 
is hypothcsized that creativity and positive schizotypy will correlate negatively with 
negative priming in the student group (revealing a reduction in negative priming). 
Furthermore, it is expected that the schizophrenic group will be higher in distractibility 
than the other groups. No predictions are made for the artists in distractibility. 
3. Spatial Ability, Balance, and Presence 
It is expected that the artist group and the matched-age comparison group will 
score higher on spatial intelligence, balance, and positive presence than the schizophrenic 
group, while the schizophrenic group will score higher on negative presence. There is, 
however, a possibility that the artist group will score higher on spatial intelligence than 
the matched-age comparison group because of their practice with spatial activities, that is, 
visual art, and since Moreno and Morales's (2008) found that spatial ability predicted 
student's ability to recreate a work of visual art. 
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Furthermore, it is expected that negative schizotypy will be negatively correlated 
with spatial intelligence, balance, and positive presence in the student group, and 
positively correlated with negative presence. Previous research found that balance 
correlated positively with mystical experience and negatively with more disintegrative 
states such as nightmares (Ayers et aI., 1999). Similar findings are expected to be 
replicated in this study. 
4. Absorption and Mystical Experiences 
a. It is hypothesized that the matched-age comparison group will have lower 
scores on absorption and mystical experience, than the other two groups. 
Similarly, it is expected that both creativity and schizotypy will correlate 
positively with absorption and mystical experiences in the student group. 
b. It is hypothesized that both the artist and the schizophrenics will score high in 
mystical experiences; however, the mystical states should have different patterns 
of relation with schizotypy and its correlates. These patterns are expected to be 
found within the correlations of the creative and schizophrenic groups. More 
specifically, it is expected that mystical experiences will be correlated with more 
positive states (e.g. positive presence, spatial abilities, and balance) in the 
creative group, as well as in the student group, but with more negative states 
(e.g., neuroticism and negative presence) in the schizophrenic group. 
c. It is expected that absorption will at least partially mediate the relation between 
creativity and the propensity to mystical experiences, and to measures that show 
conflicted states such as schizotypy. 
5. Measures of Conflicted ness: Childhood Trauma and Neuroticism 
a. It is expected that childhood trauma will be higher in the schizophrenic group 
than in the other groups. In the student group, it is expected that it will be related 
to absorption, but not to creativity per se. 
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b. It is hypothesized that neuroticism will be related to childhood abuse in the 
student group. The differences between the community groups are unknown due 
to the conflicted nature of the topic in the creativity literature. 
There has been no other study that has tested all of these variables simultaneously. For 
instance, the propensity to mystical experiences has never been examined as a commonality, nor 
h~ve spatial and related tasks been examined as differences or compensatory variables in the 
literature that examines the relation between creativity and psychopathology. This study should 
be helpful in distinguishing factors that both draw together and differentiate these concepts. 
Method 
Participants 
Five groups of participants were recruited for this study. Four constituted the core 
groups, and one was a preliminary student comparison group used to validate the manipulation of 
the negative priming task. The groups consisted of a student group, used to examine the variables 
in a nonnal population; an artist group, used to examine exceptioual creativity in a group of 
people working in the creative field of visual arts; a schizophrenic group, used to examine people 
at the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum, and a comparison group, used to compare with 
the artist and schizophrenic groups. The entire sample size was 211, 70 men and 141 women. 
See Table 1 for separate group sizes, gender, and age breakdowns. The comparison group was 
matched with the artist group for gender and age. 
Table 1. Gender and Age of Participants 
n # Males # Females Mean Age Age Range 
Student Group 102 25 77 19.8 17-28 
Student Comparison Group 37 12 25 20.3 18-50 
Schizophrenic Group 10 7 3 37.7 25-60 
Artist Group 31 14 17 43.1 21-78 
Matched-Age Comparison Group 31 12 19 39.4 23-76 
The student groups were recruited from the introductory psychology course at Brock 
University. One student fit the criteria of the working artist group, and was therefore added to the 
artist group. The patients with schizophrenia were recruited from various programs that provide aid 
to those with schizophrenia such as The Oak Center in Welland, Ontario, an alteruative clubhouse 
for people with mental illness, and the Schizophrenia Society of Ontario, S1. Catharines division. 
The comparatively small size of the patient group makes its inclusion here primarily suggestive and 
exploratory, although of potential theoretical importance. The high creative achievers were 
recruited by approaching working visual artists in the area. The criteria for choosing them was that 
they have had shows, sell their art, consider that art is, or is part of, the way they make their living, 
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and/or a way they spend a great deal of their time. This group was recruited through the Niagara 
Artists Company, the Niagara Gallery, the Kennedy Gallery, the Niagara Falls Gallery, anintemet 
site providing free advertizing (www.kijiji.ca). the cafe Tu Tu Tango (a restaurant where visual 
artists painted in front of customers). The matched-age comparison group was recruited through an 
internet site providing free advertizing (www.kijiji.ca).This group was largely found by asking the 
researcher's neighbours and extended family members who fit the approximate ages of those in the 
artist group. They were only asked to participate if they did not make any part of their income in 
creative endeavors nor spend a great deal of time engaging in a creative endeavor (e.g. spend their 
days painting, but just not selling their work). Having a creative hobby was fine. 
The two student groups were compensated with credit towards their psychology course, and 
the other three groups were given two $1 scratch tickets as a thank you for their time and effort. 
The tests took approximately one hour to administer. 
Measures 
Creativity was measured in two ways. The first was using the Barron-Welsh Art Scale 
(Barron & Welsh, 1952). This questionnaire consists of 86 figures drawn in black ink, some 
simple, and some complex, of which the participants must judge and respond with "like" or "don't 
like". See appendix A to view this scale. Scores on this test are referred to as a measure of 
"origence", which is unrelated to IQ, but related to real-life creativity and traits that are often 
associated with creative individuals (Welsh, 1975). Origence refers to a preference for perceiving 
and dealing with complexity over a preference for simplicity (Eysenck, 1995). Barron (1953a) 
found that high scores on the Barron-Welsh Art Scale were correlated .29 with verbal fluency,.35 
with flexibility, and .30 with staff and faculty ratings of creativity. Validity was also obtained in 
several studies that differentiated creative versus non-creative groups of individuals in specific 
fields with high potentials for demonstrating creativity. Gough (1976) found a correlation of.41 
between scores on the Barron-Welsh Art Scale and peer and supervisor ratings of creativity in a 
group of research scientists. Hall and MacKinnon (1969) found that creative architects scored 
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significantly higher than non-creative architects on the Barron-Welsh Art Scale. Reliability results 
were summarized by Welsh (1975) who reported test-retest correlations of up to .90, and 
Cronbach's alpha of .89. 
This test was chosen over other tests of creativity because of its visual nature. It makes 
sense to have a visual test to compare students with working visual artists in creativity. Visual 
artists may not perform as well on verbal measures. Furthermore, in Eysenck's comprehensive 
survey, correlations among most creativity measures are quite low, and most do not predict 
creativity very well. Eysenck (1995) found the greatest validity in the Barron-Welsh Art Scale. 
Creativity was also measured using a self-rated measure of creativity and creative hobbies 
devised for this study (see Table 2). Participants were asked to rate how creative they think they 
are compared to others on a five-point likert scale (ranging from I being defmitely false to 5 being 
defmitely true). Hocevar (1981) has argued that simply asking the individual is ultimately one of 
the most valid ways of measuring creativity. The question whether they had any hobbies was not 
scored so as not to be redundant with the last question. The list of hobbies was scored on a five-
point scale (ranging from I being one hobby to 5 being five hobbies). The total score consisted of 
the mean of all of the questions. 
Table 2. Self-Rated Creativity Questionnaire 
TIIE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR CREATIVITY AND YOUR CREATIVE 
HOBBIES. PLEASE USE TIIE FOLLOWING SCALE TO INDICATE HOW TRUE THESE 
STATEMENTS ARE FOR YOU. 
I Definitely false 2 = Mostly false 3 = Neutral 4 = Mostly true 5 = Definitely true 
1. I am a very creative individual. 
2. Others think I am very creative. 
3. I often come up with new ideas that excite me. 
4. I can draw or paint quite well. 
5. I can often create new songs and melodies. 
6. I am a very creative writer (stories, poems, creative essays). 
7. Do you have any creative hobbies? Yes_ No 
If yes, please list these creative hobbies. ___________________ _ 
Table 2. Self-Rated Creativity Questionnaire (con't) 
7a. If you have listed any hobbies, how creative do you consider yourself at these hobbies? 
Not at all creative little Average _Better than average creative 
7b. If you have listed any hobbies, how much time do you spend on these creative hobbies? 
_Less than an hour per month 
_About 3 hours per week 
About 3 hours per month _About 1 hour per week 
_More than 3 hours per week 
Schizotypy was assessed using the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and 
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Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason, Claridge, & Jackson, 1995; see Appendix B), a multidimensional 
measure of schizotypal personality that is made up of positive schizotypy (unusual experiences), 
disorganized schizotypy/social anxiety (cognitive disorganization), asocial schizotypy (impulsive-
nonconformity), and negative schizotypy (introvertive anhedonia). The O-LIFE, in which each 
question is answered with a yes or a no, was chosen over the Chapman scales, another widely used 
battery of schizotypy scales, due the O-LIFE's recent extended usage with schizotypal and creative 
participants. Burch, Steel, and Hemsley (1998) conducted a test-retest study with the O-LIFE and 
found that the scores for each subscale of the questionnaire were highly correlated with the score on 
the same subscale three to six months later (r = .76 to .93). Mason et al. (1995) reported good 
factorial validity of the four subscales. 
Negative Priming and distractibility were tested using a paper-and-pencil task devised for 
this study by Professor Paul Tyson. This task was based on a widely used computer procedure 
reported by Tipper and Baylis (1987) with which consistent and significant results were found with 
people high in schizotypy. It was changed to a paper-and-pencil task for ease of administration, and 
so that several participants could be tested at the same time, given the number of participants 
required for this study. The test used a within-subject design that consisted of four pages of 
searching for target words amongst distractors. Each page represented a different condition. The 
first consisted of a control condition, in which there were both target and distractor words. The 
second condition, the same distractor condition, consisted of different target words, but the identical 
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distractor words as in the fIrst condition. In the third condition, or negative priming condition, the 
target words were made up of distractor words from the previous two conditions, and the distractor 
words were all new words. In the fourth condition, or distractibility condition, the target words 
consisted of never-seen-before words, but the distractorwords consisted of target words from the 
previous three conditions, and distractor words from the previous condition. This condition 
measured the amount participants were distracted by words from previous categories. 
The four semantic categories were names of people, animals, articles of clothing, and body 
parts. Each page consisted of approximately 200 words and 20 target words. They were presented 
in 20 rows often words each, all in uppercase letters (see Appendix C for complete lists of all 
words in all conditions). 
Participants were asked to cross out as many words as they could in one minute that fIt into 
a given semantic category. The experimenter timed the participants for each condition by telling 
them when to turn the page, and when to stop writing. In order to prevent a ceiling effect, the 
experiment was adjusted so that not all targets were possible to fmd within the given time period. 
The participants were informed ahead of time that it is impossible to fInd all of the target words in 
the given time, but to try and fmd as many as they can. 
The amount of negative priming was calculated by partialling out the amount of words 
found in the same distractor condition (the second trial) from the amount of words found in the 
negative priming condition in an analysis of covariance. Distractibility was measured by partialling 
the same distractor condition from the distractibility condition. The fIrst distractor condition was 
not used in the calculations because it is assumed that the participants were still becoming 
accustomed to the task and may not have found as many words as in the second, or same, distractor 
condition. Difference scores will also be reported in the results for purposes of clarity. Negative 
priming difference scores will consist of the negative priming condition minus the same distractor 
condition and distractibility scores will consist of the distractibility condition minus the same 
distractor condition. 
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As a manipulation check of this task and to determine whether slowing effects across the 
conditions were due to more than simply fatigue, practice, or difficulty, a similar task was given to 
the smaller student comparison group. The task and the instructions were identical, but the negative 
priming and distractibility manipulations were omitted. The first and second trial no longer 
contained target words that appeared later in trial three, which eliminated the negative priming 
effect. Similarly, the fourth trial no longer contained words that were previously target words on 
the preceding three trials. These words were replaced with new but similar words. 
Spatial Ability was measured using the Embedded-Figures Test (Thurstone, 1944). The 
figures used in this test were originally developed by Gottschaldt (1938), who used them to test 
the role of past experience on perception. Thurstone (1944) abstracted five simple and 27 
complex forms from Gottschaldt's original test to devise a measure of spatial ability. The test 
consists of a series of 27 complex geometric designs divided over three pages, with a time limit of 
eight minutes. Embedded in each complex design is one of two simple figures on the top of each 
page which the subject must locate as quickly as possible and trace the outline of with a marker. 
The total score is the number of correct simple forms the participant locates in the 27 complex 
designs (see appendix D). This measure was chosen due to its face validity; in other words, it 
seems impossible to do well in this test without good spatial skills. This test shows a reasonable 
level of concurrent validity, as it correlates with various other measures of spatial ability such as 
the W AIS block design (Hunt, Gervais, Shearing-Johns, & Travis, 1992; MacLeod & Jackson, 
1986) and Kohs block design test (Witkin, 1950). Witkin (1950) found high odd-even reliability 
(.87) for a slightly different version of the test using 24 figures. 
Balance was assessed with a self-report questionnaire devised for this study, since direct 
balance beam testing was not practical. Participants were asked to rate themselves on a five-point 
Likert scale as to whether they think they have good physical balance, how skilled they think they 
are at several tasks that require good balance, and how well they think they can orient themselves 
spatially with regards to directions (see Table 3). The total score consisted of the mean of all of the 
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questions. In a study directly assessing balance (Ayers et aI., 1999), balance beam performance 
was found to correlate .45 - .60 with proclivity to mystical experience and .44 with absorption, 
meaning that those who have more mystical experiences and who are higher in absorption, have 
better balance. 
Table 3. Balance Questionnaire 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR PHYSICAL BALANCE AND SPATIAL 
ORIENTATION. PLEASE USE. THE FOLLOWING SCALE TO INDICATE HOW TRUE THESE 
STATEMENTS ARE FOR YOu. 
1 = Definitely false 2 = Mostly false 3 = Neutral 4 = Mostly true 5 = Defmitely true 
1. I have very good physical balance. 
2. I am very good at riding a bicycle. 
3. IfI had to walk: on a balance beam, I would do quite well. 
4. I have never experienced sudden vertigo either spontaneously or in response to mild 
heights. 
5. I have a very good sense of direction, in that I can find my way around unfamiliar cites 
quite well. 
Positive and negative presence was assessed using the Existential Presence Questionnaire 
(Hunt & Michalica, 2008) devised for the purpose of this study (see Table 4). A list was 
constructed of38 words (19 positive and 19 negative) that are believed to represent distinct states 
of our inner most sense of presence or being. These words are metaphors that describe basic felt 
experiences (e.g. empty, grounded, dynamic, and unreal). They were derived partly from 
Barron's ego-strength questionnaire (Barron, 1953b), from the writings of phenomenologists and 
psychotherapists who study both integrative and disintegrative states of felt presence (Almaas, 
1986; Guntrip, 1968; Malsow, 1968), and finally, from Binswanger (1963), who provided rich 
descriptions of the inner world of schizophrenia. Damasio (1999) has termed such states 
"background feelings" and Heidegger (1927) "primordial being experiences". A master list of all 
these state-describing words was first collected, after which obvious redundancies and ambiguous 
words were eliminated. 
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Table 4. Existential Presence Questionnaire (Measures Positive and Negative Presence) 
THE FOLLOWING WORDS COULD DESCRIBE YOUR MOST FUNDAMENTAL SENSE OF 
YOURSELF AS IN TIIE STATE OF YOUR INNER MOST BEING. PLEASE USE THE 
FOLLOWING SCALE TO RATE WORDS TIIAT TRULY DESCRIBE TIIE MOST BASIC QUALITY 
AND ATMOSPHERE OF YOUR EXPERIENCE OVER THE PAST MONTH. 
I = None at all 2 Slightly 
In the last month, I felt like I was ... 
1. Complete 
2. Falling 
3. Boundless 
4. Empty 
5. Grounded 
6. Constricted 
7. Soaring 
8. Disconnected 
9. Vital 
_10. Disintegrating 
11. Free 
12. Dead 
13. Flowing 
14. Unreal 
15. Solid 
16. Out of it 
17. Clear ( Clarity) 
18. Decomposing 
19. Centered 
3 = Moderately 4 = Quite a bit 
20. Stuck 
_21. Rising 
22. Pointless 
_23. Deep 
_ 24. Fragmented 
25. Natural 
26. Mechanical 
_ 27. Expanding 
28. Deficient 
29. Balanced 
5 = Completely 
30.- Contaminated 
31. Fulfilled 
32. Hollow 
_ 33. Radiating 
34. Flat 
_ 35. Dynamic 
36. Disoriented 
37. Perfection 
_ 38. Drifting 
Participants were asked to rate the degree to which each word describes their experience 
during the past month on a five-point Likert scale (ranging from I being none at all to 5 being 
completely). High scores on the positive words signify high positive presence, and high scores 
on the negative words signify higher negative presence. High scores on both may represent the 
creative struggle while low scores on both may signify either lower absorption, or lack of 
awareness of one's core sense of self. 
Absorption was measured using Tellegen and Atkinson's (1974) widely used Tellegen 
Absorption Scale (TAS). This scale contains 34 true/false items that inquire about individual 
differences in responding to engaging stimuli, vividness of imagery, cross-modal experiences, and 
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experiences in altered states of consciousness. To increase the range of responses, the true/false 
rating was switched to a five-point Likert scale (ranging from I being definitely false to 5 being 
defmitely true). According to Tel1egen (1982), the TAS with the true/false rating has an internal 
reliability of r = .88, and a 30-day test-retest reliability of r .91 (see Appendix E). 
The Hood Questionnaire of Mystical Experiences (Hood, 1975) was employed in this 
study to measure the amount of mystical experience experienced by the participants. This 
measure was chosen because it measures explicit mystical experiences and because it was hoped 
that this study would replicate Ayers et al.'s (1999) fmding of a correlation between the 
propensity for mystical experiences and creativity. The 32 items on this questionnaire measure 
states such as feelings of unity, bliss, eternity, and subjective perspectives of time (see Appendix 
F). It was rated on a five-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 being definitely false to 5 being 
definitely true). Hood (1975) reported that the scale had adequate item-total correlation 
coefficients and concurrent validity. In another study, Hood et at (2001) found the reliability of 
this scale to be very good (a = .91). 
Degree and severity of childhood stressors and maltreatment was assessed using a 
shortened version of Bemstein et aI's (1994) Childhood Trauma Questionnaire. This new scale, 
devised by Bernstein et at (2003) has 28 items, and measures five factors of childhood 
maltreatment: physical abuse, emotional abuse, physical neglect, emotional neglect, and sexual 
abuse. Each subscale has five items, with three items measuring minimization and denial. Items 
are rated on a five,..point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = never true to 5 = very often true). The 
shortened version was used to reduce the effects offatigue, given the number of questionnaires in 
this study. Bernstein et al. (2003) found that the original questionnaire had Cronbach's alphas 
ranging from .61 to .95 for the five factors. They also found that the shortened version had good 
criterion-related validity in a subgroup of psychiatrically referred adolescents (see Appendix G). 
Neuroticism was measured with the neuroticism component of the NEO-Five-Factor 
Inventory (FFI) (Costa and McCrae, 1992), one of the most widely used measures of personality. 
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The neuroticism facet has 12 items, rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging (ranging from 1 being 
definitely false to 5 being definitely true). McCrae and Costa (2007) found this scale to have good 
reliability (a = .86). Validity was confirmed by Kanning and Holling (2001), who reported that the 
scales correlated with biographical data in a personnel selection process (see Appendix H). 
Information regarding gender and age was gathered by a demographics questionnaire (see 
Appendix I). Participants also completed Bernstein and Putnam's (1986) Dissociation Scale for the 
purposes of another study. 
Procedure 
In order to maximize the sample size, testing took place at locations convenient for the 
participants (in their cities). Locations were chosen based on the comfort level of each 
participant. The students were tested in small seminar rooms at Brock University, while the 
community groups were tested in their homes, or at a community support clubhouse, and on 
occasion in coffee shops. 
Participants completed the questionnaires in groups varying from one to forty, depending 
on the size of the room that was available and the convenience of the participant. The researcher 
was present in all the sessions. The principal researcher conducted all of the research, with the 
exception of the student comparison group, assessing the validity of the negative priming 
measure, which was completed by a research associate. The various tests were administered in 
order of the importance of the hypotheses so that the tests that affect the main hypotheses 
(negative priming and schizotypy) were less likely to be affected by fatigue. Prior to filling out 
the questionnaires, the participants were each asked to sign a letter of informed consent. The 
participants were asked to provide their e-mail address or residential address so that they could 
receive a debriefing letter when the study was completed (see Appendix J). After completing the 
letter of informed consent, the participants were administered the negative priming task so that if 
there were more than one participant present, they could be timed simultaneously. The negative 
priming task was followed by the Barron-Welsh Art Scale, which they were told to complete at 
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their own pace. When everyone present was finished, instructions were given for the hidden 
figure task, and they completed it while being timed together. Finally, they were asked to 
complete the questionnaires as honestly and accurately as possible. The questionnaires were 
given in the following order: creativity, balance, schizotypy, positive and negative presence, 
absorption, mystical experiences, dissociation, childhood trauma, and neuroticism. Most of the 
questionnaires used a five-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = definitely false to 5 = definitely 
true), with the exception of the four schizotypy scales which used yes or no answers (entered into 
SPSS as 0 = no and 1 = yes). No time limit was given for the questionnaires and questions were 
addressed during the session. The anonymity of all participants' responses was ensured 
throughout the procedure. The entire procedure took approximately one hour. The participants 
had the option to terminate the study at any time if they did not feel comfortable; however, none 
did so. 
Planfor Analyses 
The following analyses were done to check the data and to test the hypotheses. 
Preliminary analyses were examined first. The data was checked for missing cases, distributions 
were checked for normality, and the reliability of each questionnaire was calculated. 
ANOV As were then calculated for the three community groups and these were examined 
fITst within each hypothesis. More specifically, the means of the artist group, the schizophrenic 
group, and the matched-age comparison group were compared for each variable. Full ANOV A 
tables can be viewed in Appendix K. When the ANOV As were fITst calculated, the student group 
was included in the analysis. Some significant differences, however, were noted between the 
student group and the matched-age comparison group which should not have happened since they 
were both comparison groups (see Appendix L). These differences could be due to age (the mean 
age of the students was 19.8, while the mean age of the matched-age comparison group was 39.4) 
or with student status. Due to these potentially confounding variables, it was decided that the 
ANOV As should include only the three community groups. However, there were a few 
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interesting fmdings in the results of the ANOVAs that included the student group, and these 
analyses can be seen in Appendix L. For post hoc comparisons, the least significant difference 
(LSD) multiple comparison test was used due to its increased power and because it works very 
well for the comparison of three means since it keeps the familywise error rate equal to the alpha 
level (Howell, 2007). 
A full factorial ANOVA was done to check for interactions between the groups and the 
various trials of the negative priming and distractibility tasks. An ANOVA including the student 
comparison group was also done to check for fatigue, practice, or level of difficulty of the various 
trials. These were followed by covariance analyses used to check the face validity of these 
cognitive tasks. To see if the negative priming manipulation worked, the covariance analysis 
partialled the second trial (the distractor trial) out of the third trial (the negative priming trial) and 
to see if the distractibility manipulation worked, the covariance analysis partialledthe second trial 
(the distractor trial) out the fourth (the distractibility trial). The face validity check for both 
negative priming and distractibility was done by comparing the partialled scores of the student 
group and the student comparison group. 
In order to examine group differences in the negative priming and distractibility tasks, 
regressions using dummy coding were utilized. Two new dummy variables were first coded, one 
to examine the differences between the artists and the comparison, and one to examine the 
differences between the artists and the schizophrenics. To partial out the second trial (the 
distractor trial), it was entered on the first step, followed by the group comparisons. Interactions 
between the second trial and the group comparisons were entered on the third step to rule out the 
possibility that the differences were related to the second trial. 
For each hypothesis, the ANOVAs or regressions were then followed by the correlations 
within the student group, which can be seen as an alternative test for the group ANOV As. These 
correlations test the same core hypotheses as the ANOVAs and were predicted to echo their 
results. Correlations within the three community groups were also calculated to see if the 
correlations differed within the various groups. Due to the large number of variables in this 
study, the correlations that were not predicted should be interpreted with extreme caution. To 
examine correlations with negative priming and distractibility, partials (again, with tria12 
partialled out) were used. All correlations can be found in Appendix M. 
To sum this up, the results will generally be presented with the ANOV As or 
regressions for the community groups first, followed by the correlations for the given 
variable within the student group. 
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
The data for all the paper-and-pencil tasks and questionnaires were entered into SPSS, 
version 13.0 for Windows. Preliminary analyses were conducted in order to check for missing 
data, and to obtain the internal consistency of each questionnaire. One participant in the student 
group skipped two pages, thereby missing 24 questions on the unusual experiences sub scale and 
17 questions on the cognitive disorganization subscale, while another skipped the entire presence 
questionnaire. Missing cases were deleted listwise for all of the analyses. 
Initially, it was planned that with the exception of the negative priming and distractibility 
validity checks, the student group and the student comparison group would be combined. 
However, some unexpected differences were found between the two groups. The greatest 
differences were found in the Barron-Welsh Art Scale and the Embedded-Figures Task (see Table 
7). There is a chance that these differences occurred because the data of the student control group 
was obtained by a different researcher. For this reason, the data collected from the student 
comparison group was kept only for the purposes of checking the validity of the negative priming 
and distractibility tasks, including the full factorial ANOV A checking for interactions and an 
ANOV A to view the effects of the manipulations by comparing all of the groups to a comparison 
group that had not been presented these manipulations. 
Distributions for Normality 
Most of the distributions of the variables were relatively normal with a few exceptions 
(see Table 7). Skewness is considered excellent if it falls within the range of -1 to + 1 (Georgee & 
Mallery,2003). Unsurprisingly, the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire was positively skewed for 
all groups. Negative presence was positively skewed in all groups except the schizophrenic 
group. The introvertive anhedonia subcale of the O-Life schizotypy measure and the negative 
priming task were slightly positively skewed in the matched-age comparison group. The 
impulsive nonconformity subscale of schizotypy was also slightly positively skewed in the artist 
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and schizophrenic groups. Finally, the Hood Questionnaire of mystical experiences was slightly 
negatively skewed in the schizophrenic group. The levels of child abuse, negative presence, and 
introvertive anhedonia are generally lower in normal samples, thus producing these distributions. 
The results including these measures, therefore, should be interpreted carefully, although 
community· group research must be expected to feature some skewness as part of its logic. 
Preliminary ANOVAsfor the Cognitive Task 
Prior to checking the validity of the cognitive tasks, a full factorial ANOVA was done on 
the three trials and the two student groups to check for interactions between the groups and the 
trials (see Table 5). It was found that there was a significant main effect for the trials, no main 
effect for the groups, and a significant interaction between the trials and the groups. Because of 
the significant interaction found in this ANOV A, a follow up ANOV A and t-test were done to see 
exactly where the significant differences lied. 
Table 5. ANOVA Results for the Student Groups on the Cognitive Task 
Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 df F P 
Trials M 17.31 13.67 13.23 1 281.40 .000** 
SE .19 .23 .25 
Student Student 
Group Comparison Group 
(N 102) (N = 37) df F P 
Groups M 14.72 14.76 1 .011 .917 
SE .19 .31 
Student Student 
Group Comparison Group 
Trials 2 3 4 2 3 4 df F P 
Trial * Groups M 17.67 14.07 12.41 16.95 13.27 14.05 1 23.81 .000** 
SE .19 .24 .26 .32 .39 .43 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
A second and similar ANOV A was done that split the results into the separate student 
groups. It was found that the main effect for trials was equally significant for both of the two 
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groups (student group: F(1, 101) = 382.84,p = .000; student comparison group: F(1, 36) = 83.40, 
p .000). A follow up T-test revealed that it was the distractibility trial in which the significant 
differences lie, T(137) = -3.31,p = .001. So to describe the interaction, it can be said that the two 
student groups differed significantly, but only on the fourth, or distractibility trial. 
Another ANOV A was conducted to compare the student comparison group from the 
other groups in order to check for practice, fatigue, and trial difficulty effects (see Table 6). This 
analysis revealed that the groups significantly differed on all of the trials. To examine the 
differences more closely, the post hoc tests were examined. These tests revealed that the student 
comparison group only differed from the schizophrenic group; however, the schizophrenic group 
seemed to perform worse on each trial, so the effect may not be contributable to negative priming. 
The test also revealed that the student comparison group differed significantly from each one of 
the other groups on the fourth, or distractibility triaL This signifies that the distractor words in 
the distractibility task had a significant effect on the performance of all of the groups for whom 
they were present. In other words, the distractibility effects were present despite fatigue or 
practice effects. As a post hoc exploration, the analyses were redone without the schizophrenic 
group. In this case, no group differences were found, F(3, 197) = .35,p .788. 
Table 6. ANOVA Results for all of the Groups on the Cognitive Task 
Student Matched-Age 
Student Comparison Schizophrenic Artist Comparison 
Group Group Group Group Group 
(N = 102) (N = 37) (N= 10) (N = 31) (N = 31) df F P 
Tria12 M 17.68 16.95 13.80 17.06 17.32 4,206 6.57 .000** 
SD 1.97 1.93 3.82 3.17 2.26 
Trial 3 M 14.07 13.27 9.40 14.19 13.55 4,206 7.71 .000** 
SD 2.26 2.75 3.75 2.95 2.90 
Tria14 M 12.41 14.05 9.80 12.35 12.10 4,206 5.71 .000** 
SD 2.73 2.12 3.36 3.30 2.43 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
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Negative Priming Manipulation Check 
To check the face validity of the negative priming task, the student group (adjusted mean: 
13.97) was compared to the student comparison group (adjusted mean: 13.55) by analysis of 
covariance (ANCOV A). The covariance was then done by partialling the score of the same 
distractor trial (second trial) from the score of the negative priming trial. The difference between 
the two groups was significant, F(2) = 4.21,p .017; however the result was in the opposite 
direction than predicted, meaning the negative priming manipulation was not successful. 
Distractibility Manipulation Check 
In the case of distractibility (trial 4 with trial 2 partialled out), the ANCOVA revealed 
that the difference between the student experimental group (adjusted mean: 12.31) and the student 
comparison group (adjusted mean: 14.34) was significantly differentF(2) = 13.32,p < .000, 
meaning that the distractibility manipulation was successful. 
Reliability Analyses. 
The Cronbach's alpha values and the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) 
of all the measures for all groups together and separately can be found in Table 7. Although 
means were used in the analyses, Table 7 reports totals for the schizotypy questionnaires, the 
mystical experiences questionnaire, and the neuroticism questionnaire so that results can be 
compared across their studies. Ofthese, the Hood mysticism scores were considerably higher 
than the norms for previous high creativity/absorption samples in Ayers et al (1999). The 
schizotypy scores were comparable to norms found by Mason and Claridge (2006), with the 
exception of the unusual experiences scores, which were slightly higher in this study. The 
reliability for all of the variables in all the groups together was adequate with the exception of the 
balance questionnaire and the impulsive nonconformity sub scale of the O-Life measure of 
schizotypy, both with a Cronbach's Alpha level of .69. The alphas were also problematic for 
these measures for the separate groups, especially for the schizophrenic group. 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics, Reliability, and Normality of the Tasks and Questionnaires. 
Means Standard Deviations 
Variables n (# Items) All Student Student Schiz Artist Matched-Age All Student Student Schiz Artist Matched-Age 
Groups Group Comparison Group Group Comparison Groups Group Comparison Group Group Comparison 
Group Group Group Group 
Barron-Welsh Art Scale* 211(86) 29.76 32.36 27.89 28.20 30.00 23.68 13.19 12.62 12.15 12.00 12.70 15.32 
Embedded-Figures Task* 211(27) 15.72 16.11 14.73 11.70 18.26 14.35 7.08 6.41 5.92 8.79 8.14 8.09 
Self-Rated Creativity 211(9) 2.91 2.68 2.61 3.14 4.22 2.64 1.04 .96 .90 .90 .51 .89 
Balance 211(5) 3.60 3.59 3.70 2.82 3.76 3.64 .81 .77 .73 .93 .78 .91 
Unusual Experiences* 211(30) 11.93 11.65 11.78 12.00 14.19 10.71 5.64 5.15 4.35 6.78 6.71 6.69 
Cognitive Disorganization* 211(24) 11.63 12.47 11.57 12.50 9.23 11.10 5.53 5.42 5.06 3.69 5.92 6.05 
Introvertive Anhedonia* 211(27) 5.32 5.16 4.41 9.40 4.74 6.19 4.22 4.15 3.78 5.19 3.83 4.35 
ImpUlsive Nonconformity* 211(23) 8.35 8.76 8.16 8.70 8.81 6.65 3.71 3.69 3.38 2.98 4.42 3.27 
Positive Presence 210(19) 3.02 2.94 2.97 2.71 3.72 2.76 .74 .65 .57 .86 .74 .77 
Negative Presence 210(19) 1.88 1.89 1.85 2.34 1.86 1.75 .72 .73 .65 1.00 .83 .55 
Absorption 211(34) 2.96 2.83 2.81 2.86 3.72 2.83 .73 .69 .55 .89 .56 .70 
Mystical Experiences* 211(32) 108.47 103.93 103.19 124.90 130.70 102.16 26.42 16.19 19.16 31.89 24:00 22.53 
Child Abuse 211(27) 1.56 1.41 1.30 2.02 1.98 1.81 .64 .46 .35 .77 .85 .78 
Neuroticism* 211(8) 33.55 35.07 32.46 36.70 29.45 32.90 9.25 9.15 9.55 2.63 9.25 9.46 
Trial 1 (First Names) 211(20) 17.22 17.58 17.27 13.80 16.97 17.32 2.90 2.81 2.50 2.30 3.18 2.95 
Trial 2 (Animals) 211(20) 17.22 17.68 16.95 13.80 17.06 17.32 2.44 1.97 1.93 3.82 3.17 2.26 
Trial 3 (Clothing) 211(20) 13.65 14.07 13.27 9.40 14.19 13.55 2.79 2.26 2.75 3.75 2.95 2.90 
Trial 4 (Body Parts) 211(20) 12.52 12.41 14.05 9.80 12.35 12.10 2.83 2.73 2.12 3.36 3.30 2.43 
Negative Primingt 211(1) -3.57 -3.61 -3.68 -4.40 -2.87 -3.77 2.32 2.32 2.48 2.84 2.29 1.93 
Distractibilityt 211(1) -4.70 -5.26 -2.89 -4.00 -4.71 -5.23 2.71 2.71 1.93 1.89 3.31 2.11 
*Based on total scores not individual mean scores; tReported as Difference Scores of Totals 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics, Reliability, and Normality of the Tasks and Questionnaires (Cont'd). 
Cronbach's Alpha Skewness 
Variables Total Student Student Schiz Artist Matched-Age Total Student Student Schiz Artist Matched-Age 
Group Comparison Group Group Comparison Group Comparison Group Group Comparison 
Group Group Group Group 
Barron-Welsh Art Scale .89 .87 .79 .95 .89 .90 -.23 .01 -.49 .25 -.11 .28 
Hidden Figure Task .91 .89 .87 .96 .90 .92 .06 -.19 .04 .59 -.06 .22 
Self-Rated Creativity .88 .86 .85 .78 .76 .85 -.09 .13 -.03 -.60 -.52 -.50 
Balance .69 .69 .74 .56 .51 .77 -.55 -.46 -.66 -.16 -.11 -.59 
Unusual Experiences .83 .80 .70 .88 .89 .89 .30 .39 .34 .55 .11 .20 
Cognitive Disorganization .85 .84 .82 .62 .89 .89 .04 -.00 .08 -.33 .29 .11 
Introvertive Anhedonia .80 .80 .75 .81 .76 .79 .91 1.21 .94 -.62 .88 1.08 
Impulsive Nonconformity .69 .69 .65 .48 .79 .65 .37 .29 -.09 1.24 1.12 .42 
Positive Presence .91 .88 .86 .92 .94 .92 .00 -.25 -.18 .64 -.52 -.13 
Negative Presence .93 .93 .91 .96 .94 .88 1.49 1.50 1.68 .10 1.44 1.51 
Absorption .94 .93 .89 .95 .91 .93 -.05 .04 -.23 -.26 -.08 .14 
Mystical Experiences .94 .94 .88 .97 .94 .92 -.15 .30 -.39 -1.17 -.76 .33 
Child Abuse .90 .91 .65 .95 .95 .94 2.21 2.09 2.29 .45 1.70 1.90 
Neuroticism .85 .86 .88 .79 .87 .87 .43 .54 .49 -.01 .79 .41 
Trial 1 (First Names) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -.82 -.87 -1.03 1.26 -.83 -.97 
Trial 2 (Animals) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -1.45 -.98 -1.16 .67 -2.15 -.60 
Trial 3 (Clothing) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -.53 -.30 .14 .10 -.64 -.36 
Trial 4 (Body Parts) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -.30 -.04 -.37 1.14 -.01 -.39 
Negative Priming N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -.07 .46 -.41 -.33 -.31 1.03 
Distractibility N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A .11 -.21 .52 -.37 -.31 -.34 
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Hypothesis 1: The Creativity Measures, Creativity, and Schizotypy. 
Creativity Measures in the Community Groups 
ANOV A results, group means, and standard deviations for the two creativity measures 
can be found in Table 8. The ANOV A for self-rated creativity was highly significant. The 
working artists were significantly higher than the other two groups (p .000) on self-rated 
creativity and hobbies, which helps demonstrate the validity of the measure and also demonstrates 
that people on the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum are less creative than artists. There 
was no significant difference between the schizophrenic group and the matched-age comparison 
group (p .069). 
Table 8. ANOVA Results for Creativity 
Schizophrenic Artist Matched-Age 
Group Group Comparison Group 
(N= 10) (N=31) (N=31) df F p 
Self-Rated Creativity M 3.14 4.22 2.64 2,69 34.93 .000** 
SD .90 .51 .89 
Barron-Welsh Art Scale M 28.20 30.00 23.68 2,69 1.67 .197 
SD 12.00 12.70 15.32 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
The ANOVA for the Barron-Welsh Art Scale (figure preference task) was not significant 
and the mean of the working artist group was not significantly higher than that of the other two 
groups (p .076), which diminishes its validity as an overall measure of creativity for the 
purposes of this study. In addition, there was no correlation(r .02) between the Barron-Welsh 
Art Scale and the self-rated measure of creativity in the student group, suggesting that they are 
not measuring the same concept. For these reasons, only the self-rated creativity measure will be 
reported when discussing creativity. However, there are some interesting correlations with the 
Barron-Welsh Art Scale that may give some insight into what this task is measuring. For 
exploratory reasons, therefore, significant findings with the Barron-Welsh Art Scale will be 
reported below. 
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Schizotypy in the Community Groups 
See Table 9 for ANOV A values for the schizotypy measures across the groups. The 
entire ANOVA was not significant for unusual experiences (positive schizotypy). As had been 
predicted, however, the mean of the working artist group was significantly higher than the 
matched-age comparison group (p = .045), demonstrating a relation between creativity and 
unusual experiences. The artist group did not differ from the schizophrenic group (p = .372), and 
the schizophrenic group did not differ from the matched-age comparison group (p = .599). 
Table 9. ANOVA Results for Schizotypy 
Schizophrenic Artist Matched-Age 
Group Group Comparison Group 
(N= 10) (N=31) (N=31) df F p 
Unusual Experiences M .40 .47 .36 2,69 2.11 .129 
SD .23 .22 .22 
Cognitive Disorganization M .52 .38 .46 2,69 2.88 .222 
SD .15 .25 .25 
Introvertive Anhedonia M .35 .18 .23 2,69 4.57 .014* 
SD .19 .14 .16 
Impulsive Nonconformity M .38 .38 .29 2,69 2.81 .067 
SD .13 .19 .14 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
The ANOV A for cognitive disorganization was not significant, and no predicted 
differences were found between the three community groups. 
The ANOVA was significant for introvertiveanhedonia (negative schizotypy). As 
predicted, the schizophrenic group scored significantly higher than the artist group (p = .004) and 
the matched-age comparison group (p = .042). In other words, people on the extreme end of the 
schizophrenia spectrum are very high in negative schizotypy. The working artist group did not 
differ from the matched-age comparison group in introvertive anhedonia (p = .184). 
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Lastly, the ANOVA for impulsive nonconformity was not significant. However, as 
predicted, the working artist group was significantly higher than the matched~age comparison 
group (p = .028), demonstrating that artists are high in the behavioural component of schizotypy. 
Creativity and Schizotypy in the Student Group 
The correlations within the student experimental group are largely in line with the 
comparisons between the three community groups (see Table 10). Self-rated creativity was 
significantly correlated with the unusual experiences sub scale (positive schizotypy) and impUlsive 
nonconformity, confirming the creativity and schizophrenia spectrum relation. By contrast, and 
as expected, self-rated creativity was not related to introvertive anhedonia (negative schizotypy) 
or cognitive disorganization. 
Table 10. Correlations Between Creativity and Schizotypy in the Student Group 
Unusual Experiences 
Cognitive Disorganization 
Introvertive Anhedonia 
Impulsive Nonconformity 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
Self-Rated Creativity 
.30** 
-.04 
-.00 
.36** 
Barron-Welsh Art Scale 
.20* 
.18 
.05 
.30** 
A regression for each subscalc of schizotypy was conducted to check the possibility of a 
curvilinear relation between that sub scale of schizotypy and creativity. For each regression, a 
sub scale of schizotypy was entered on the first step, followed by that sub scale of schizotypy 
squared. In each case, creativity was the dependant variable. The regressions were not 
significant, demonstrating that there is no curvilinear relation between any facet of schizotypy 
and creativity. 
The Barron-Welsh Art Scale 
To obtain a better idea as to what the Barron-Welsh Art Scale is measuring, the following 
observations were made. Interestingly, although it did not successfully distinguish between the 
artists and the matched-age comparison group, the Barron-Welsh Art Scale revealed identical 
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patterns of correlations to the four schizotypy measures as the self-rated measure of creativity. 
More specifically, the Barron-Welsh Art Scale was positively correlated with unusual experiences 
and impulsive nonconformity and not related to cognitive disorganization and introvertive 
anhedonia. However, it was also correlated with two negative variables, namely childhood abuse 
(r = .35; p = .001) and neuroticism (r = .26; p = .008). It was also correlated with the introvertive 
sub scale of mystical experiences (r = .26;p = .008), which will be discussed below. 
Also of interest was that within the artist group, self-rated creativity was significantly 
negatively related to the Barron-Welsh Art Scale (r = -.42; p = .020), in contrast to their 
nonsignificance (above) in the student experimental group. 
Hypothesis 2: Cognitive Similarities between Creativity and the Schizophrenia Spectrum 
Creativity, Schizophrenia and Negative Priming in the Community Groups 
Since the negative priming manipulation did not work out, the variable measured cannot 
be called 'negative priming'; however, group differences will still be checked for exploratory 
reasons. Hierarchical multiple regressions were done to check for group differences in the 
negative priming task. The same distractor trial (second trial) was entered on the first step of the 
regression to partial out its variance. The second step included dummy coded variables 
representing the comparison between the artist group versus the schizophrenic group, and the 
artist group versus the matched-age comparison group. It was predicted that the artist and the 
schizophrenic group (people at the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum) would score 
higher than the matched-age comparison group; however, the artist group (estimated M of third 
trial = 13.94) scored significantly higher than the schizophrenic group (estimated M= 11.60; see 
Table 11). The artist group and the matched-age comparison group (estimated M = 13.10) did not 
differ significantly from each other. 
75 
Table 11. Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Negative Priming Group Comparisons 
Variable df R2LJ F p B Sp2 t P 
Step 1 1,70 .579 96.26 .000** 
Trial 2 .761 .761 9.81 .000** 
Step 2 3,68 .047 37.93 .000** 
Trial 2 .691 .638 8.61 .000** 
Artists vs Schizophrenics .343 .210 2.84 .006** 
Artists vs Comparisons .219 .133 1.80 .077 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
Creativity, Schizotypy and Negative Priming in the Student Group 
Partial correlations (with trial 2 partialled out) were used to calculate correlations with 
the negative priming task in the student group. Nothing was found to be significant between 
creativity or schizotypy and the negative priming trial. Not surprisingly, the partial of negative 
priming, however, was correlated with the partial of distractibility (r = .55), meaning people who 
found more words on the third trial (negative priming trial) also found more on the fourth trial 
(distractibility trial). 
Creativity, Schizophrenia, and Distractibility in the Community Groups 
The three community groups were compared using a similar regression that was used in 
negative priming, however, no differences were found (see Table 12). 
Table 12. Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Distractibility Group Comparisons 
Variable df RLJ2 F p B sr t p 
Step 1 1,70 .389 44.53 .000** 
Tria12 .624 .624 6.67 .000** 
Step 2 3,68 .006 14.78 .000** 
Tria12 .608 .562 5.96 .000** 
Artists vs Schizophrenics .100 .062 .65 .516 
Artists vs Comparisons .033 .020 .21 .833 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
Post Hoc Exploration on Negative Priming and Distractibility Task 
Apart from doing a covariance analysis to obtain scores for negative priming and 
distractibility, ANOVAs were also conducted on the totals for each trial (see Table 13). It was 
76 
found that the schizophrenic group perfonned worse than both the artist group and the matched-
age comparison group on the second and the third trials ofthe cognitive task, confirming a 
general slowing down of cognition in the extreme end ofthe schizophrenia spectrum. The results 
went in the same direction for the fourth trial, but did not reach significance. Within the student 
group, these three trials were highly correlated (correlations ranging from r .3 7 to r = .61; P = 
.000), demonstrating that those who found more words on a given trial also found more words on 
every other trial. 
Table 13. ANOVA Resultsfor Each Trial of the Cognitive Task 
Schizophrenic Artist Matched-Age 
Group Group Comparison Group 
(N = 10) (N=31) (N 31) df F P 
Trial 2 M 13.80 17.06 17.32 2,69 5.90 .004** 
SD 3.82 3.17 2.26 
Trial 3 M 9.40 14.19 13.55 2,69 9.64 .000** 
SD 3.75 2.95 2.90 
Trial 4 M 9.80 12.35 12.10 2,69 2.95 .059 
SD 3.36 3.30 2.43 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
Hypothesis 3: Relations of Creativity and Schizophrenia to Spatial and Related Tasks 
Spatial Ability 
Although the entire ANOVA was not significant for spatial ability (see Table 14), as 
predicted, the artists scored significantly higher than the schizophrenic group (people at the 
extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum;p = .031) and had a higher mean than the matched-
age comparison group although this finding was not significant (p = .065). 
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Table 14. ANOVA Results for Spatial and Related Tasks 
Schizophrenic Artist 
Group 
(N 10) df F p 
Spatial Ability M .43 .69 .49 2,69 3.11 .051 
SD .32 .29 .27 
Balance M 2.S2 3.76 3.64 2,69 4.69 .012* 
SD .93 .7S .91 
Positive Presence M 2.71 3.72 2.76 2,69 14.21 .000** 
SD .S6 .74 .77 
Negative Presence M 2.34 1.86 1.75 2,69 2.37 .101 
SD 1.00 .83 .55 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
Within the student group, spatial ability was significantly related to self-rated creativity 
and to the impulsive nonconformity subscale of schizotypy. These results were not predicted, but 
also not surprising given that artists also scored higher on spatial ability. Spatial ability was also 
correlated with mystical experiences, and the second and third trials of the cognitive task (see 
Table 15). 
Table 15. Correlations Among Spatial and Related Tasks in the Student Group 
Spatial Ability Balance Positive Presence Negative Presence 
Self-rated Creativity .35** .02 .22* .OS 
Unusual Experiences .05 -.03 -.11 .21 * 
Cognitive Disorganization -.11 -.44** -.52** .60** 
Introvertive Anhedonia -.06 -.12 -.35** .42** 
Impulsive Nonconformity .23* -.01 -.05 .29** 
Absorption .13 .16 .10 .12 
Mystical Experiences .21 * .21 * .27** .04 
Neuroticism -.07 -.33** -.45** .69** 
Trial 2 (Cognitive Task) .25* -.OS .04 -.11 
Trial 3 (Cognitive Task) .2S* -.02 .12 -.01 
Spatial Ability -.02 .21 * -.OS 
Balance .22* -.32** 
Positive Presence -.47** 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
Balance 
Previous research has found that balance beam performance was positively correlated 
with the propensity to mystical experiences (Ayers et aI., 1999). Since balance was positively 
correlated with mystical experiences in the student group, this can be seen as a partial validity 
check for the self-rated balance measure. 
ANOVAs revealed that group differences in balance were significant (see Table 14). 
More specifically, and as predicted, the mean of the schizophrenic group (the group at the 
extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum) was significantly lower than that of the artist group 
(p = .004) and the matched-age comparison group (p = .011). 
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Within the student group, the only significant finding with balance and schizotypy was a 
negative correlation between balance and cognitive disorganization (meaning having worse 
balance is related to higher cognitive disorganization; see Table 15). Balance, as predicted, was 
also negatively correlated with neuroticism, and positively correlated with mystical experience. 
Positive and Negative Presence 
Significant group differences were also found for positive presence (see Table 14). The 
working artists' mean in positive presence was significantly higher than that of the schizophrenic 
group (or those at the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum;p = .001) and the matched-age 
comparison group (p = .000). 
Within the student group, positive presence was significantly correlated with self-rated 
creativity, as well as with spatial ability and balance (see Table 15). Although the ANOVAs did 
not find that the schizophrenic group was significantly lower in positive presence than the 
matched-age comparison group, positive presence was negatively correlated in the student group 
with cognitive disorganization and introvertiveanhedonia. It was also strongly negatively 
correlated with negative presence and neuroticism, and positively correlated with mystical 
experiences. 
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Group differences were not significant for negative presence (see Table 14), although, 
as predicted, the schizophrenic group (people on the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum) 
scored significantly higher than the matched-age comparison group (p = .034). 
Within the student group, negative presence was positively correlated with every subtype 
of the schizotypy scale (see Table 15). It was correlated with unusual experiences, with cognitive 
disorganization, as predicted with introvertive anhedonia, and with impulsive nonconformity. It 
was also correlated positively with neuroticism and negatively with balance. 
Hypothesis 4(a): Absorption and Mystical Experiences 
The ANOVA for absorption was significant (see Table 16). As predicted, the artist group 
scored significantly higher than the matched-age comparison group (p = .000). Surprisingly, the 
artist group also scored significantly higher than the schizophrenic group (or people on the 
extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum;p = .000). Contrary to the predictions, the mean of 
the schizophrenic group did not differ from that of the matched-age comparison group (p = .886). 
Table 16. ANOVA Resultsfor Absorption and Mystical Experiences 
Schizophrenic Artist Matched-Age 
Group Group Comparison Group 
(N = 10) (N = 31) (N = 31) df F p 
Absorption M 2.86 3.72 2.83 2,69 15.29 .000** 
SD .89 .56 .70 
Mystical Experiences M 124.90 130.70 102.16 2,69 10.97 .000** 
SD 31.89 24.00 22.53 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
The ANOV A for mystical experiences was also significant. As predicted, the artist group 
scored significantly higher than the matched-age comparison group (p = .000), as did the 
schizophrenic group (people on the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum;p = .013). 
Furthermore, the artist group did not differ significantly from the schizophrenic group (p = .518). 
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Three Subsets of Mystical Experiences 
As a post hoc exploration, the mystical experience questionnaire was subdivided into the 
three factors found by Hood et al. (2001) to provide a superior solution to the unidimensional 
model in both an American and Iranian sample. The three factors are introvertive experiences, in 
which the self is lost into a greater unity; extrovertive experiences, in which one experiences that 
all is one; and the interpretive factor, in which one interprets the experiences as holy, noetic, or 
producing positive affect. Interestingly, Hood et al. (2001) found that the interpretive factor was 
associated with a stronger intrinsic religious orientation, while the introvertive factor was 
positively correlated with more psychological dysfunction such as somatization, depression, and 
obsessive-compulsiveness. Since both the artists and people high on the schizophrenia spectrum 
scored high on the mystical experiences questionnaire, an ANOV A was conducted to see if they 
differed on these three factors. The ANOVA was significant (see Table 17), but the post hoc 
analyses only demonstrated that the artist and schizophrenic groups scored higher then the 
matched-age comparison group in all three factors, which is the same information obtained from 
the full-scale ANOV A. The artist and the schizophrenic groups did not differ significantly on the 
introvertive factor (p = .351), the extrovertive factor (p = .535), or the interpretive factor (p = 
.912). 
Table 17. ANO VA Results for the Three Subsets of Mystical Experiences 
Schizophrenic Artist Matched-Age 
Group Group Comparison Group 
(N = 10) (N = 31) (N=31) df F p 
Introvertive M 3.73 4.03 3.01 2,69 9.41 .000** 
SD 1.23 .77 .86 
Extrovertive M 3.61 3.84 2.72 2,69 8.67 .000** 
SD 1.24 1.12 .93 
Interpretive M 4.27 4.30 3.69 2,69 8.49 .000** 
SD .71 .72 .74 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
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Correlations within the student group, however, did reveal some differences between the 
factors. More specifically, the introvertive experiences subscale was correlated with cognitive 
disorganization and neuroticism. The extrovertive experiences subscale was correlated with 
balance, positive presence, and neuroticism. And [mally, the interpretive subscale was correlated 
with positive presence and negatively correlated with introvertive anhedonia. The three factors 
were also highly intercorrelated (see Table 18). 
Table 18. Correlations with the Three Subsets of Mystical Experiences in the Student Group 
Balance 
Cognitive Disorganization 
Introvertive Anhedonia 
Positive presence 
Neuroticism 
Introvertive Experiences 
Extrovertive Experiences 
Interpretive Factor 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
Introvertive 
.10 
.28** 
-.09 
.11 
.28** 
Extrovertive Interpretive 
.33** .16 
.04 -.02 
-.18 -.30** 
.21 * .38** 
.21 * .04 
.69** .67** 
.68** 
In the student group, as evident in Table 19, absorption was positively correlated with 
self-rated creativity. It was also positively correlated with several facets of schizotypy: unusual 
experiences, cognitive disorganization, and impulsive nonconformity. It was also highly 
correlated with mystical experiences and to a lesser extent with childhood abuse. 
The propensity to mystical experiences in the student group was correlated with self-rated 
creativity. In terms ofschizotypy, it was positively correlated with unusual experiences, 
impulsive nonconformity, and negatively correlated with introvertive anhedonia. 
Table 19. Correlations With Absorption and Mystical Experiences in the Student Group 
Self-Rated Creativity 
Unusual Experiences 
Cognitive Disorganization 
Introvertive Anhedonia 
Impulsive Nonconformity 
Childhood Abuse 
Absorption 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
Absorption 
.44** 
.64** 
.24* 
.03 
.48** 
.30** 
Mystical Experiences 
.29** 
.36** 
.12 
-.22* 
.40** 
.18 
.69** 
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Hypothesis 4(b): Correlations with Mystical Experiences in the Artist and Schizophrenic Groups 
Some interesting differences were noted in the correlations within the community groups 
(see Table 20). It was predicted that mystical experiences would correlate with negative states 
within the schizophrenic group and positive states within the artist group. However, mystical 
experiences only correlated with positive variables, specifically spatial ability, self-rated 
creativity, and absorption. Within the artist group, mystical experiences correlated surprisingly 
negatively with spatial ability (given the relation is positive in the student group and in the group 
comparisons), and positively with unusual experiences, positive presence, and absorption. 
Table 20. Correlations with Mystical Experiences within the Schizophrenic and Artist Groups 
Mystical Experiences 
Mystical Experiences 
Spatial 
Ability 
.74* 
-.41 * 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
Self-Rated 
Creativity 
Unusual Positive 
Experiences Presence 
Schizophrenic Group 
.72* .49 -.28 
Artist Group 
.33 .44* .38* 
Absorption 
.71 * 
.65** 
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Hypothesis 4(c): The Mediation of Absorption 
Absorption was tested to see if it mediated the relations between creativity, and both 
mystical experiences and schizotypy. First, regressions were conducted to make sure creativity 
was related to absorption and to mystical experiences or schizotypy. If so, then it was checked 
whether Baron and Kenny's (1986) assumptions for mediation were met. In the cases where 
absorption was significantly related to both creativity and to mystical experiences or one of the 
schizotypy measures, absorption was partialled out to see if the correlations between creativity 
and mystical experiences or schizotypy remained. To do this, multiple regressions were 
calculated with either mystical experience or the relevant schizotypy sub scale as the criterion, and 
creativity and absorption as the predictors. This analysis provided the partial correlation (see 
Appendix 0). If the partial correlation was significant, then a Sobel test (Preacher& Leonardelli, 
2001) was calculated to see if absorption partially or fully mediated the relation. In the student 
group, it was found that the partial correlation was not significant between creativity and mystical 
experiences (pr = .02), meaning that this relation was completely mediated by absorption. 
Similarly, the partial correlation between creativity and unusual experiences was also not 
significant (pr = .03). Finally, the partial correlation between creativity and impulsive 
nonconformity was not significant (pr = .19). 
The only other full mediation was seen in the schizophrenic group between creativity and 
mystical experiences. The partial here was not significant (pr = -.25). In the artists group, where 
mysticism was highest, the relation between mystical experiences and self-rated creativity could 
not be accounted for by absorption because self-rated creativity was neither significantly related 
to absorption or mystical experiences. In other words, according to Baron and Kenny, the 
assumptions for mediation were not met in this case. 
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Hypothesis 5: Measures of Conflicted ness: Childhood Trauma and Neuroticism 
The ANOV A for childhood trauma was not significant, and no predicted differences were 
found between the three community groups (see Table 21). Due to the skewed distribution, these 
findings must be interpreted with caution. 
Table 21. ANOVA Results for Childhood Trauma and Neuroticism 
Schizophrenic Artist Matched-Age 
Group Group Comparison Group 
(N = 10) (N = 31) (N = 31) df F p 
Childhood Trauma M 2.02 1.98 1.81 2, 69 .42 .656 
SD .77 .85 .78 
Neuroticism M 3.06 2.45 2.74 2,69 2.91 .061 
SD .22 .77 .79 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
As predicted, childhood trauma was not related to self-rated creativity in the student 
group, but was significantly related to absorption. It was also related to the impulsive 
nonconformity subscale ofschizotypy, neuroticism, and all trials of the cognitive task (see Table 
22). 
Table 22. Correlations with Childhood Trauma and Neuroticism in the Student Group 
Childhood Trauma 
Self-Rated Creativity 
Balance 
Unusual Experiences 
Cognitive Disorganization 
Introvertive Anhedonia 
Impulsive Nonconformity 
Positive Presence 
Negative Presence 
Absorption 
Tria12 (Cognitive Task) 
Trial 3 (Cognitive Task) 
Trial 4 (Cognitive Task) 
Neuroticism 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
.14 
-.05 
.19 
.16 
.13 
.27** 
.05 
.15 
.30** 
-.23* 
-.27** 
-.25* 
.34** 
Neuroticism 
.04 
-.33** 
.21 * 
.77** 
.27** 
.41 ** 
-.45** 
.69** 
.18 
-.02 
-.02 
-.10 
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The ANOV A for neuroticism was also not significant (see Table 21). Although this 
result was not predicted, it is interesting to note that the artist group scored significantly lower on 
neuroticism than the schizophrenic group (p = .028). 
As predicted, neuroticism was positively correlated with childhood abuse in the student 
group (see Table 22). It was also positively correlated with negative presence and all facets of the 
schizotypy measure, namely with unusual experiences, cognitive disorganization, introvertive 
anhedonia, and impulsive nonconformity. Neuroticism was negatively correlated with balance 
and positive presence. 
Discussion 
This study examined the commonalities and the differences between creativity and the 
schizophrenia spectrum. Several interesting commonalities and differences were found between 
these two categories, some that are consistent with and some that extend the current literature. In 
particular, the propensity to mystical experiences was associated with both creativity and the 
schizophrenia spectrum. That creativity and the schizophrenia spectrum are not synonymous, 
however, was demonstrated by several traits, such as spatial ability, balance, and sense of 
presence, on which they differed. Given the small size of the schizophrenic group, caution should 
be taken in interpreting its results. 
The Creativity Measures 
In addition to the examination of similarities and differences between creativity and the 
schizophrenia spectrum, some interesting observations were made regarding the measurement of 
creativity, a topic on which there is currently much debate. This study employed two measures of 
creativity: the Barron-Welsh Art Scale and a self-rated creativity measure. This study had the 
extra advantage of having a highly creative group of working visual artists that acted as its own 
index of creativity, independently of the creativity measures. This group also made it possible to 
check the validity of the creativity measures by seeing if the artists scored higher than the 
matched-age comparison group. The results revealed that the artist group scored higher than the 
matched-age comparison group on the measure of self-rated creativity devised for this study. 
Furthermore, the self-rated creativity measure correlated with other variables that tended to be 
higher in artists (i.e. spatial ability, unusual experiences, impulsive nonconformity, positive 
presence, absorption, and mystical experiences). These fmdings provide validity for the self-
rated measure as a measure of creativity. The artists, however, did not score higher than the 
matched-age comparison group on the Barron-Welsh Art Scale, although the student group did 
(see Appendix L). However, the self-rated creativity measure and the Barron-Welsh Art Scale 
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did not correlate together in the student group. These fmdings appear to diminish the validity of 
the Barron-Welsh Art Scale as a measure of creativity. 
Examining these measures within the student group, however, revealed that The Barron-
Welsh Art Scale correlated with the same subsets of schizotypy that were higher in artists, 
namely, with unusual experiences and impulsive nonconformity. The Barron Welsh, however, 
also correlated positively with neuroticism, a variable on which artists scored lower than the other 
groups. It seemed, therefore, that the Barron-Welsh Art Scale may have been measuring a related 
construct to creativity, but one with more negative qualities. Moreover, it was noted during the 
administration of the measures that realism artists seemed to score lower on the Barron-Welsh Art 
Scale than non-realism artists, so perhaps the Barron-Welsh Art Scale is picking up more on the 
novelty aspect of creativity, and the number of realism artists may have lowered the scores in the 
working artist group. Future research could separate realism from non-realism artists to verify 
these observations. Also it is possible that since the artists in this study were largely volunteers, 
they were perhaps generally more positive in outlook than the average artist, making them not 
relate as much to the Barron-Welsh Art Scale, which picked up on more negative qualities of 
creativity. 
Also interesting was that within the artist group, self-rated creativity was significantly 
negatively related to the Barron-Welsh Art Scale as well as the spatial abilities measure. This 
seems counterintuitive since both in this study and in the literature, creativity is found to be 
correlated with spatial ability (Moreno and Morales, 2008). Since the working artists are by 
definition already highly creative, they may have viewed the self-rated creativity measure 
differently than the other groups. In their case, rating themselves on creativity may have had 
more to do with their self-image as artists; in other words, the more confident they were in their 
art and/or in themselves as artists, the higher they rated themselves. Participants in the non-artist 
groups may have viewed the self-rated creativity question in a more general sense, and answered 
based on estimates of their normative level of creativity. For example, there were some cases in 
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the non-artist group in which people rated themselves as very creative, and when asked in which 
hobbies they are very creative, answered 'decorating my room' or 'editing photos on the 
computer'. The artists may have been thinking more in terms of the self perceived originality of 
their artistic creations as compared to other artists, as in some artists who have actually had many 
art shows saying "I'm mostly a creative individual". 
Creativity and the Schizophrenia Spectrum 
As predicted, artists were higher in self-rated creativity than people with schizophrenia, 
which replicates previous research that people on the higher end of the schizophrenia spectrum 
are not necessarily creative (e.g. Rubinstein, 2008). There was, however, a negative correlation 
between age and creativity within the schizophrenic group, which may suggest that people in the 
beginning stages of the disorder are more creative than those in the later stages. Due to the small 
sample size in the schizophrenic group, however, this result should be interpreted with caution 
and would need to be replicated. 
Support was found for the main hypothesis positing a correlation between creativity and 
schizotypy. More specifically, people who scored high on the schizotypy facets of unusual 
experiences (positive schizotypy) and impulsive nonconformity were found to be more creative. 
Similarly, working artists were found to be higher than the matched-age comparison group in 
unusual experiences and impulsive nonconformity. These results replicate the fmdings of 
previous research (e.g. Schuldberg, 200 l). Unusual experiences consist of magical or unusual 
beliefs, perceptual aberration, paranoia, and suspiciousness. All of these expand everyday 
experience, perhaps making one more likely to sample more types of experiences that may 
facilitate potentially creative connections. Impulsive nonconformity consists of asocial behaviour 
and disinhibition. Such behaviour is potentially important for creativity because it takes a certain 
level of disinhibition to make public ideas that are different and original. Original ideas are often 
initially met with opposition, so revealing them would be facilitated by nonconformity and a lack 
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of fear of what others think. Furthermore, nonconformity would also be needed to come up with 
original ideas in the frrst place. 
Also replicating previous research (e.g. Schuldberg, 2001), working artists were not 
higher in cognitive disorganization or in introvertive anhedonia (negative schizotypy) and there 
were no correlations among these facets of schizotypy with creativity in the student group. This 
finding was also consistent with the notion that people on the extreme end of the schizophrenia 
spectrum are not more creative, since the people with schizophrenia in this study scored higher in 
introvertive anhedonia (negative schizotypy). This was not surprising given that negative 
symptoms predominate in people diagnosed with schizophrenia (Bleuler, 1924). Negative 
symptoms such as flat affect would likely impede the richness of experiences needed to generate 
art. 
Negative Priming and Distractibility 
The paper-and-pencil negative priming task devised for this study proved to not have 
good face validity as a measure of negative priming. More specifically the participants in the 
student experimental group, who were presented target words that were previously distractors, 
were not slower in identifying these target words than a student comparison group that did not 
have the distractor words presented earlier. Perhaps the presentation of many words 
simultaneously, as opposed to one trial at a time such as on computer tasks used to measure 
negative priming, might have prevented this task from picking up the negative priming effect. 
There is, however, another way to interpret the failure of the manipulation test that could call for 
a reassessment of the results for the cognitive task. Due to the post hoc nature of these findings, 
however, they are added as an appendix (see Appendix N). 
In terms of distractibility, the face validity of the measure was confirmed by the results of 
the student experimental versus the student comparison group. No significant differences, 
however, existed between the community groups. 
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To investigate further into this measure, means for each trial were calculated apart from 
the covariation of the negative priming and distractibility trials from the baseline trial. It was 
found that the schizophrenic group did worse on two of the trials and in the same direction for the 
third trial, replicating fmdings of a general slowing down of cognition in schizophrenia (e.g. 
Morrens, Hulstijn, Van Heeke, Peuskens, & Sabbe, 2006). Perhaps the way in which the stimuli 
were presented in our task could have posed some problems to the individuals with 
schizophrenia. As mentioned above, it has been known for nearly a century that people with 
schizophrenia have impaired attention, especially in the form of distractibility and the inability to 
sustain attention, which makes them difficult to assess using cognitive tasks (Bleuler, 1924). 
Moreover, studies found that distractibility increases with the chronicity of the schizophrenic 
illness (McGhie, Chapman, & Lawson, 1965), making it very likely to affect the patients in this 
study. Each page in our paper-and-pencil task contained 200 words. This presentation might 
have overwhelmed them and revealed their more "molar" level of general distractibility and, 
therefore, incapacity. Perhaps instead of inhibiting certain words, the patients doing this task 
were so overwhelmed that they perseverated, or repeated their response after the cessation of the 
original stimulus. In other words, perhaps the people with schizophrenia were simply distracted 
by the fact that there were so many words surrounding the target words. 
Spatial and Related Tasks 
In terms of spatial and related tasks, results showed that the artists performed better than 
the people on the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum in spatial ability, thus showing 
support for the hypothesis that artists have better spatial skills than people with schizophrenia. 
A more general relation between spatial ability and creativity was found in the student group 
where spatial ability was significantly related to self-rated creativity. Spatial ability was also 
positively related to the impulsive nonconformity subscale of the schizotypy measure in the 
student group, itself also correlated with self-rated creativity and highest in the artist group. 
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Finally, spatial ability was correlated with mystical experiences, itself a strong correlate 
of creativity. This is consistent with Swartz and Seginer's (1981) study, which found that a 
spatial orientation task was related to mystical experience, and Hunt et al.'s (1992) study, which 
found that mystical experiences was related to scores on the Wechsler Scale of block designs. 
This result provides support for the notion that mystical experiences are both "carried and evoked 
by the felt embodiment of still more general spatial dimensions drawn from the ecological array, 
such as light, darkness, flow, density, expansive force, and the openness of spaciousness itself' 
(Hunt, 2007, p. 212). In other words, mystical experiences cannot be separated from basic spatial 
metaphors drawn out of perception in ways also reflected in measures of spatial intelligence. 
Similar results were found for balance as for spatial ability, in that the artists and the 
matched-age comparisons had better balance than people on the extreme end of the schizophrenia 
spectrum. This replicates the results of Sullivan, Rosenbloom, and Pfefferbaum (2002) who 
found that people with schizophrenia had poorer balance than people without schizophrenia. 
Balance was also lower in people who scored high on cognitive disorganization, neuroticism, and 
negative presence. Interestingly, Ayers et aI., (1999) found that mystical experiences and 
archetypal dreams correlated with balance beam performance. These results support the view that 
good balance tends to be associated with more integrated states of consciousness while poor 
balance tends to be associated with more disintegrative states. As predicted, balance was also 
positively correlated with another integrating state, namely, positive presence. 
In terms of positive presence, the artists scored higher than all of the other groups. This 
indicates that they had more positive states of presence and identified more with metaphors that 
depict positive states of being. Positive presence was also significantly correlated with self-rated 
creativity in the student group. Creativity can be fueled by several negative states such as trauma 
(e.g. Simonton, 1975), conflict such as social rejection (Akinola& Mendes, 2008), and the facing 
of life's existential concerns more directly (Rank, 1932). However, this relation and the relation 
between creativity and the propensity to mystical experiences that will be elaborated on below 
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suggest that it is not only negative states that stimulate creativity. It is likely, given their 
sensitivity and openness, that artists experience a larger variety of states, both positive and 
negative, more intensely which demonstrates their enhanced sense of self-presence. Accordingly, 
it is these intense states from which they derive much of their inspiration. 
Positive presence was negatively correlated with the cognitive disorganization and 
introvertive anhedonia facets of schizotypy in the student group, and these two facets of 
schizotypy were not related to creativity; Positive presence was also strongly negatively 
correlated with negative presence and neuroticism. Finally, positive presence was positively 
correlated with the propensity to mystical experiences in the student group. This also fits with the 
predictions since the metaphors chosen for the positive presence scale describe states than can 
lead to mystical experiences (Hunt, 2007). 
As expected, people on the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum scored 
significantly higher than the matched-age comparison group in negative presence. In the student 
group, negative presence was positively correlated with all schizotypal subtypes: unusual 
experiences, cognitive disorganization, introvertive anhedonia, and impulsive nonconformity. It 
was also correlated positively with neuroticism. This fmding helps to validate the measure as 
having the ability to detect negative states of presence. In addition, it provides support for Sass 
and Pamas' (2003) theory that the sense of presence is diminished in schizophrenia. According 
to Sass and Pamas (2003), this diminished sense of presence is often felt as a detachment from 
the self or the body, or a diminished sense of existing as an autonomous source of awareness and 
action. The measure of negative presence included many words that can describe such a 
detachment, such as the following: disconnected, unreal, and mechanical. 
The finding that spatial ability was not correlated with balance is surprising given the 
notion that they are both aspects of the core sense of self (Hunt, 1995; 2007); however, not 
finding such a correlation has been common in past research (e.g. Ayers et aI., 1999; Spafadora & 
Hunt, 1990). Given that these and other spatially-related variables cover such a wide array of 
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phenomena, a direct correlation may not exist. Both spatial ability and balance, however, were 
found to be positively correlated with positive presence, while balance was also negatively 
correlated with negative presence. This provides support that the sense of presence is at least 
partially rooted in physical balance and spatial orientation, in other words, a general state of 
embodiment (Hunt, 2007). 
Absorption and the Propensity to Mystical Experiences 
It was predicted that the artists and people at the extreme end of the schizophrenic 
spectrum, or the schizophrenic group, would score higher than the matched-age comparison 
group in absorption; however, this prediction was only partially supported. The artists were 
higher in absorption than the matched-age comparison group, but they were also higher than the 
schizophrenic group. The relation between creativity and absorption was also found in the 
student group since absorption was correlated with creativity. This finding was not surprising 
given that the correlation between creativity and absorption is widely known (e.g. Manmiller et 
aI., 2005). According to Tellegen and Atkinson (1974), absorption involves experiencing 
episodes of having one's attention completely engaged. Most activities requiring creativity 
would require such an absorbing state of attention. 
Although absorption was not significantly higher in the people on the extreme end of the 
schizophrenia spectrum than in the matched-age comparison group, it was positively correlated in 
the student group with several facets of schizotypy: unusual experiences, cognitive 
disorganization, and impulsive nonconformity. This suggests that artists and people high in 
schizotypy are higher in absorption, but not people at the extreme end of the spectrum. Of 
course, due to the small sample size of this group, these results would need replication. 
Absorption's relation to both creativity and schizotypy can be explicated by the theory 
mentioned above that absorption has two sides, an integrative side and a more negative or 
disintegrative side (e.g. Hunt et aI., 2002; Roche & McConkey, 1990). Besides being correlated 
with schizotypy and childhood abuse, it was also highly correlated with mystical experiences and 
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creativity. Perhaps the intense absorbing attention that Tellegan and Atkinson (1974) speak of in 
regards to absorption also increases the chances of absorbing oneself in extreme self-altering 
expenences. 
The most striking finding in the study was that both working artists and people on the 
high end of the schizophrenia spectrum scored significantly higher than the matched-age 
comparison group in the propensity to mystical experiences. This suggests that this is a 
propensity that unites the two groups. Previous research has found that people with 
schizophrenia had equal mysticism scores as had long term meditators (Stifler, Greer, Sneck, & 
Dovenmuehle, 1993), while Ayers et al. (1999) found that productive creatives had significantly 
more mystical experiences than imaginative comparisons. The Hood Questionnaire of Mystical 
Experiences describes experiences that transcend space and time, in contrast to the more common 
altered states of consciousness measured by the absorption and schizotypy measures. Many of 
the non-realist artists who spontaneously described where they found their inspiration mentioned 
their spirituality. Similarly, Ayers et al. (1999) concluded that these intense states of 
consciousness may be part of the creativeness of artists. 
The mystical experiences, however, may have different consequences in the lives of the 
artists and the people with schizophrenia. For example, perhaps artists are best able to integrate 
these potentially identity dissolving mystical experiences, using them in their art, while people 
with schizophrenia might instead find that these experiences destabilize their identity and are 
accordingly more frightening. For instance, in contrast to the artist group, the schizophrenic 
group in this study was significantly higher in introvertive anhedonia and neuroticism, lower in 
positive presence (positive states of being), balance, and lower in spatial abilities. These findings 
suggest that the supportive context such as a positive sense of presence needed to make mystical 
experiences more safe and integrative were lacking in the patient group. 
There were also some interesting correlations with mystical experiences within both the 
artist group and the schizophrenic group, representing the extreme end of the schizophrenia 
95 
spectrum. The Hood Scale of Mystical Experiences correlated with absorption within both the 
artist and schizophrenic groups, with creativity within the schizophrenic group, with unusual 
experiences and positive presence within the artist group, and with relative spatial ability within 
both groups. The latter unexpectedly went in opposite directions: positive with mystical 
experiences within the schizophrenic group and negative with them within the artist group. As 
can be seen, the propensity to mystical experiences itselfwas not correlated with any negative 
variables within the schizophrenic group, it was only correlated with positive ones. It is the 
additional context of higher psychopathology scores and lower spatial orientation however, that 
could entail a destabilizing impact for an inherently positive state. As for the opposite direction 
of the correlation between mystical experiences and spatial ability in the two groups, it may have 
to do with the base level of spatial ability within each group. Spatial ability, which is also 
normally correlated with general intelligence, is generally lower in people with schizophrenia 
(e.g. Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998). However, the participants who scored high in it also scored 
high in mystical experiences, both of which could facilitate their higher scores on creativity. 
Conversely, artists generally have better spatial ability. As mentioned earlier, however, artists are 
a very diverse group, as reflected in varying degrees of realism in their art. For example, perhaps 
some move towards art through naturally higher spatial ability whereas others, who are higher in 
mystical experiences, gain their inspiration more from their altered states. Naturally, this would 
have to be replicated due to the small sample size of the groups to make sure it was not simply a 
spurious correlation. 
Absorption was also found to mediate several of the above relations. In the student 
group, absorption was found to mediate the relation between creativity and mystical experiences, 
creativity and unusual experiences, and creativity and impulsive nonconformity. This suggests 
that it is absorption in the more creative individuals of the student group that leads them to have 
more mystical experiences, more unusual experiences and score higher on impulsive 
nonconformity. Absorption also mediated the relation between creativity and mystical 
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experiences in the schizophrenic group. It seems, perhaps, that the capacity to become 
completely absorbed in attentional stimuli may be a necessary precursor to various other altered 
states, both positive and negative. As for absorption mediating the relation between creativity 
and impulsive nonconformity, perhaps being more absorbed in something favours immediate 
responsivity. Interestingly, absorption was not found to be a precursor to altered states in the 
artist group. The absence of mediation within the artist group, highest in mystical experiences in 
the present study and significantly higher in artists over comparisons matched for high absorption 
in Ayers et al. (1999), suggests a more intrinsic relation between creativity and mystical 
experiences for many artists. Although absorption may facilitate mystical experiences in most 
people, they may come more spontaneously to highly creative individuals. In addition, the 
highest levels of creativity can trigger states of felt clarity and brilliancy that are 
phenomenologically identical to accounts of classical mystical experience (Almaas, 1986; Laski, 
1961). 
Childhood Abuse 
Although no differences were found between the community groups in terms of 
childhood abuse, it was interesting to note in Appendix L that the artist group, the schizophrenic 
group, representing the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum, and the matched-age 
comparison group all scored higher than the student group. This suggests that the older the 
participant, the more likely they are to have experienced childhood abuse. Several things could 
account for this finding. First, perhaps the older people are, the more likely they are to report 
childhood abuse, either from greater honesty or more time to recover hazy recollections, or both. 
Second, perhaps there are historical differences in child-rearing practices and the amount that is 
reported about them. Third, perhaps there are other differences between the matched-age 
comparison group and the student group such as the status of being a student in a university. This 
finding was not predicted, and incidentally the childhood abuse measure was quite positively 
skewed, meaning this result must be interpreted with caution. 
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Artists were not higher in childhood abuse than the matched-age comparison group, nor 
was creativity related to abuse in the student group, replicating the results of Ayers et al. (1999) 
who also did not find a correlation between creativity and abuse. This study, however, replicated 
the established relation between childhood abuse and absorption (e.g. Eisen, & Carlson, 1998). 
It was hypothesized that the people on the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum 
would be significantly higher in childhood abuse than those in the matched-age comparison 
group; however, this was not the case. Childhood abuse was, however, significantly related to the 
impulsive nonconformity subscale of schizotypy and to neuroticism in the student group. It 
seems as if people with a history of abuse tend to exhibit more antisocial behavior and are more 
neurotic than people with no history of abuse. Alternatively, it could also be that people who are 
more asocial or neurotic may be more willing to acknowledge childhood abuse. Childhood abuse 
was also negatively related to finding more words on the second, third, and fourth trials of the 
negative priming and distractibility tasks. Although much caution needs to be taken in 
interpreting this finding, due to the skewed distribution and the fact that this was not a predicted 
finding, this could suggest that a history of childhood abuse may lead to later cognitive deficits, 
specifically in searching for target words in lists of words. This finding is, in fact, consistent with 
other studies (e.g. Perez & Widom, 1994). 
Neuroticism 
The artist group scored significantly lower on neuroticism than the student group and the 
people on the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum. This is contrary to some creativity theory 
and research, but in accordance with most studies. For example, Ayers et al. (1999) found that high 
creatives were not more neurotic than high absorption comparisons. Nevertheless, this finding is 
somewhat contrary to what may be expected given earlier theories that creative people are more 
prone to mood disturbances (e.g. Barron, 1969; Eysenck, 1993) and given the results of Burch et al. 
(2006), who found higher neuroticism scores in visual arts students than students in other 
departments. There is the possibility that the method of recruiting artists for this study could have 
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impacted variables such as neuroticism. The artists in this study were recruited largely bye-mail 
advertisements to members of artist coalitions and galleries, and were promised only a small 
compensation (two bingo scratch tickets). People that responded were likely generally helpful 
people who are interested in psychology, which could be consistent with lower neuroticism. By 
contrast, Burch et al. (2006) recruited art students and paid them £ 1 0 for their participation. 
Perhaps this resulted in a slightly more random sample of artists than the one found in this study, 
which found more established artists who were kind enough to volunteer their time for research. 
In the student group, neuroticism was positively correlated with all facets of the 
schizotypy measure, namely with unusual experiences, cognitive disorganization, introvertive 
anhedonia, and impUlsive nonconformity. The interrelation of characteristics that predispose one 
to schizophrenia and negative emotionality has been documented in other studies (e.g. Ettinger, 
2005). Claridge and Davis (2001) suggested that neuroticism could be a non-specific predictor of 
many different types of psychopathology. 
Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research 
The results of this study revealed some interesting details about the measurement of 
creativity. Simply asking people how creative they think they seemed to be a better way of 
distinguishing between artist and non-artists than examining whether people prefer complex to 
simple forms. Despite these results, the self-rated measure has its limitations. First, because this 
measure was devised for this study, it was not validated in other research, or against other 
measures of creativity. The working artists, however, are by definition already creative, so they 
acted as their own criterion of creativity above and beyond any creativity measure used. Second, 
there is evidence from the results that the measure may tap into one's level of confidence, 
especially within the artists. For example, artists and non-artists may have very different notions 
concerning the definition of creativity while rating a question such as "I am a very creative 
individual". Some may be thinking of everyday creativity, such as cooking dinner, while others 
may be thinking of the originality of their own writing or drawing. In future research, it may be 
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beneficial to specify that one's level of creativity should be compared to the average person rather 
than to others in one's field. Finally, there was much discrepancy between the various items in 
the self-rated creativity measure. For example, some people may see themselves as very creative 
at drawing but not creative at all in coming up with melodies. Much work remains to be done on 
the measurement of creativity; and particularly, the question needs to be posed whether a general 
"creativity" exists or whether people may be more creative in some areas than in others. 
Due to the extensive variability in the artist group on several of the variables and the 
observations that certain types of artists relate more to certain measures, it would be interesting in 
future research to separate realist from abstract artists. Substantial differences would likely be 
found between them on certain variables, such as schizotypy. Creativity is defined by many as 
the creation of something that is both novel and relevant. Artists who paint only realism most 
defmitely paint images that are relevant to society, but the question remains whether their works 
can be considered as novel. A study separating different types of visual artists may find very 
different characteristics in these types of artists. Likewise, Nettle (2006) found differences in 
schizotypy amongst hobbyist, serious, and professional artists. Future research should not 
overlook these distinctions. 
Another limitation of this study was the use of a self-report measure of balance. Again, 
since this measure was devised for this study, it was not validated in other research or against 
other measures of balance. Correlations among different balance measures, however, have 
generally been found to be poor (Hunt, 2007). This is likely due to the fact that only a component 
of all them entails the sense of embodiment of interest in this study. Furthermore, many of the 
predicted results with the self-report measure, such as its positive relation to mystical experiences 
and its negative relation to more disintegrative states such as cognitive disorganization and 
neuroticism, were found to be significant. 
The way of recruiting the artist, the schizophrenic, and the matched-age comparison 
groups may also constitute a limitation to this study. These were largely convenience samples 
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chosen because of ease of access, rather than random samples. Due to the small compensation, 
they were basically volunteers who were kind enough to offer their time. Many clinical studies, 
including sleep studies face this problem. While many of the predicted hypotheses, such as the 
artists being higher than the schizophrenic group in creativity, spatial ability,balance, and 
positive presence, were confirmed, replication would be helpful to make more deftnite 
conclusions. 
One of the most signiftcant limitations of this study was the small size of the 
schizophrenic group, representing the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum. Again, this is a 
limitation seen in many clinical studies, one that largely affects the power ofthe study and the 
ability to make deftnite conclusions about smaller groups. There is much variability among 
patients with schizophrenia, which would further add to the inconclusiveness of the results 
regarding that group. The schizophrenic spectrum, of which the schizophrenic group represents 
the extreme end, however, was measured in this study in two ways. Apart from the smaller 
clinical group, schizotypy, which is believed to represent a predisposition to schizophrenia, was 
assessed in a relatively large normative university group. This gave the study the advantage of 
considering the full range of the schizophrenic spectrum, including both the personality and 
disease components, and of measuring it in two ways, both within a clinical and normative 
student sample. 
This study replicated previous ftndings that people on the extreme end of the 
schizophrenia spectrum, who have been diagnosed with schizophrenia, are not as creative as 
working artists. This study is also consistent with other studies in ftnding that creativity is related 
to positive schizotypy (unusual experiences) and asocial behaviour (impulsive nonconformity). 
This suggests that if a continuum between low schizotypy and schizophrenia does exist, then 
those in the mid range of the continuum are the most creative. 
Carson et al.'s (2003) ftnding that artists have the tendency to be overinclusive in their 
perception was not replicated in this study because the manipulation test for the negative priming 
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section of the cognitive task did not work out. There were some potential problems with the 
cognitive measure, however, that may have accounted for its failure to demonstrate negative 
priming, the details of which are presented in Appendix N. This study did, however, demonstrate 
that people with schizophrenia have a general slowing of cognition, as seen in performance on 
timed tasks. 
This study extended fmdings of previous research that found similarities between 
creativity and mental illness or characteristics that may predispose people to mental illness, 
represented in this study by the schizophrenia spectrum. As predicted, spatial ability and related 
tasks, namely balance and sense of presence, were the variables that provided the greatest 
separation between artists and people on the extreme end of the schizophrenia spectrum, and 
between creativity and schizotypy. These variables may be compensatory qualities, related to 
traditional concepts of ego strength (Barron, 1969) for the more vulnerable characteristics that 
artists share with the schizophrenia spectrum. In other words, because creative individuals are 
high in spatial and related tasks, they are protected from the ego fragmentation or disintegrative 
states found in schizophrenia. It would be interesting to see if these and related variables explain 
the separation between creativity and mental illness to a greater extent than general intelligence, 
the theory put forward by a number of researchers (e.g. Carson et aI., 2003). The present results 
provide support for Hunt's (2007) phenomenologically based theory that an expanded versus 
deleted sense of self presence, which can be at least partially detected by measures of physical 
balance and spatial abilities, is the general dimension underlying more integrative versus more 
disintegrative transformations of consciousness. 
The propensity to mystical experiences was the variable that most strongly connected 
creativity and the schizophrenia spectrum, both with the extreme end of the spectrum and with the 
positive symptoms of schizotypy. The mediation of absorption suggested that it is the capacity to 
become intensely absorbed in both inner and outer experiences in patients and students that 
allows them to have classical mystical experiences. The relation was more direct and unmediated 
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in the artists. It is these extreme experiences that then may become either integrative with a more 
positive sense of self presence, and help with the creative process, or disintegrative, feeding the 
fear and confusion experienced in schizophrenia. 
This study taught us that creative individuals have more unusual beliefs and experiences 
than most others. And although these experiences share some commonalities with those of 
people with milder psychoses, they are not necessarily synonymous with those with full blown 
psychosis. The unusual experiences of creative individuals can show themselves in many forms, 
from greater absorption to everyday experiences to self-altering mystical experiences; and, it is 
these experiences that help inspire their creativity. Creative individuals are also more impulsive 
and nonconforming, but are not necessarily disorganized or antisocial like some believe them to 
be. People with full blown psychosis, such as schizophrenia, may have similarly altered 
experiences as highly creative individuals. However, perhaps due to their diminished sense of 
presence and lack of spatial abilities, and balance, they are not able to use these experiences in 
constructive ways and alternatively become more frightened as a result. 
This study further extended what is known about the relation between creativity and 
psychopathology by being the ftrst study to include the propensity to mystical experiences, 
absorption, and spatial and related tasks to the knowledge of the similarities and differences 
between creativity and psychopathology. Additional research could expand this knowledge base 
by examining different types of artists, recruiting a larger schizophrenic group so that subtypes 
could be compared, and examining different subtypes of mental disorders, such as bipolar 
psychosis. Exploring different measures of overinclusiveness could prove to be helpful, as well 
as examining other potentially separating or compensatory variables such as intelligence. 
Such results could ultimately be beneftcial in reducing stigma in schizophrenia by 
focusing on variables that are shared with highly creative individuals. It could also be used to 
help people with schizophrenia by focusing on self presence, spatial tasks, and cognitive tasks 
such as overinclusiveness in therapy. More speciftcally, there could be great potential in using 
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balance and spatial tasks for the diagnosis, the prevention in the form of training, and or the 
treatment of schizophrenic children. Using creativity could also be beneficial in therapy for 
people with schizophrenia, and could potentially be used as an outlet for their potentially 
damaging self-altering states. 
Finally, the role of classical mystical experience in creativity has not been appreciated 
other than in anecdotal and phenomenological accounts. It's presence in schizophrenia, apart 
from the well known wider range of altered states, may promise an important integrative factor at 
the heart ofa major disintegrative dimension of human existence. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Figure Preference Task) 
FIGURE PREf1'ERENCES 
YOU ARE ASKED IF YOU LIKE OR DON'T LIKE EACH OF THE 
DRAWINGS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES. 
PLEASE PUT AN "L" ANYWERE ON EACH ORA WINO YOU LIKE 
AND A "D" ANYWERE ON EACH DRAWING YOU DON'T LIKE. 
RATE EACH DRA "'1NG IN ORDER, DON'T SK.IP ANY DRAWINGS. 
IF YOU CAN'T DECIDE, GUESS. IF YOU LIKE THEM ALL, TRY TO 
DJFFERENTIATE THE ONES YOU LLKE A LOT MORE THAN THE 
REST, AND IF YOU DON'T LIKE ANY, TRY TO DIFFERENTIATE 
THOSE YOU TRULY DISLtKE FROM THE REST. 
TRY TO WORK AS FAST AS YOU CAN. 
EXAMPLE: 
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Appendix B. O-LIFE Measure of Schizotypy 
Unusual Experiences Subscale (All items are scored positively) 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK YOU TO THINK ABOUT YOUR BELIEFS AND 
EXPERIENCES. PLEASE ANSWER THEM WITH A YES (Y) OR NO (N). 
1. Are the sounds you hear in your daydreams usually clear and distinct? 
2. Are your thoughts sometimes as real as actual events in your life? 
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3. Does it often happen that nearly every thought immediately and automatically suggests 
an enormous number of ideas? 
4. Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost hear them? 
5. Do you think you could learn to read others' minds if you wanted to? 
6. Have you felt that you have special, almost magical powers? 
7. Do ideas and insights sometimes come to you so fast that you cannot express them all? 
8. Can some people make you aware of them just by thinking about you? 
9. Does a passing thought sometimes seem so real that it frightens you? 
_ 10. Does your voice ever seem distant, faraway? 
_ 11. Do you sometimes feel that your accidents are caused by mysterious forces? 
_12. Do people in your daydreams seem so true to life that you sometimes think they are? 
_13. Is your hearing sometimes so sensitive that ordinary sounds become uncomfortable? 
_ 14. Have you felt that you might cause something to happen just by thinking too much about 
it? 
_ 15. Are you so good at controlling others that it sometimes scares you? 
_ 16. Do you ever have a sense of vague danger or sudden dread for reasons that you don't 
understand? 
_ 17. Have you sometimes had the feeling of gaining or losing energy when certain people look 
at you or touch you? 
_ 18. Have you ever thought you heard people talking only to discover that it was in fact some 
nondescript noise? 
_19. Have you occasionally felt as thought your body did not exist? 
_ 20. On occasions, have you seen a person's face in front of you when no one was in fact 
there? 
_ 21. Do you often have a day when indoor lights seem so bright that they bother your eyes? 
_ 22. Have you wondered whether the spirits of the dead can influence the living? 
_ 23. Have you felt as though your head or limbs were somehow not your own? 
_ 24. Now and then when you look in the mirror, does your face seem quite different than 
usual? 
_ 25. Do you ever feel that your thoughts don't belong to you? 
_ 26. Do you ever suddenly feel distracted by distant sounds that you are not normally aware 
of? 
_ 27. When in the dark, do you often see shapes and forms even though there's nothing there? 
_ 28. Have you sometimes sensed an evil presence around you, although you could not see it? 
_ 29. Does you sense of smell sometimes become unusually strong? 
_ 30. Do you ever feel sure that something is about to happen, even though there does not seem 
to be any reason for you thinking that? 
Cognitive Disorganization Subscale (All items are scored positively) 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK YOU TO THINK ABOUT YOUR BELIEFS AND 
EXPERIENCES. PLEASE ANSWER THEM WITH A YES (Y) OR NO (N). 
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1. Do you often hesitate when you are going to say something in a group of people that you 
know more or less? . 
2. Do you frequently have difficulty in starting to do things? 
3. Do you often worry about things you should not have done or said? 
4. When in a crowded room, do you often have difficulty in following a conversation? 
5. No matter how hard you try to concentrate, do unrelated thoughts always creep into your 
mind? 
6. Are you easily hurt when people find fault with you or the work you do? 
7. Do you easily lose courage when criticized or failing in something? 
8. Do you seem to be a person whose mood goes up and down easily? 
9. Are you sometimes so nervous that you are 'blocked'? 
_10. Do you find it difficult to keep interested in the same thing for a long time? 
_ 11. Do you dread going into a room by yourself where other people have already gathered 
and are talking? 
_ 12. Do you often have difficulties in controlling your thoughts when you are thinking? 
_ 13. Do you often feel that there is no purpose to life? 
_14. Do you worry about awful things that might happen? 
_15. Are you easily distracted from work by daydreams? 
_ 16. Are you easily confused iftoo much happens at the same time? 
_17. Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience? 
_ 18. Do you often feel lonely? 
_ 19. Do you often experience an overwhelming sense of emptiness? 
_ 20. Do you often feel 'fed up'? 
_ 21. Would you call yourself a nervous person? 
_ 22. Is it hard for you to make decisions? 
_ 23. Do you ever feel that your speech is difficult to understand because the words are all 
mixed up and don't make sense? 
_ 24. Are you easily distracted when you read or talk to someone? 
Introvertive Anhedonia Subscale (Items scored negatively are marked with *) 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK YOU TO THINK ABOUT YOUR BELIEFS AND 
EXPERIENCES. PLEASE ANSWER THEM WITH A YES (Y) OR NO (N). 
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1. Have you had very little fun from physical activities like walking, swimming or sports? 
2. Do you enjoy many different kinds of play and recreation? * 
3. Has dancing, or the idea of it, always seemed dull to you? 
4. Is trying new foods something you have always enjoyed? * 
5. Are there very few things you have ever really enjoyed doing? 
6. Are you much too independent to really get involved with other people? 
7. Do you think having close friends is not as important as some people say? 
8. Are you rather lively? * 
9. Does it often feel good to massage your muscles when they are tired or sore? * 
_ 10. Do you like mixing with people? * 
_ 11. On seeing a soft, thick carpet have you sometimes had the impulse to take off your shoes 
and walk barefoot on it? * 
_ 12. Are people usually better off if they stay aloof from emotional involvements with most 
others? 
_13. Can just being with friends make you feel really good? * 
_ 14. Have you often felt uncomfortable when your friends touch you? 
_15. When things are bothering you do you like to talk to other people about it? * 
_16. Do you have many friends? * 
_ 17. Do you prefer watching television to going out with other people? 
_ 18. Is it true that your relationships with other people never get very intense? 
_ 19. Do you love having your back massaged? * 
_ 20. Is it fun to sing with other people? * 
_ 21. Do people who try to get to know you better usually give up after a while? 
_ 22. Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a lively party? * 
_ 23. Are the bright lights of a city exciting to look at? * 
_ 24. Do you usually have very little desire to buy new kinds of foods? 
_ 25. Do you like going out a lot? * 
_ 26. Do you feel very close to your friends? * 
_ 27. Do you feel that making new friends isn't worth the energy it takes? 
Impulsive Nonconformity Subscale (Items scored negatively are marked with *) 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK YOU TO THINK ABOUT YOUR BELIEFS AND 
EXPERIENCES. PLEASE ANSWER THEM WITH A YES (Y) OR NO (N). 
1. Do you often overindulge in alcohol or food? 
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2. When with groups of people, do you usually prefer to let someone else be the centre of 
attention? * 
3. When you catch a train, do you often arrive at the last minute? 
4. Do you often change between intense liking and disliking of the same person? 
5. Have you ever cheated at a game? 
6. Do you at times have an urge to do something harmful or shocking? 
7. Are you usually in an average sort of mood, not too high and not too low? * 
8. Would you take drugs which may have strange or dangerous effects? 
9. Do you stop to think things over before doing anything? * 
_ 10. Have you ever blamed someone for doing something you know was really your fault? 
_11. Would being in debt worry you? * 
_ 12. Do you think people spend too much time safeguarding their future with savings and 
insurance? 
_ 13. Do you ever have the urge to break or smash things? 
_ 14. Have you ever felt the urge to injure yourself? 
_ 15. Would it make you nervous to play the clown in front of other people? * 
_16. Do you consider yourself to be pretty much an average kind of person? * 
_ 17. Have you ever taken advantage of someone? 
_18. Would you like other people to be afraid of you? 
_19. Do you often have an urge to hit someone? 
_ 20. Do people who drive carefully annoy you? 
_ 21. Do you sometimes talk about things you know nothing about? 
_ 22. Do you often feel like doing the opposite of what other people suggest, even though you 
know they are right? 
_ 23. Do you often feel the impulse to spend money which you know you can't afford? 
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Appendix C - Negative Priming and Distractibility Tasks 
TRY AND CROSS OUT AS MANY TARGET WORDS AS 
POSSIBLE UNTIL YOU ARE ASKED TO "STOP" (AT 
WHICH TIME PLEASE FLIP YOUR BOOKLET OVER) 
PRACTICE EXAMPLE: 
TARGET CATEGORY: DAYS OF THE WEEK 
READER MELON THURSDAY LUCK COMPACT INNOCENT VIKING 
BILLION CASSEROLE PARTY KETCHUP SUNDAY SPUNKY OBSCENE 
FRIDAY SUBVERT SAINT PETTERN CONVINCE BALLOON TUESDAY 
TORMENT BRILLIANT WAIL ALLEY CLEAN FELON SOLAR ruG 
LIQUID TEXT TESTIFY WEDNESDAY IMPRESS SAILOR AUNT LORE 
STOP 
WHEN I SAY "START" TURN THE PAGE AND BEGIN 
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Target Category: First Names of Men and Women 
HAT STREAM KITE UNITE TRAIN SOCIAL EXAMPLE JOHN VEST SPREAD 
GAME SPEAK DARE FORCE ROLL TRACY GLOVE BLACK SEASON THINK 
BECOME JOSHUA BIRD WISE SUSAN CITY FROM SHIRT COTTON SHOW 
SHOW NATION BOOK CURRENT PANTS YOUTH DANGER DARK AGENT 
MORNING STEEL CHRIS REST GROUND LETTER SALT GATE CAR TABLE 
MATTHEW HARDLY BELT HANG END ELEVEN YES PRETTY SERVE SKY 
SQUARE PRESSURE KIND TREE SANDLES FURNISH LOVE CORN DICE ALE 
FAVOUR KATE SHADOW BARB SHORTS TASK HOUSE TALK ACROSS DAY 
PLACE DESCRIBE HEAVY SCENE SILVER TOM WAY NATURE NO BRIGHT 
MUSIC MOON SKIRT DAVE FIELD STORY CAPTAIN SEA DRESS MACHINE 
MARKET LISA WEALTH SINCE SMILE GROUP SIGN SCARF EFFORT GIVE 
KELLY EXPLAIN SIMPLE JACKET DRIVE CUT STEVE OTHER PASS WHICH 
TUBE LIGHT WALL EXPLAIN RICK GATHER PROPER COVER ROBE ERIN 
TWENTY MATH MIDDLE JOB MOMENT KNOW SHOES SKY SURE VISITE 
FALL VOICE FACE SALLY SOCKS COST VIRTUE LANGUAGE BOB START 
SWEATER BIG LEAVE MAKE FLOWER TANYA SAIL READ SPIRIT FRAME 
CLUB DANIEL GREEN SURE FEEL RATHER TIE FLOOR APPLES BLAZER 
CASE TRUST MOVE RISE WEAR FURNITURE NEIL CHAIR FIELD MARKER 
HAMMER PHONE BETH BED SUIT DRINK OCEAN BANNER PIN PLANT 
MEET PEACE GRADE MITTEN GLEN DOING BOOK HEATING STAY GRID 
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Target Category: Names of Animals 
UNITE TRAIN SOCIAL EXAMPLE DUCK VEST HAT STREAM KITE SPREAD 
FORCE ROLL SNAKE GLOVE BLACK GAME SPEAK DARE SEASON THINK 
BECOME TURTLE BAND WISE TIGER CITY FROM SHIRT COTTON SHOW 
SHOW NATION BOOK CURRENT PANTS YOUTH DANGER DARK AGENT 
STEEL BEAR REST GROUND LETTER SALT GATE CAR MORNING TABLE 
MONKEY HARDLY BELT HANG END ELEVEN YES PRETTY SERVE SKY 
SQUARE PRESSURE KIND TREE SANDLES FURNISH LOVE CORN DICE RAT 
BIRD SHORTS TASK FAVOUR LION SHADOW HOUSE TALK ACROSS DAY 
HEAVY SCENE PLACE DESCRIBE SILVER DOG WAY NATURE NO BRIGHT 
MOON SKIRT FROG FIELD MUSIC STORY CAPTAIN SEA DRESS MACHINE 
SINCE SMILE MARKET WOLF WEALTH GROUP SIGN SCARF EFFORT GIVE 
WHALE EXPLAIN SIMPLE JACKET DRIVE CUT LEND OTHER PASS WHICH 
CAT GATHER TUBE LIGHT WALL EXPLAIN PROPER COVER ROBE FAIR 
TWENTY MATH MIDDLE JOB MOMENT KNOW SHOES SKY SURE VISITE 
FALL VOICE COST VIRTUE FACE EAGLE SOCKS LANGUAGE FOX START 
FLOWER RABBIT SAIL SWEATER BIG LEAVE MAKE READ SPIRIT FRAME 
SURE FEEL RATHER TIE FLOOR APPLES BLAZER CLUB HORSE GREEN 
CASE TRUST MOVE RISE WEAR FURNITURE DEER CHAIR FIELD MARKER 
HAMMER PHONE FISH BED SUIT DRINK OCEAN BANNER PIN PLANT 
MEET PEACE GRADE MITTEN GLEN DOING BOOK HEATING STAY GRID 
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Target Category: Articles of Clothing 
LAMP BOX SHORE WRONG STRONG HAT WAVE ANCIENT DETAlL SPACE 
MIND LAUGH GLOVE PEPPER SOLDIER CLAIM SUN GROW SOON SEVEN 
SHIRT MONSTER ARRIVE SPOON GUITAR CLEF SALVE FOSTER TEA TIDY 
CLARITY TORTE ROOF OVEN LURK ISLAND ZAP NEURAL KNOB MEDAL 
GOLD FEEL FRUGAL SEMI CAMEO TRACK PILE STEREO PUKE SANDALS 
WAX PANTS RIGHT RECKON HALL SKIP MUFFIN SEEM DRAWER HOST 
ASH DROP MILD YEILDING UNZIP WOOD STUDY WHOEVER BABY TONE 
BELT SQUEEZE MILK WASH UNTO VAULT THRILL SHORTS SEEMLY RED 
RUPTURE PROCESS NINTH ROBE SATURN OF DEPUTY VITAL MODE SELF 
IMAGE STRADDLE BREAD SAGE VENUE SKIRT CHASM SALT PIE DISPOSE 
CONVINCE DRESS NOMAD SCARF SCALE TOWN GRlffiL VENUE Bl~B ON 
WATER SORBET BLUE TEN VANISH TIDBIT CUP TELLING CANVASS BALL 
SWEATER MAN DRUM WHISKER NORTH CHEESY PAIR SIDE PUCK SHADE 
BOAT HORN POWER TIE SOCKS POWER CAPTOR RUBBER PLAN FIDDLE 
STAMP FLUTE PERSON FACTORY UNSURE OLD BLAZER PASS WORK NIP 
SUCCESS HUE YOUR WHEEZY YET TRAFFIC OCCUR MANY PORCH SHOES 
ORANGE MITTEN AUTO SYSTEM OBOE BASS ARRIVE VEST QUOTE BLESS 
PIANO GUSTO CLUTCH NUT TROLL LOFT FLOOD FORMAL HIS COMMUNE 
BEAN FRYER JADE SUIT PLURAL LATER WELL WET SCORE TROMBONE 
TOW BOGUS SEAL CLOSE SLAP BLAST GROUP JACKET MEMORY STRING 
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Target Category: Body Parts 
EARTH ARM JOHN CHERRY PENDANT COPE MITTEN SCARF RABBIT OUT 
WOLF BULK BID MINER SHOULDER BEAR WHALE SKILLS WRIST SNAKE 
TRACY RECALL INJECT JOSHUA DUCK GLOVE NOSE ATTUNE TIGER BOB 
DRUG LEG BROWN HAND SANDALS HALO LINE FERRY MIDDLE TANYA 
DANIEL SHOES AGE TRUCK FARM COURSE FOUR LINGER FINGER FISH 
LION BETH MATTHEW DRESS BITE FROG TICKLE SANE TENET SUSAN 
FOOT DICE RING WEEP TRY CHOOSE PLACEBO FOX SWEATER JACKET 
CAT EGG ARRIVE JOLT WINTER BELT BARB SPOONERISM COAL COURT 
CARD ELBOW EAGLE ERIN SUIT INK THEIR PATRON GROUND SOCKS 
TALK HAT FIRE DEBT IVORY BLUR COASTER HORSE SALLY COMPOSER 
TOO NIGHT TRUST PROTEST HEAD MONEY TURTLE KNIFE GLOVE WIN 
COAL COURT MODEL BERRY FAIR ALE SKIRT OLIVE ANKLE ADRIAN 
CHRIS BIRD TOE MONKEY TRUMPET STEVE PANTS CHIN COMPUTER TAR 
LISA TOM HELMET TROPICAL BIRD TIE PRECIOUS KATE ROBE SPASM 
KNEE BLACK NUT VAPOR BLAB BLAZER RICK BOARD FOOL MERCHANT 
SMOKE SULFUR PITCH DOG FISH EAR HALF MINUS NEIL SEEDLING 
ARMY HAIR RAT WELCOME TOASTER ANIMAL SHIRT DANCE FINAL PIN 
HEEL RESPECT EVE SHORTS KELLY KEYBOARD BELLY PLATE CAN ROT 
DEER CANDY LEVY GLOVE LENT ROUGH LANDLORD ZOOM LIPS RAPIDS 
SUCROSE VEST NECK COLIC MANOR DOLL EASEL FESTIVE BREAK TIME 
Appendix D. Embedded-Figures Test (Spatial Ability) 
HIDDEN FIGURES 
ON THE TOP OF OF THE FOLLOWING J PAGES, THERE ARE 
TWO SIMPLE GEOMETRIC FIGURES. ONE OF THEM IS 
CONTAINED IN EACH OF THE COMPLEX FIGURES BELOW. THEY 
ARE THE AND IN THE SAME POSITION (ALWAYS 
RIGHT SIDE UP). 
FOR EACH COMPLEX FIGURE, OUTLINE THE PART THAT IS 
SAME AS ONE OF THE TWO ABOVE FIGURES (MARK ONLY ONE 
FIGURE IN EACH DRAWING). YOU HAVE 8 MINUTES TO 
COr-.fPLETE THIS EXERCISE. SO YOU DON'T HA VE TO BE NEAT, 
AS LONG AS IT'S OBVIOUS YOU SEE WHICH FIGURE IS 
CONTAINED IN EACH DRAWING. IF YOU SKIP ANY, TRY C'JOING 
BACK TO THEM WHEN YOU ARE FINISHED THE REST. 
TRY TO WORK AS FAST AS YOU CAN. 
EXAMPLE: D 
ANY QUEST10NS? 
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Appendix E. Tellegen Absorption Scale (All items are scored positively) 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK YOU TO THINK ABOUT EXPERIENCES YOU MAY HAVE 
HAD IN THE PAST. PLEASE USE THE FOLLOWING SCALE TO INDICATE HOW TRUE THESE 
STATEMENTS ARE FOR YOU. 
1 = Defmitely false 2 = Mostly false 3 = Neutral 4 = Mostly true 5 = Definitely true 
1. Sometimes I feel and experience things as I did when I was a child. 
2. I can be greatly moved by eloquent or poetic language. 
3. While watching a movie or TV, I may become so involved that I forget about myself and 
my surroundings and experience the story as if it were real and I were taking part in it. 
4. IfI stare at a picture and then look away from it, I can sometimes "see" an image of the 
picture, almost as if I were sti11looking at it. 
5. Sometimes I feel as if my mind could envelop the whole world. 
6. I like to watch cloud shapes change in the sky. 
7. IfI wish, I can imagine some things so vividly that they hold my attention as a good 
movie or story does. 
8. I think I really know what some people mean when they talk about mystical experiences. 
9. I sometimes step outside my usual self and experience an entirely different state of being. 
10. Textures such as wool, sand, or wood sometimes remind me of colours or music. 
_11. Sometimes I experience things as if they were doubly real. 
_ 12. When I listen to music I can get so caught up in it that I don't notice anything else. 
_ 13. IfI wish, I can imagine that my body is so heavy that I could not move it ifI wanted to. 
_ 14. I can sometimes sense the presence of another person before I actually see herlhim. 
_15. The crackling and flames of wood fire stimulate my imagination. 
_ 16. It is sometimes possible for me to be completely immersed in nature or in art and to feel 
as if my whole state of consciousness has somehow been temporarily altered. 
_ 17. Different colours have distinctive and special meanings for me. 
_ 18. I am able to wander off into my own thoughts while doing a routine task and actually 
forget that I am doing the task, and then find a few minutes later that I have completed it. 
_ 19. I can sometimes recollect certain past experiences in my life with such clarity and 
vividness, I feel like I can experience them again or almost so. 
_ 20. Things that might seem meaningless to others often make sense to me. 
_ 21. While acting in a play, I think I could really feel the emotions of the character and 
"become" her/him for the time being, forgetting both myself and the audience. 
_ 22. My thoughts often don't occur as words but as visual images. 
_ 23. I often take delight in small things (like the five-pointed star shape that appears when you 
cut an apple across the core, or the colours in soap bubbles). 
_ 24. When listening to organ or other powerful music, I sometimes feel as ifI am being lifted. 
25. Sometimes I can change noise into music by the way I listen to it. 
_ 26. Some of my most vivid memories are called up by scents and smells. 
_ 27. Certain songs or pieces of music remind me of pictures or changing colour patterns. 
_ 28. I often know what someone is going to say before he or she says it. 
_ 29. I often have "physical memories"; for example, after I've been swimming I may still feel 
as if I'm in the water. 
_ 30. The sound of a voice can be so fascinating to me that I can just go on listening to it. 
_ 31. At times I somehow feel the presence of someone who is not physically there. 
_ 32. Sometimes thoughts and images come to me without the slightest effort on my part. 
33. I fmd that different odours have different colours. 
_ 34. I can be deeply moved by a sunset. 
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Appendix F. Hood Mysticism Scale (Items scored negatively are marked with *) 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK YOU TO THINK ABOUT EXPERIENCES YOU MAY HAVE 
HAD IN THE PAST. PLEASE USE THE FOLLOWING SCALE TO INDICATE HOW TRUE THESE 
STATEMENTS ARE FOR YOu. 
1 = Definitely false 2 = Mostly false 3 = Neutral 4 = Mostly true 5 = Definitely true 
1. I have had an experience which was both timeless and spaceless. 
2. I have never had an experience that cannot be expressed in words. * 
3. I have had an experience in which something greater than myself seems to absorb me. 
4. I have had an experience in which everything seems to disappear from my mind until I 
was aware only of a void. 
5. I have experienced profound joy. 
6. I have never had an experience in which I felt myself to be absorbed as one with all 
things. * 
7. I have never experienced a perfectly peaceful state. * 
8. I have never had an experience in which I felt as if all things were alive. * 
9. I have never had an experience which seemed holy to me. * 
_ 10. I have never had an experience in which all things seemed to be aware. * 
_ 11. I have had an experience in which I had no sense of time and space. 
_12. I have had an experience in which I realize the oneness of myself with all things. 
_13. I have had an experience in which a new view of reality was revealed to me. 
_ 14. I have never experienced anything to be divine. * 
_ 15. I have never had an experience in which time and space were non-existent. * 
_ 16. I have never experienced anything that I could call ultimate reality. * 
_ 17. I have had an experience in which I felt that all was perfection at that time. 
_ 18. I have had an experience in which I felt that all was perfection to me. 
_ 19. I have had an experience in which I felt everything in the world to be part of the same 
whole. 
_ 20. I have had an experience which I knew to be sacred. 
_ 21. I have never had an experience which I was unable to express adequately through 
language. * 
_ 22. I have had an experience which left me with a feeling of awe. 
_ 23. I have had an experience that is impossible to communicate. 
_ 24. I have never had an experience in which my own self seemed to merge into something 
greater. * 
_ 25. I have never had an experience which left me with a feeling of wonder. * 
_ 26. I have never had an experience in which deeper aspects or reality were revealed to me. * 
_ 27. I have never had an experience in which time, place, and distance were meaningless. * 
_ 28. I have never had an experience in which I became aware of a unity of all things. * 
_ 29. I have had an experience in which all things seemed to be conscious. 
_ 30. I have never had an experience in which all things seem~d to be unified into a single 
whole. * 
_ 31. I have had an experience in which I felt nothing is ever really dead. 
_ 32. I have never had an experience which was incapable of being expressed by words. * 
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Appendix G. Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (Items scored negatively are marked with *) 
THESE QUESTIONS ASK ABOUT SOME OF YOUR EXPERIENCES GROWING UP AS A CHILD 
AND A TEENAGER. PLEASE USE THE FOLLOWING SCALE TO INDICATE HOW TRUE THESE 
STATEMENTS ARE FOR YOU. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THESE QUESTIONS ARE OF A 
PERSONAL NATURE, PLEASE TRY TO ANSWER AS HONESTLY AS YOU CAN. YOUR 
ANSWERS WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. 
1 - Never true 2 Rarely true 3 - Sometimes true 4 Often true 5 Very often true 
When I was growing up, ... 
1. I didn't have enough to eat. 
2. I knew there was someone to take care of me and protect me. * 
3. People in my family called me things like "stupid", "lazy", or "ugly". 
4. My parents were too drunk or high to take care of the family. 
5. There was someone in my family who helped me feel important or speciaL * 
6. I had to wear dirty clothes. 
7. I felt loved. * 
8. I thought that my parents wished I had never been born. 
9. I got hit so hard by someone in my family that I had to see a doctor or go to the hospital. 
10. There was nothing I wanted to change about my family. 
11. People in my family hit me so hard that it left me with bruises or marks. 
_ 12. I was punished with a belt, a board, a cord, or some other hard object. 
13. People in my family looked out for each other. * 
_ 14. People in my family said hurtful or insulting things to me. 
15. I believe that I was physically abused. 
16. I had the perfect childhood. 
_17. I got hit or beaten so badly that it was noticed by someone like a teacher, neighbour, or 
doctor. 
_ 18. I felt that someone in my family hated me. 
_19. People in my family felt close to each other. * 
20. Someone tried to touch me in a sexual way, or tried to make me touch them. 
21. Someone threatened to hurt me or tell lies about me unless I did something sexual with 
them. 
_ 22. I had the best family in the world. 
23. Someone tried to make me do sexual things or watch sexual things. 
24. Someone molested me. 
25. I believe that I was emotionally abused. 
26. There was someone to take me to the doctor ifI needed it. * 
_ 27. I believe that I was sexually abused. 
_ 28. My family was a source of strength and support. * 
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Appendix H. Neuroticism Questionnaire (Component of the NEO-Five-Factor Inventory-FFI) 
(Items scored negatively are marked with *) 
mE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK YOU TO THINK ABOUT EXPERIENCES YOU MAY HAVE 
HAD IN THE PAST. PLEASE USE mE FOLLOWING SCALE TO INDICATE HOW TRUE mESE 
STATEMENTS ARE FOR YOU. 
1 = Definitely false 2 = Mostly false 3 = Neutral 4 = Mostly true 5 = Defmitely true 
1. I am not a worrier. * 
2. I often feel inferior to others. 
3. When I'm under a great deal of stress, sometimes I feel like I'm going to pieces. 
4. I rarely feel lonely or blue. * 
5. I often feel tense and jittery. 
6. Sometimes I feel completely worthless. 
7. I rarely feel fearful or anxious. * 
8. I often get angry at the way people treat me. 
9. Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged and feel like giving up. 
_ 10. I am seldom sad or depressed. * 
_ 11. I often feel helpless and want someone else to solve my problems. 
_ 12. At times I have been so ashamed I just wanted to hide. 
Appendix 1. Demographics Questionnaire 
Gender: F __ M__ Age: __ 
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Appendix J. Debriefing Letter 
Dear Participant, 
I am writing to thank you for your participation in our study entitled, "Creativity and the 
Schizophrenia Spectrum Unveiled: The Similarities and the Differences". Your assistance in 
completing the tasks and filling out the questionnaires is greatly appreciated. Thank you very 
much! 
This study dealt with the correlates of creativity and cognitive similarities and differences 
between people who are highly creative (working visual artists) and people who either have 
schizophrenia or people who have characteristics that might be part of a normal continuum with 
schizophrenia. 
Creativity was found to be related to two facets of schizotypy, the name for the above continuum. 
The two facets that were correlated with creativity were having unusual beliefs or experiences 
(including magical thinking) and the tendency to impulsive nonconformity. 
The largest commonality among the artists and people with schizophrenia that was not found in 
the comparison group was the propensity to have mystical experiences. These are extreme, self-
altering experiences such as a loss of sense of self such as feelings of being absorbed into all 
things, feelings of unity, spatial and temporal transcendence, the acquisition of special intuitive 
knowledge, and having experiences that cannot be put into words. 
The greatest difference between the artists and the people with schizophrenia was that artists were 
generally higher in creativity (although many of the younger people with schizophrenia were 
highly creative), the artists generally performed better in spatial abilities, had better balance, and 
more positive states of self presence. 
In summary, this study has taught us a little more about what characteristics are shared and what 
characteristics differ between people high in creativity and people with schizophrenia or on the 
normal continuum with schizophrenia. 
Thanks again for your participation! 
Sincerely, 
Kerri Michalica (kittykeni(a)hotmaiLcom) 
PhD Candidate 
Harry Hunt (hbunt@brocku.ca) 
Faculty Supervisor 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Brock Research Ethics Board. (File #07-011) 
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Appendix K. ANOV A Table for Community Groups 
Variable df F P 
Gender 2,69 1.50 .231 
Age 2,69 .72 .492 
Barron-Welsh Art Scale 2,69 1.67 .197 
Embedded-Figures Test 2,69 3.11 .051 
Self-Rated Creativity 2,69 34.93 .000** 
Balance 2,69 4.69 .012* 
Unusual Experiences 2,69 2.11 .129 
Cognitive Disorganization 2,69 1.54 .222 
Introvertive Anhedonia 2,69 4.57 .014* 
Impulsive Nonconfonnity 2,69 2.81 .067 
Positive Presence 2,69 14.21 .000** 
Negative Presence 2,69 2.37 .101 
Absorption 2,69 15.29 .000** 
Mystical Experiences 2,69 10.97 .000** 
Childhood Abuse 2,69 .42 .656 
Neuroticism 2,69 2.91 .061 
Negative Priming t 3,68 37.93 .000** 
Distractibility t 3,68 14.78 .000** 
Names of Animals (Trial 2) 2,69 5.90 .004** 
Articles of Clothing (Trial 3) 2,69 9.64 .000** 
Body Parts (Trial 4) 2,69 2.95 .059 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed, t 2nd step of hierarchical multiple regression 
Appendix L. ANOV A Results that Include the Student Group 
Student Schizophrenic Artist Matched-Age 
Group Group Group Comparison Group 
(N 102) (N 10) (N = 31) (N = 31) df F P 
Barron-Weisht M 32.36 28.20 30.00 23.68 3, 170 3.56 .016* 
SD 12.62 12.00 12.70 15.32 
Embedded-Figures Test M 16.11 11.70 18.26 14.35 3, 170 2.75 .044* 
SD 6.41 8.79 8.14 8.09 
Self-Rated Creativity M 2.68 3.14 4.22 2.64 3, 170 26.16 .000** 
SD .96 .90 .51 .89 
Balance M 3.59 2.82 3.76 3.64 3, 170 3.53 .016* 
SD .77 .93 .78 .91 
Unusual Experiences M 11.65 12.00 14.19 10.71 3, 170 2.08 .104 
SD 5.15 6.78 6.71 6.69 
Cognitive Disorganization M 12.47 12.50 9.23 11.10 3, 170 2.88 .037* 
SD 5.42 3.69 5.92 6.05 
Introvertive Anhedonia M 5.16 9.40 4.74 6.19 3,170 3.73 .012* 
SD 4.15 5.19 3.83 4.35 
Impulsive Nonconformityt M 8.76 8.70 8.81 6.65 3,170 2.76 .044* 
SD 3.69 2.98 4.42 3.27 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed; t represents a significant difference between the student group and matched-age comparison group 
Student Schizophrenic Artist Matched-Age 
Group Group Group Comparison Group 
(N= 102) (N= 10) (N = 31) (N=31) df F P 
Positive Presence M 2.94 2.71 3.72 2.76 3, 170 12.94 .000** 
SD .65 .86 .74 .77 
Negative Presence M 1.89 2.34 1.86 1.75 3, 170 1.63 .184 
SD .73 1.00 .83 .55 
Absorption M 2.83 2.86 3.72 2.83 3, 170 14.38 .000** 
SD .69 .89 .56 .70 
Mystical Experiences M 103.93 124.90 130.70 102.16 3, 170 10.80 .000** 
SD 16.19 31.89 24.00 22.53 
Childhood Traumat M 1.41 2.02 1.98 1.81 3, 170 9.48 .000** 
SD .46 .77 .85 .78 
Neuroticism M 35.07 36.70 29.45 32.90 3, 170 3.54 .016* 
SD 9.15 2.63 9.25 9.46 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed; t represents a significant difference between the student group and matched-age comparison group 
AppendixM. Correlations Among all the Variables in the Student Group 
Items 1. 2 3. 4. 5 . 
1. Gender .13 . 06 -.03 -.01 
2. Age -.10 -.02 -.00 
3. Barron-Welsh Art Scale .12 .02 
4. Embedded Figure Test .35** 
5. Self-Rated Creativity 
6. Balance 
7. Unusual Experiences 
8. Cognitive Disorganization 
9. Introvertive Anhedonia 
10. Impulsive Nonconformity 
11. Positive Presence 
*p < .05; **p < .01; two-tailed 
Items 1. 2 3. 4. 5. 
12. Negative Presence .01 .10 .06 -.08 .08 
13. Absorption .06 .10 .06 .13 .44** 
14. Mystical Experiences -.02 .10 .18 .21 * .29** 
15. Childhood Abuse .13 .16 .25* -.02 .14 
16. Neuroticism -.05 .12 .26** -.07 .04 
17. Negative Priming t -.16 .22* -.09 .13 .14 
18. Distractibility t -.21 * .22* -.09 .10 .14 
19. 2nd Trial of Negative Priming -.28** -.01 .10 .25* .02 
20. 3rd Trial of Negative Priming -.25* .20 -.04 .22* .14 
21. 4th Trial of Negative Priming -.29** .21* -.05 .18 .14 
*p < .05; **p < .01; two-tailed, t partial correlations 
6. 7. 8. 
.12 -.06 .04 
.06 .08 .02 
-.14 .20* .18 
-.02 .05 -.11 
.02 .30** -.04 
-.03 -.44** 
.28** 
6. 7. 8. 
-.32** .21* .60** 
.16 .64** .24* 
.21 * .36** .12 
-.05 .19 .16 
.33** .21* .77** 
.01 .10 -.03 
.19 .09 -.13 
-.08 .13 .03 
-.02 .15 -.01 
.14 .13 -.11 
9. 10. 
.23* -.02 
.17 .07 
.05 .30** 
-.06 .23* 
-.00 .36** 
-.12 -.01 
.19 .51 ** 
.34** .40** 
.08 
9. 10 .. 
.42** .29** 
.03 .48** 
-.22* .40** 
.13 .27** 
.27** .41** 
-.04 .12 
.06 .09 
-.17 .17 
-.11 .18 
-.01 .14 
11. 
-.10 
.00 
-.12 
.21 * 
.22* 
.22* 
-.11 
-.52** 
-.35** 
-.05 
11. 
-.47** 
.10 
.27** 
.05 
-.45** 
.12 
.03 
.04 
.12 
.05 
-VI 
tv 
Items 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 
12. Negative Presence .12 .04 .15 .69** .04 -.02 -.11 -.01 -.06 
13. Absorption .63** .30** .18 .06 .00 .04 .07 .02 
14. Mystical Experiences .18 .19 .11 .00 .01 .10 .01 
15. Childhood Abuse .34** -.20 -.18 -.23* -.27** -.25* 
16. Neuroticism -.01 -.10 -.02 -.02 -.10 
17. Negative Priming t .55** N/A N/A N/A 
18. Distractibility t N/A N/A N/A 
19. 2nd Trial of Negative Priming .41** .37** 
20. 3rd Trial of Negative Priming 
21. 4th Trial of Negative Priming 
.61 ** 
*p < .05; **p < .01; two-tailed, t partial correlations 
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Appendix N. A Closer Look at the Results of the Manipulation Tests for the Cognitive Task 
There is a possibility that the manipulation test for the cognitive task did not work in the 
way that was expected because of unanticipated differences in the difficulty of the various trials. 
For instance, despite the absence of any manipulation in the student comparison group, the results 
suggest that the difficulty level was higher for the last two trials, especially the third trial (see 
below). 
Trial 1 (First Names) - 17.27 (highest score = easiest) 
Tria12 (Animals) - 16.95 (high score = easy) 
Tria13 (Clothing) - 13.27 (lowest score = most difficult) 
Tria14 (Body Parts) - 14.07 (low score = difficult) 
Furthermore, it appears as if the second trial (the same distractor trial) was facilitated for 
the groups with the manipulation (all groups with the exception of the student comparison group) 
because some of the distractors were repeated and thus, already inhibited. The student 
comparison group did not have these same distractors so they performed worse on the second trial 
than the first trial (first trial = 17.27, second trial = 16.95). The facilitation of the trials for the 
student experimental group may have thrown off the results of the manipulations, giving the 
appearance that they did not work out. 
If this was the case, then perhaps the results for negative priming in the artist group may 
have been more in line with the hypotheses than previously believed. The artists were predicted 
to have reduced negative priming depicted by a higher score on the third trial. They did 
performed significantly higher than the schizophrenic group on the third trial (p = .006), and 
higher than the matched-age comparison group, although this probability did not reach 
significance (p = .077). This suggests that the artists seemed to display reduced negative priming 
(confirming the findings of Carson et aI., 203) despite the fact that the manipulation of the task 
did not appear to work out. Although it was predicted that both the schizophrenic and the artist 
groups would have a reduction in negative priming, Williams (1996) found that the only 
subgroups of people with schizophrenia who showed a reduction in negative priming were the 
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reality distortion and disorganization subgroups. The patients in the present study were recruited 
from community programs instead of hospitals, making it less likely that they were in reactive 
stages in which positive symptoms such as reality distortion are more common. Furthermore, 
Beech, Powell, McWilliam, and Claridge (1990) found that anti-psychotics reduced the effects of 
cognitive inhibition by 'normalizing' the perception of people with schizophrenia, and most of 
the people in the schizophrenic group were on some form of medication. 
Moreover, if one considers difference scores alone (see Table 7), which is questionable 
due to their high variability, then it can be seen that the difference between the second trial and 
the third (negative priming trial) was smaller in the artist group than the other two community 
groups, meaning that they have the greatest reduction in negative priming. Similarly for the 
distractibility trial, it was hypothesized that the schizophrenic group would be more distractible. 
However, the artists and the group with schizophrenia had lower difference scores between the 
second the fourth (distractibility trial) than the matched-age comparison group, meaning that they 
were less affected by the distractions. Because these results are based on difference scores, they 
must be interpreted with caution; however, they are suggestive for future research. 
These results suggest that paper-and-pencil versions of negative priming and 
distractibility tasks are potentially promising, but care needs to be exercised in controlling for the 
level of difficulty of the various trials. Future research should look further into considering such 
tasks for measuring cognitive variables in research samples assessed in a community context. 
Appendix o. Correlation and Regression Tables for the Mediation of Absorption 
Correlations 
Variable 
Creativity 
Mystical Experiences 
Unusual Experiences 
Impulsive Nonconformity 
Creativity 
Mystical Experiences 
Unusual Experiences 
Impulsive Nonconformity 
Creativity 
Mystical Experiences 
Unusual Experiences 
Impulsive Nonconformity 
Creativity 
Mystical Experiences 
Unusual Experiences 
Impulsive Nonconformity 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
Creativity 
Student Group 
.29** 
.30** 
.36** 
Absorption 
.44** 
.63** 
.64** 
.48** 
Schizophrenic Group 
.72* 
.44 
-.07 
.33 
.01 
.14 
Artist Group 
.77** 
.71 * 
.78** 
-.07 
.28 
.65** 
.73** 
.19 
Matched-Age Comparison Group 
.30 
.13 
-.03 
.41 * 
.38* 
.56** 
.13 
Regressions (Only done if Assumptions for Mediation are Met) 
Variable 
Unusual Experiences 
Impulsive Nonconformity 
Mystical Experiences 
Mystical Experiences 
*p < .05; **p < .01, two-tailed 
df 
6,100 
6,100 
6,100 
4,9 
B 
Student Group 
.040 
.154 
-.10 
Schizophrenic Group 
.293 
t 
.34 
1.46 
-.87 
1.04 
p 
.738 
.148 
.389 
.347 
pr 
.03 
.12 
-.07 
.19 
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